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PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE
MOOT COURT.
The Mooi Court Hulleiin will appear
ejfularly during tlie academic year, and
will contain the rules of court, the cases
ind various pleadings and briefs of counsel.
The publication will be in fact, as well as
in theory, the bulletin or journal of the
Moot Cour . A copy of the bulletin will be
cept by the clerk of the court and tiled
among' the records: copies will be placed
and preserved in ihe library, so that they
may be open to students for examination at
any time.
The cases are intentionally practical.
They are actual cases—cases that have
arisen and are pending in tiie Circuit, Ap-
pellate and Supreme Courts of the State,
and at the tiuie ot argument in the Moot
Court tlie cases in question are either unde-
cided or the judgments of the respective
courts have not been reported. The venue
and the names of parties are necessarily
ichanged, and not infrequently the facts of
the cases are modified in the interest of
simplicity.
In this way, fanciful or fictitious cases
are not considered, and the student has the
advantage of preparing and trying actual
cases in his undergraduate days. It is felt
that this practical training should be of
great service to the young practitioner.
Dean Oliver A. Harker takes entire
charge of tlie Court and will regularly pre-
side.
MOOT COURT RULES.
1. The Moot Court will be held at 1:00
o'clock p. m. on NIondays and Tuesdays.
2. All members of the second and third-
year classes will be required to attend regu-
lar sessions of the Court.
.3. The clerk will keep a docket of all
cases, and keep on tile and open for inspec-
tion all papers in pending cases.
4. Two students will be appointed as
counsel on each side of every case.
5. Immediately after receiving the state-
ment of facts, the attorneys for tlie plain-
tiff or complainant shall draw the declara-
tion or bill and tile two copies of the same
with the clerk before 9:00 a. m. the Monday
following. Attorneys for the defendant
must tile tsvo copies of plea, answer or de-
murrer, by the Friday following.
6. The case must be called during motion
hour on the second Monday for the settle-
ment of i.ssue.
7. Counsel holding the attirmative must,
on or before the third Monday foUowirjg
the assignment of the case, furnish one
copy of their brief to the clerk of the
Court and one copy to opposite counsel.
Counsel holding the negative will furnish
one copy of their brief to such professor
and one copy to the opposite counsel by the
Friday following.
8. Oral arguments will be limited to
thirty minutes on a side.
9. Students not engaged as counsel will
be required to draft pleadings, motions and
affidavits on statements given out by the
judge of the Moot Court, and to comment
on cases after trial.
10. All freshmen in the College of law
are subject to juror duty.
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lleriry Baker
vs. [• Case No. 1
Nun on rriiHiriy: Co. )
On the 24Ui of September. 1912, the
plainlitf tor a period of 12 months leased
the lirst ttoor of his two s'ory bricic build-
ing siluaiert at No 28 Main street. Cham-
paij^ii. Jilinoss. to the defHiuiariL at a rental
"f $7.5 per month, Ttie leased property to
l)e used by ilie defendant, an lilinoiscor-
poralion, for its printi.i^f anl bindinjr busi-
ness.
"i'he lease contained the following pro-
vision:
'Said lessee agrees that at the expiration
of this lease, it will surrender siid preinis-
es together with all I )Cks, keys, Jcnoljs,
doors, glass, siiutlers. water piprt. plumb-
ing and all other appurtances whether of
liie same or of a different kind so far as it
is responsil)le therefor, in a condition sim-
ilar t(i and equally good with t lie condition
thereof at tlie coinmencement of said term,
except natura' wea ar.d decay, the effect
of accidental tire and leuipest and damage
from the acts of God and llie public en-
emy."
It also contained the follovving:
"Said parti-s mutually agree that the to-
tal destruction of said building withaut
the fault or negligence of lessee shall woriv
a termination of this lease."
On tite 24th of June, 1913, after the
defendant had been occupying the premis-
es for 9 months the building was sii'Lick by
ligtitning and set on tire. The tire totally
destroyed the macliinery and other equip-
ment of the defendant vvnic>i was in ttie
building at tiie time, or so .naierially al-
tered it tliat the material is of no value to
the lessee. No steps were iake;» by the de-
fendant to remove any of the property, be-
cause it was worthless.
The plaintiff decided to rebuild on the
first of August, and on several occasions, a
few days afterwards demanded of the de-
fendant's superintendent that he remove
the worthies-; inasiiitj'riry atul equipixurit;
but the superinten lent declined to do .so,
saying that the defen lant had no use for
the property. Toe plaintiff replied that he
would then reinove tlie stuff and would
expect the defendant to pay f >r the, cost in-
volved in doing so Th.-i supBrint«n lent
replied that the defendant was under noob-
iigativ)ns to remove the remains and svould
not pay any tiling f.)r its reun/val.
At an expeiise of $140 the plaintiff remov-
ed the injur.-^d machinery and other mai-
ler and now brings suit to recover. Tiie
attorneys tor the plaintiff will prepar.:; a
lease and dei^iaration an(i file tlie same
with the clerk uithin ten days after re-
ceiving a copy of this' statement.
For Plaintiff, Britton & Cassidy.
For l>efendani, Caffee & Essington.








On the 6th of .May, 1912, the defend
ant, an Illinois corooration, executed and
delivered to the plaintiff a safe burgiarv
pol'cy, nsuringit against loss for two years
to the amount of $15,000. The policy re-
cited that the insurance was "For all loss
by burglary of money, bonds a!id bank
notes in consequence of the felonious ab-
straction of the same from the safe located
it the banking room of the insured by an
v
person or persons who shall make entry in-
to such safe by use of tools or explosives
directly thereon." Attached to this clause
was an asterisk reference to a note a^'pear
ing at the bottom of the page in small type
as follows: "Note. This company siiall
be liable for loss of m >ney. bonds or bank
notes from a burglar proof safe containing
an ini:er steel burglar proof chest, unless
the same shall have been abstracted from
A,
J
the chest after eiilry into Uie chesl eltecl-
ed hs the use of tools m- explosives directly
thereon." Tlie plainlitf's !>afe was a so-
called bufj^lar proof safe, a'l 1 also cj.'ilaiii-
ed an inner steel l)ur>ilar proof ciiest
On Uie iiijfiil of JiuR 10. 191.i, llie plaint-
iff's bankin>> lionse and safe \s^.Xi burglar-
ized and there «ere al)stracled from the
safe $124i)t). The aujounl of $-140 in silver
iiiclcles and pennies uas taken fn»in the
outer coinparlmenl of the safe and the rest
from the inner cliast. Tiie entry of the
safe was affected by tools and explosives.
NeiUier tools nor explosives were used to
enter the cliest. Eillier the conibii.alion
lock to it was not turned on or the burglar
understood tile ct)inljination Ttie defend
ant in Jsts thai ii is not liable and suit is
brought upon llie policy. The attorneys
for the plaintiff" v»ill draft policy of insur-
ance in accordance uith staieuieiil and
tii^^ ''"•' ' )n in as^iunp&it.
ff, Anderson & Barlow,
ant. Brannan & BuLt;.'n.
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The plainiilliiow sues the defendant in
the Circuit Court of (Jhainfiaign County, ai-
le,.^ing as ctjurae of action the Missouri
judgment and intere^'t on same.
it i\ill be defended upon tlie ground that
ili<:; .Missouri judgment has beeti merged in-
to the one recovered in Indiana.
b'or t^laintill.\ Finfroch & Fisiier.





Plaintiff recove"ed judgiiient agiaist de-
fendant in the Circuit Court of .loimson
County. Mo., .July «, 190ii, for $690. In.Jmie,
1909, tiie judgment not iiaving been satis-
tied, tlie plaintiff sued the defendarit in
Wayne County. Iruiiana, iiasing his suit up-
on the .Missouri ju(i.(meni aui recovered to
tiie amount of $824.
The plaintiff has always resided at War-
rensburg, .Missouri. The defendant vviio re-
sided in Warrensburg when judgment was
recovered against him Uiere and whore-
sided in Wayne County. Indiana, when
judgment was recovered against him
there, now resides in Champaign, Illinois.





vs. [- Case No. 4.
Cnarles I^rake. )
Statement.
The defendant had been negotiating witii
•James French for the exchange of lot (5,
block 4, Logan's Addition to the city i>f
Peoria, Illinois, iov the N. % of Sec. 13 T.
10-R. 4, Williamson County, Illinois. On
.July 2b, 1911, he called at the plaintiff's of-
fice and told liim that he v\ou!d pay iiim a
commission of $(500 if he would procure
Frencli to make the deal. Tiiereupon the
Plaintiff' drew up a written proposition in
which Drake proposed to French to convey
his Peoria property to iiim and pay liim
$1,200 for a conveyance of Frencli's land in
Williamson County. The proposition was
in regular form and signed by Drake. Av-
ery then drew up a short agreement (whicli
was duly signed b> him and Drake) in wliich
it was recited that "'When the said Aver>
lias secured from said French an accept-
ance of tlie proposition made by said Drake
to excliatige his lot (5 in blo^k 4, Logan's
Addition to the City of Peoria, Illinois, for
the N. M of Sec. 13. T. 10, R. 4, in Wil-
liamson County, Illinois, owned by said
Frencii, dated July 2i). 1911, said Drake will
pay said Avery $600."
On the following day Avery procured
French to accept the offer and to sign a
written statement endorsed upon the prop-
osition, accepting Drake's offer and agree-
ing to furnish an abstract of title to the
Williamson County land within 30 days,
MOOT COURT BULLETIN
and then to execute a deed to the land to
Drake. On the same day Drake deposited
with the J^eoria Savings Hank in escrow
$1,200, and a deed to the I'eoria property,
to bs delivered t,o French (jn iiis depositing
in the bank for Drake \\ itiiin 30 days a
deed to tlie VViiliamson Counly land with
abstract of title to the same.
French did not deposit the deed or ab-
stract within the 30 days, and ntjlitied
Drake tiiat lie would not- do so, and declin-
ed to make tile conveyance upon ti)e ground
tliat it had been discovered that tlie land
was underlaid wiiii a ricii deposit of coal, a
fact of wliicii he was ignorant at tlie time
Avery procured liisagreement. Thereupon
Drake withdrew the $1,200 and deed left
with the bank.
Avery now sues Drake for the $600. Drake
claims that at the time Avery procured
from him the agreement to pay him tlie
KiOO he stated ihat it the trade was not
consummated he would not expect him to
pay the commission, and that the $600
would be due only in theevent of the trade
being made. That is not disputed by Av-
ery, who is a siirewd real estate broker,
with a license to practice law.
For I'laintiff, Brown & Bya.
For Defendant, Clapp & Coffee.
Mary Carter, i
vs. V Case No 5.
Henry Hales, Executor. )
Statement.
On May 3, 1913, .lane Lowle, a resident of
Champaign, Illinois, died leaving a will by
whicii she disposed of all her property—ex-
ecuted March 2, 1913.
To her brother Henry Bates alie devised
lots 4 and 5, block 6 in Haden's Addition to
tiie City of Champaign,
To her sister, Mary Carter, all the furni-
ture valued at $3000, used in the two room-
ing houses located on said lots 4 and 5.
To her grandson, James Lowle, 20 shares
of stock in the Champaign National Bank.
The will named Flenry Bates as executor
t.) serve williout bond, and directed him to
collecl all claims due her estate and out of
the same to pay all debts and costs of ad-
ministraiion
The honsi^s with the furniture men'ioned
were leased to tenants until .1 uly 1, 1914. and
it was r;-ci;ed in the will that the rents as
collected from month to month should be
paid to the said .James Lowle lo miet his
expenses while attending the University of
Illinois as a student. The will also con-
tained the following clause: "It is my
will that all money when collected, no mat-
ter from what source, shall be divided
equally between my sister Mary Carter and
my grandson, .lames Lowle." The will
was admitted to probate in the county
court.lune4. 1913, and Bates qualified as
executor,
The furniture was covered by a fire in-
surance policy for $1500 running to July 21,
1913, and on that day. Bates renewed the
insurance for one year, taking the policy
in his own name as executor and paying
tlie premium out of money collected for
the estate. On Sept. 1, 1913, liie twoliouses
and furniture were destroyed bv tire and
30 days after Bates collected $1-500 on the
policy covering the furniture. That sum
now he holds together with $6500 other
money collected for the estate. All debts
against the estate and cost of administra-
tion liave been paid and all claims due the
estate have been collected. Bates reports
that there :s nothing fulher for him to do
as executor and contends that the $8000 in
his hands should be paid in equal parts to
Mary Carter and James Lowle. Mary Car-
ter contends tiiat she is entitled to the en-
tire amount of insurance m<jney collected
and tiles a petition in the county court in
which she asks that it be paid to her, and
that the remaining $6500 be paid to her
and James Lowle in equal parts.
For Petitioner, Brannon & Dillon.
For Executor, Esselborn & Lee.
Moot Court Bulletin
College of Law University of Illinois
Vol. XL November 10, 1913. No. 2.
Henry Baker, )
vs. [• Case ]S^o. 1.
Npfton Printing Co, )
Brief for Defendant.
In the absence of an express covenant to
remove disiinguishable property after a
tire which destroyed the premises leased,
and rendered the property worthless, a
tenant Is not bound under a general coven-
lant. ''to return tiie premises in as good a
condition as when they were recei ed by
him, natural wear and the act of God or
destruction by fire excepted," to remove
such distinguishable property or repair the
[damages done to the premises by the fire or
,.act which terminated the tenancy.
Fleischman vs. Toplitz, 31 N. E. 1089, 91.
Bordman vs. Howard, 64 L. R. A. 648.
52 N. Y. Sup. 172, Decker vs. Morton.
Warren vs. Wagner, 75 Ala. 188.
Such tenant is not bound as between him-
self and the landlord, to do any act of re-
pair which the act or fire made necessary.
Fleischman vs. Toplitz, 31 N. E. 1089.
Boardman vs. Howard, 64 L. R. A. 649.







When a lessee covenants with his lessor
hat upon the termination of the lease he
vill surrender the premises in a condition
imilar to and equally good with the con-
dition thereof at commencement of tlie
term, except natural wear and decay, the ef-
fects of accidental fire and tempest and
damage from the acts of God and of the
public enemy, the lessee is liable to the
lessor for tiie expense incurred by the lat-
ter in the removal of debris and rubbish
from the leased premises after the lease
has been termitiated. '^
Boardman vs. Howard, 90 Minn. 273, 64
L. R. A. 648.
Fleischman vs. Toplitz, 31 N. E. 1089
(N. Y.)
49 Mo. App. 6.31, cited in 64 L. R. A. 648
(Note) at page 662.




Opinion by Samuels, A. J.
In this case the Norton Printing Com-
pany leased premises for one year from
Henry Baker under a lease containing a
general covenant that at the expiration of
their lease the lessee would surrender said
premises together with all locks, keys,
knobs, doors, glass, shutters, water pipe,
and all other appurtenances whether of the
same or of a different kind so far as it is
responsible therefor, in a condition similar
to and equally good with tlie condition
thereof at the commencement of said term,
except natural wear and decay, the effect
of accidental fire and tempest and damage
from the acts of God and the public
enemy."
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The lt;ase also contained the foilovvirii;:
"Said parties rautualiy aj^ree ttiat tlie
total destruction of said building without
the fault or neglij^jerice of the lessee shall
wuilc a termination of the lease."
Tiiereafter and before llie expiration of
the lease tiie building- was struck by light-
nitif^ and totally destroyed by tire. The tiro
totally destroyed and rerjdered worthless
defendant's maclunery and equipment
vvliic'h was in the building; at the time of
the tire Plaintiff several times demanded
of defendant that he remove same, but no
steps were takp.n by the defendant to do
this, defeiidant insisting that he was under
no such obligation.
Later the plaintiff, deciding to rebuild,
and being told by diefendant that he would
not remove the stuff, because worthless,
went ahead and removed same at an ex-
pense of $140. This action is brought to
recover of defendant the money so expen-
ded.
The case comes before us on demurrer,
hence no question arises as to the termina-
tion of the lease, such being admitted by
the demurrer.
It appears that this precise state of facts
has never been before the courts of this
State. Counsel for both sides have, how-
ever, cited several cases adjudicated m
other States. Two of these cases are chiefly
relied upon by both sides as autnority for
their respective contention. Tlie first of
these is a Minnesota case. Boardman, vs.
Howard, reported in 90 Minn., 273. There
the tenant held under a lease with a cov-
enant for the surrender of tlie premises in
as good condition as when received. There
was a partial destruction of the building,
and relation of landlord and tenant was
terminated by agreement. The tenants
were licensed by tlie landlord thereafter to
enter for the purpose of taking away their
property, and cotitinued Jo do so until it
became appareit that tlie debris a:id ruli-
bish resultifig from the paitial destru'Miou
of the injured furrdture which had been
their property were valueless, when ili5y
ceased to remove it, but "eft it in Hid
building. The court held on these facts
that the tenant, under the privilege to
take away tlieir goods, could not enjoy it
so far as beneficial and leave a part of their
damaged property in tlie building to en-
cumber plaintiff's possession, and the ex-
pense incurred by the landlord in removing
the rubbish which defendant left and de-
clified to take away, is a legal obligation
against them.
It will be observed that this case is not
precisely i/i point wiLli the case before us,
for here the tenants did not refuse to take
av;ay part, after having been licensed and
arier having resuuied to carry away all of
till- rubbish. Tne court, h wever, said by
way of delta that "the exaction relating to
the injury of the building by lire, vvhiie it
would excuse the tenants from repairing or
rebuilding, would not justify them in im-
posing burdens upon the landlord arising
strictly from the tenants occupying and
use of the preuiises
The New York case, Fleishman vs. Top-
litz reported in 31 K. E. 1089 is also not in
,
point. This was an action by a tenant vs.
his landlord to recover money expended in
reuioving carcaner and debris from leased
premists after their destruction by tire.
The lease provided that the tenant at his
own cost will comply with all the orders of
the board of health. The building burned
and under a statute providing that on the
destruction of the building without fault
of tenant the latter may thereupon quit
and surrender possession. It was held tiiat
the relation of landlord and tenant ceased
at the time of tire. The board of health
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served notice on the defendant to remove
the debris and he sent the notice to plain-
titT too with request that he remove it
without prejudice to the liability'. It was
held that the plaintiff could recover for tlie
expense incurred In removing same on tlie
grounds that the tenancj' had ceased and
the covenant ergo did not apply.
But the court goes on to say by way of
dictation: If the lease was terminated by
the State upon the destruction of tlie
building, it is clear that the tenant, or be-
tween liimself and liis landlord was not
bound by its terms to perform any act in
respect to liie premises whicli the tire
made necessary to perform. Such perform-
ances could not be made until after the re-
lation of landlord and tenant had ceased,
i^or would the tenant in such case, apart
from the terms of the lease, be obliged to
remove dead bodies of the house." But it
shouM be noticed that the covenant in
this case did not provide for a surrender of
the premises in the same conition as wtien
the lease began. "Manifestly" in such a
case, representing the courf, "the damage
to the real estate and the burden cast upon
it Idv the fire, be borne by the landlord
and not by the tenant."
We come now to a consideration of the
covenant, its proper construction and mean-
ing. ]t provided tliat the premises should
be returned in equally good condition as
wtien acquired, barring lire, etc. Now if
the lease had expired by due course, surely
the tenant would not have been allowed to
leave the premises scattered over with rub-
bish, for that would not be returning them
in equally good condition. If the tenant
had destroyed or injured the building, neg-
ligently, he would have to rebuild or repair
at the expiration of the lease, else he
would be violating his lease to turn over in
equally good condition. But surely he
would not be permitted to leave the prem-
ises scattered over v.ith debris and rub-
bish, for this too would be in violation of
liis covenant. Now if the building is de-
stroyed by lire witliout tiie tenant's fault,
as in liiis case, he is not obliged to rebuild,
i. e., and turn over in equally good condi-
tion, for in such event, the term of his cov-
enant, he is excused from doing that, But
is he in this case, any more than in the
other, excused from leaving the premises
scattered over vvitli rubbisli? We ihinic
not. What is the reasonable contention of
this covenant? What was the intention of
the parties as manifest9d by its terms? Is
it not reasonable to say that the parties
meant in case of fire, only to excuse failure
to turn over the premises in equally good
condition? Does not the covenant have
reference only to condition of the premises
as they vvere when first leased (—
repairing and rebuilding caused by fire) and
not to conditions arising strictly from the
tenants' occupancy and use of the premises-
The tire is a good excuse for not turning
over a perfect building, but is not an ex-
cuse for the tenant imposing additional
burdens upon the landlord by his failure to
remove his effects. The tenant was re-
quested to remove liis valueless property so
that an entry by iiim upon the premises
could not have constituted a trespass. He
should have removed this rubbish, for he
could, despite the fire, do tliat much toward
turning over the premises in equally good
condition which he was to do. The tire ex-
cused him from turning over ivhat he re-
ceived in equally good condition, but it did
not excuse liim for leaving his rubbish on
the premises, altliough this rubbisli was
caused by the tire, any more ttian it would
have excused him for leaving it there if
the tire had destroyed his machinery and
equipment and left the building untouched.
Therefore, the tenant being under obli-
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gallon to remove this rubbish, by the
terms of his covenant, and refusing to do
so, he is liable for the expense incurred by
another who does for him that which he





James Dudley and Ira }> Case No. 6.
Molt, partners as Dud-
1
dley and Mott. J
Statement.
The defendants are stock br jlcers in Chi-
cago, Illinois. Prior to October 1, 1912,
the plaintiff had thru the defendants
bought and sold a great deal of railroad
stock and bonds. In some of the deals the
names of the defendants' principals were
disclosed. In others they were not. On the
day mentioned he told them he had 200
shares of stock in the Illinois Central Rail-
road Company that he desired to sell and
asked whether they had a client willing to
pay $26,000, to which Mott replied that
they had not but that they would see what
they could do for him. On the afternoon
of the following day Mott called up tne
plaintiff by telephone and after referring to
the conversation of the previous day said:
"We can take that stock off your hands
at $25,000." After some parleying it was
agreed between them that plaintiff should
have the certilicate of stock properly as-
signed in blank in his otflce at 12 o'clock of
the following day, wtien the defendants
would receive it and pay him $25,000.
The plaintiff made the assignment as di
reeled and remained in his otHce from 12
o'clock until 2 o'clock on the following
day, but neither of the defendants appear-
ed. He then called tliem on the phone and
asked wliy they had not come to take up
the stock and pay him the $25,000. Mott
replied, "The purchaser of the stock has
not come in. It looks very much .as if lie
was trying to back out. I. C. went off sev-
eral points in New York this morning, you
know." The plaintiff responded that he
should expect the defendants to comply
with their agreement and take the stock
off his hands at the $25,000.
Two days later (after 1. C. stock had re
covered from the drop) the plaintiff receiv-
ed thru the mail a letter from the defend-
ants staling "We nave not yet seen the
purcliaser of your 200 shares of 1. C. stock,
but you can depend upon our making it all
right at the price named.
Yours, etc.,
Dudley and Molt."
The stock market was quite nervous at
the time, and on the 10th of the month
the plaintiff called at the defendant's of-
fice: tendered to Mott foe stock certificate
and demanded payment (jf the $25,000.
The defendants declined to take the stock
or pay the money, but a few days after-




In the present state of the market we
have been unabie to get a bid oa your I. C.
stock. We advise you to sell it if you have
an opportunity. We are sorry our man
has gone back on his promise, but can not
understand why you should consider us
liable, as we did not buy it on our own
account.
In a few days the plaintiff sold the stock
for $23,500, the price quoted in the market
and the highest that he could obtain for it.
He now sues in the circuit court of Cook
County to recover $1500.
For Plaintiff, Corbly & Cummins.






and Henry Fox and Jatnes )» Case No. 7.
Holt, Commissioners of i




On September 4, 1910, the county board
of Jefferson County, Illinois, passed an or-
der fixing the salary of the county cleric at
$1,500 and allowing him $1,000 for a deputy
for the four years beginning with the first
Monday in December, 1910.
Eli Brown having been elected cleric was
duly installed as such official on December
4, 1910, and appointed Easton Rude iiis
deputy.
The salary of Rude was paid in quarterly
^i installments of $250, at the end of each
quarter. Tlie method of procedure was for
Rude to tile his claim with a certificate
from Brown that he had served for the
quarter, wiiereupon, Brown was directed to
issue an order on the county treasurer to
pay Rude the $250.
After Rude had been in service about a
year he began the practice of discounting
his quarterly claim in advan?,e of its al-
lowance. Sometimes he would discount to
Brown, and at otner times to Peter Cofer.
IThat was accomplished by Rude making
out his claim against the county in regular
form and endorsing on the back of it a re-
quest that the order for $250 be issued to
the person who liad advanced him the mon-
ey. At the end of the quarter the county
board after receiving the certificate of
Brown as to service would allow the claim,
and direct the order to issue to the person
Qamed by Rude in the endorsement.
On July 1, 1913, Cofer paid to Rude $240,
and received from him a claim, made out
on the usual blank, as follows:
September 1, 191.3.
County of JetTerson, Illinois, To Easton
Rude, Dr.
"To service as Deputy County Clerk for
quarter ending September 1, 1913, $250."
On the back of which was endorsed:
'•For value received, I assign the within
claim to Peter Cofer, and request the
county board of Jefferson County to direct
order for the amount to be issued to him.
Easton Rude."
Following the course taken by him on
three previous occasions, in which the or-
ders had been issued to him on like en-
dersements, Cofer, on the morning of Sep-
tember 1, filed his claim. On the same
day Brown filed the usual certificate that
Rude had served for the quarter ending
then. The claim was not paid that day
for the reason that there weie other mat-
ters engaging the attention of the board.
On that night Rude, after delivering to
one John Edwards a claim made out like
the one delivered to Cofer, with an endorse-
ment to Edwards signed "Rude," (instead
of Easton Rude) absconded.
When Cofer called up his claim on Sep-
tember 2, Brown informed the board that
Rude had left but before going had made
some kind of au assignment to Edwards.
The board refused to allow the claim and
direct order to issue to Cofer as requested.
For Petioner, Howe & Strong.




' ( Case No. 8.
Statement.
The defendant lives on Second street,
Champaign, Illinois, near East Side Park.
He has a son 12 years of age for whom he
procured some time in May, 1913, an arch-
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ery outfit, consisting c/f two bows, twelve
arrows and a tar^^et The lar>?ei consisted
of a circular |)iece of soft wood, three feet
in diameter with a painted br.il's eye in
the center. When used in practice it rest-
ed on a pedestal about ei.i-hteen inches
from the ground. Tlie arrows were point-
ed with steel so they would stick in the
target when shot from tlie bow.
For the first two or three weeks after re-
ceiving the outfit the boy was content to
use it in defendant's back yard. After
that he with the knowledge and consent of
tlie defendant oegan practicing with it in
company with other boys in the adjacent
park. Almost ev^ry afternoon, after school
iiours it vv'as so used.
On the after/iooa of June 3, 1913, the de-
fendant's boy, while practicing in the park
with other boys shot an arrow which miss-
ed tiie. target and struck the plaintifl in
the right eye, thereby destroying its sight.
The plaintiff was not witnessing the tar-
get practice buc was simply passing along
the walk which leads from the northwest
corner to the southwest corner of the park.
For Plaintiff, Gunnel & Hannah.
For Defendant, Keran & Lewis.
Elliot C. Johns)
vs. [ Case No. 9.
Susan Johns )
Statement.
Frank Cox Johns was the son of Elliot C.
Johns and Jennie Johns. In April. 1889, he
being three years of age, was adopted by
his maternal grandfatiier, Frank Cox. The
adoption proceedings, which took place in
the County of Sacramento wiiere all the
parties concerned then resided, were regu-
lar and valid, being conducted according to
statute. The father and mother consented
in writing to the adoption, as did the
wife of Frank Cox. Frank Cox was engag-
ed in business in Sacramento, and was a
man of some wealth. Elliot Johns who
had formerly resided in Illinois was disat-
istied with life in California and had ar-
ranged to take up his permanent residence
in Illinois when the child was adopted by
his wife's father. March 25. 1906, Frank
Cox died bequeathing a legacy of $20,000 to
his adopted son. In June, 1909, Frank Cox
Johns, the aaopted son, died intestate,
owning no property except the legacy
whicii had be.en bequeathed to him by
Frank Cox. It consisted entirely of per-
sonal property, the most of it in bank
stock. Fie left surviving a widow, Susan
Johns. The only relatives he left were
his father in blood, this plaintiff, and his
grandmother, Jennie Cox.
The plaintiff had no information of death
of his son (which occurred at Los Angeles,
California) until some time during the
year 1912. His wife had been dead several
years and he had not made any inquiry
concerning his father-in-law or his child.
The defendant, widow of Frank Cox Johns,
administrated upon the estate of her hus-
band and under the order of the probate
court at Los Angeles, after representing to
the court that there was no heir but her-
self, received the entire estate, amounting
to $20,000, and was du'y discharged. In
December, 1911, she left California to take
up her permanent residence in Macon
County, Illinois. The plaintifl resides in
Peoria. As soon as he ascertained the de-
fendant's place of residence and what des-
position had been made of his son's estate
he made demand upon the defendant for
one-half of the $20,000 received by her,
claiming it as a right in succe.ssion as the
father of Frank Cox Johns. Payment was
refused and plaintifl presents suit in the
Circuit Court of Macon County, Illinois.
For Plaintiff, Pogue & Samuels.
For Defendant, Seidenberg «fe Stephens.
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On Jannar}- 2, 1911, plaintiff and defend-
ant entered into an a^n-eeraent whereby the
defendant, a corporation en<jaged in manu-
facturing automobiles at Detroit, Michi-
gan, gave to the plaintiff "the exclusive
right to sell the Oakland Auto cars in tiie
counties of Champaign, Douglas, Macon
and Piatt, Illinois." The cars were to be
delivered f. o. b. cars at Champaign, Tus-
cola, Decatur or Monticello, from time to
time as ordered. P'ur all sales made the
plaintiff was to have a commission of 25
per cent. In consideration of the givin^,'- of
sucii exclusive right to sell the plaintiff
agreed to sell no other make of automobil-j
within tlie terrilcjry mentioned, for the
period oi three years. The plaintiff imme-
diately established garages at Champaign,
Tusccjla, Decatur and Monticello, where he
lias kept Oakland cars on exhibition and
from wiiich he has sold about 400.
On .July 24, 1913, Amos Price and Leon-
ard Watts, residents of Urbana, Illinois,
visited the defendant's sales room in De-
troit and purchased two Oakland cars, one
for $1375 and tlie other for $1575, being the
prices for which such cars were billed to
the plaintiff plus the freight charges to
(/hampaign. Price and Watts had become
familiar with the Oakland in seeing theui
driven and in driving them in Champaign
and Urbafia, and so drove the machines lo
Qrbana after paying for them.
x\s soon as the plaintiff' learned from
Price and Watts of cheir purchases tie
wrote to the defendant claiming $737.50,
commission on the sales. The defendant
refused so allow it upon the ground that
he had neitlier made nor assisted in tlie
sales. As a matter of fact, he had never
offered to sell Price or Watts a machine.
For tiie Plaintiff, Lunsy and Newell.
For the Defendant, McKnight and Pat-
terson.
Mary Woods )
vs. [ Case No. 11.
James Carson. )
Statemerit.
Tlie defendant is the Irisband of the
plaintiff's aunt, Jane Car.son. For a num-
ber of years the d'ifendant has been the
proprietor of a aeparvment store in Dan-
ville, Illinois. From 1907 utiil 1911, Henry
Woods was in the employment of the de-
fendant as a salesman. On the 4th of June,
1910, the plaintiff who at the time was re-
siding at the home of the defendant was
married to Henry Woods. After they were
married the defendant and Henry Woods
quarreled, when Ilen'-y Woods left hisem-
pioyment and engaged with a jobbing
iioiise iaChicago, as a traveling salesman.
Tile parties continued to live in Danville.
Beginning September, 1911, the defendant
began making fal.se representation to the
plaintiff as to the conduct of her husband,
alleging that lie was intimate witli immor-
al women, and on several occasions report-
ed to lier of specific instances occurring in
the cities of Peoria, Chicago and Spring-
field. These statements were made to her
from time to time during the entire fall of
that year. Tiie defendant enjoined upon
her that she would not give tne name of
the informer. During the months of No-
vember and December she accused her hus-
band of these acts of which her uncle had
told her He de \ied them and insisted up-
on the name of her infoimer, which she re-
fused to tell. She believed her uncle and
did not believe her husband.
Some time in February 1912, Woods after
a severe trip through Southern Indiana,
returned to Danville, sick. When he reach-
ed liis iiome his door was locked and his
wife denied him admittance, saying that
she intended to sue liim for a divorce. He
was tlien taken to the Plaza Hotel and
there confined to his bed quite sick for
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three weeks. Messages were sent to the
plain tiff, asking, that she [visit him in the
hotel but she refused. As soon as he regain-
ed his health he resigned his position and
left for California. After he had been gone
six of seven months the plaintiff ascertain-
ed from her aunt, who had recently
separated from her liusband, that the rep-
resentations made by the defendant to the
plaintiff concerning the immorai acts of
her husband were false, and that thev were
wilfully made by the defendant out of mal-
ice toward Henry Woods!
The plaintiff now brings suit against the
defendant alleging her damages at $10,000.
In a declaration it will be charged that
Henry Woods left the plaintiff because of
the cruelty of the plaintiff toward the hus-
band in refusing to visit him while sick,
and because of the false representation
made toward him by the defendant and
which she believed. The defendant will
file a general demurrer upon which the ar-
gument will be heard.
For Plaintiff, Stambaugh & Shobe.
For Defendant, Swanson & Switzger.
Charles Gray
vs. -^
Henry Enos and I
John Church and f Case No. 12.
The Central Trust J
Company
Statement.
During the spring of 1912 a movement
was started to consolidate all of the local
telephone companies of the twenty-two
counties in the extreme southern part of
Illinois. As result of the movement two
corporations were formed, The Central
Trust Company and the Southern Trust
Company. They were formed solely to
purchase and hold stock and bonds of the
Southern Illinois Telephone Compiny.
The stock of both was to be equal in value,
share for share, and was to ba based upon
the stock and bonds of the Telephone
Company and nothing else. Each share
of stock in the Central Trust Company
will represent the same number of stock
and bonds of the Telephone Company as
would each share of stock of the Southern
Trust Campany. The only difference be-
tween the two companies was that the
principal place of business of the Central
Trust Company uill be at Centralia and
that of the Southern Trust Company at
Cairo. There are to be two sets of of-
ficers, excepting the president, and he is
to be president of each corporation. The
capital stock of each was $200,000.
Enos and Church were agents for the
company at Cairo and Reed and Brown
were agents for the company at Centralia.
It was the custom of these firms to receive
subscriptions for stock and the certificate
would be issued from the company's office
either at Cairo or Centralia. Books were
opened by these agents in December, 1912,
and all the stock was subscribed by th9
20th of January, 1913. On the 4th of Janu-
ary, 1913, the plaintiff paid to Enos and
Church $1,000 and attached his signature
to the following instrument:
—
''We the undersigned he-^eby agree to
pay to Enos and Church, agents, the sum
set after our names on the following
terms and conditions; 50 per cent cash and
the balance as called for, being payment on
account of purchase of stock of the Central
or Southern Trust Company. Said Cen-
tral or Southern Trust Company stock rep-
resents bonds and stock of the Southern
Illinois Telephone Company."
NAMES. AM'T to BE PAID.






At the time that the plaintiff attached
his signature to the subscription paper and
paid to Enos and Church the $1,000, he
stated that he wanted his stock in tiie
Southern Trust Company, that his reason
for so desiring was that he knew tlie local
officers and resided nearer Cairo than Cen-
tralia. To this statement Enos replied
that thai was all right and that i:e should
have his stock iri ,t;iy cv>inpa;iy desired. On
the follcnung day Enos and Church learned
througii the president of the two com-
panie:^ thai all of he stock in the Southern
Trust Company hud bee.i talcen. Tliey
then sent the $1,000 less their commission
to the Central Trust Company which is-
sued to the plaintiti a certificate for 20
shares of tlie stock and stated to him that
the other $1000 would be due Marcli 1,
1913. Immediately upon receiving the cer
titicate, the plaintiff returned it to the
office of the Central Trust Company at
Centralia, stating that he liad not sub-
scribed for stock in that company and
called upon Enos and Church, asking that
they return the $1,000. Enos and Church
replied that he was bound by liis subscrip-
tion, and the Central Trust Company
claimed that they had no information as
to the si!bs2ription excepting what ap-
peared in tiie subscription list when they
rect^ived the money. They decline to re-
turn tiie money.
Gray brings suit joining the Central Trust
Company with Enos and Chuich.
For Pl'aintitr, Ratcliff & Ruth.
For Defendants, Enos and Church, Sear-
ing & Seed.





College of Law University of Illinois
Vol. XI. November 24, 1913. No. 3.
First National Bank of Rantoul
vs.
Henry Clay Casualty Company.
No. 2.
I5rief for the PlaintiflE.
An insurance contract is constr'ied most
favorably for tiie insured especially where
the conditions or stipulations will defeat
the purpose of the contract as a forfeiture
of the insurance.
100 111. 649.
Commercial Ins. Co., vs. Robinson, 64
111. 267.
Providence Saving Life Ins. Co., vs. Can-
non, 103 111. App. 534, affirmed 201 111. 260.
National Accident Society vs. Ralston,
101 111. App. 192.
19 Cyc. 657.
May on Insurance. Vol. 1, Page 342.
That a tool as used in burglary insurance
contract where policy provides that burg-
iary must be effected by the use of tools or
explosives directly thereon, may be merely
the use of the thieves hands.
Fidelity & Casuality Co. of N. Y. vs.
Sanders, 32 Ind. App. 448.
Rosenthal vs. American Bonding Co., 124
N. Y. Sup. 905.
Printed conditions in small type on back
of policy should not be deemed part of it
and not to bind him unless brought to his
notice.
Bassel vs. American Fire Ins. C, 2
Hughes (Fed.) 531.
Stipulations on back of policy are to be
construed as part of it, if by terms of




Attorneys for the Plaintiff.
Opinion by Harker, P. J.
This is a suit upon a burglary insurance
policy to recover for a 'oss of $12,496. stolen
from the plaintiff's banking house and safe
in the night time.
The policv recited an insurance- to the
amount of $15,000, "For all loss by burg-
lary of money, bonds and bank notes in
consequence of the felonious abstraction of
the same from the safe located in the bank-
ing house of the insured, by any person or
persons who shall make entry into such
safe by use of tools or explosives directly
theri;on."
Attached to the clause was an asterisk
reference to a note appearing at the bot-
tom of the same page in small type as fol-
lows: "Note. This company shall be li-
able for loss of money, bonds, or bank
notes from a burglar proof safe containing
an inner steel burglar proof chest, unless
the same shall be abstracted from the
chest effected by the use of tools or ex-
plosives directly thereon." The safe was
a so-called burgkr proof safe and contained
an inner steel burglar proof chest. Entry
to the outer compartment was effected by
tools and explosives. Neither tools nor
explosives were used to enter the inner
chest.
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Either the combination lock to it was
not turned on or the burglar understood
the combination.
As to $446 there can be no question, be-
cause that amount was taken from the out-
er compartment. Tlie real contest is over
the $12,000 taken from the inner chest, the
insistance on the part of the defendant
being that absence of proof that the
inner chest was entered by tlic use of tools
or explosives relieves it of all liability, for
the money stolen from the chest. In other
words, the defe/idant contends that tlie
facts attending Ine entry of the inner
chest brings the case within the provision
contained in the note ai)ove quoted.
Before one can recover upon a policy of
insurance it is essential that he bring him-
self within tlie express provisions of the
policy. I fully recognize the general trend
of counts to construe all doubtful pro-
visions of an isurauce policy in favor of
the insured. But where the terms of tlie
policy are plain anti explicit no forced con-
struction should be indulged in to fix a
liability on the ifisurance company wliicli
it has not assumed. The policy sued on
was not a general one against burglary,
but against burglary com.nitted by the use
of tools and explosives, not only upon the
safe itself but upon the inner chest also.
The defendant took the precaution to
limit its liability to acts of violence (the
use of burglar tools or explosives) and did
not insure against loss arisifig from neg-
ligence of defendant's servants in failing to
turn on the combination or loss through
the use of the secret combination on the
chest lock known to the burglar.
Counsel for the plaintiff urge that as the
condition was not in the body of the policy,
but was in a foot note printed in very line
type, it for that reason should be disregard-
ed. They cite decisions bearing out that
contention. I confess that I have never
been favorably impressed with the ilea
tliat a condition should be read out of an
insurance contract simply because it ap-
pears in smaller type than that used in the
rest of the instrument.
We all know that a foot note, whether
used in a book, magazine, or other publi-
cation is put ir» smaller type tlian the text.
The office of the asterisk is to challenge
attention to something in the margin of
bottom of the document in which it is
used. I see no merit in the point.
Under the terms of the policy and the
facts of the case, the plaintiff is entitled
to recover only for the amount stolen from
tlie outer com^*artment, $446.







1. Where an existing judgment is sued
upon as a cause of action, and a new judg-
ment recovere.i on it, there is no merger
of the first judgment or is it extinguished
without satisfaction of the second.
23 Cyc. 1473.
Griswold vs. Hill, Federal case 5836.
Mumford vs Stocker, 1 Cow. 178.
Lawton vs. Perry, 18 Se. 861.
Lilly Bracket Co. vs Sonnerman, 163.
California. 632.
2. No merger takes place vvhere the two
securities are equal. If the securities of
the last judgment were of superior degree,
to those of the tirst, it would be logical to
merge them, but where they are the same,
there is no principal upon svhich they
should be merged.
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Lawson on Rit^hts, Remedies and Prac-
tice.
McLean vs. McLean, 90 N. C. 531.
3. A judfrment does not constitute a
cause of action in another State, and suit
should be brought on the original judgment.
So long as the indebtedness is unsatisfied,
successive suits in different States may be
prosecuted.
Evans vs. Rsed, 2 Mich. N. P. 212.
Spring vs. Pharrall, 131 X. C. 193.
Mumfcrd vs. Stocker, 1 Cow. 178.
4. It may be inconvenient for two judg-
ments to subsist in the sime State against
the same person, but no such inconven-
ience exists where tiie two judgments are
in ditferent States. Any hardship arising
from successive judgment will be avoided
by the defendant paving the debt.
Ames vs. Hoy, 12 Calif. 19.









A second judgment op the same debt,
though for a less amount than that recov-
ered in the tirst, is a waiver of the remaind-
er and ati extire extinguishment of the first
judgment.
Price vs. First National Banlc, 63 Kan.
735, 1901.
Where two judgment, of the same pur-
port have been rendered in t he sane osi-
it will be presumed that the first merged
in the second and was constructively [va-
cated by it, and the first judgment won't
support a plea of Res Adjudicata.
Johnson vs. Hesser, 61 Neb. 631 (1901.)
A judgment rendered in Indiana, on
which a judgment was subsequently re-
covered in a court of competent jurisdic-
tion in Ohio, was thereby merged in the
latter, so as to release all liens and prior-
ities of the former on lands in Indiana and
the owner was entitled to an injunction
upon sale.
Gould vs. Hayden, 63 Ind. 443.
The merger occasioned by one judgment
sued upon as a cause of action also destroys
its effect as a lieu as well as destroying the
right to sue upon the tirst judgment
again.
Deuegre vs. Haun, 13 Iowa, 240
Whiting vs. Beebe, 7 Eng. 421, 549.
Chitty vs. Glenn, 3 Mon. 425.
Gould vs. Flayden, 63 Ind. 443.
Frazier vs. McQueen, 20 Ark. 68.
Neale vs. Jeter, 20 Ark. 98.
Bank of U. S., vs. Patton, 5 How. Miss.,
200.
Brown vs. Clarke, 4 How. U. S. 34.
Armstrong vs. McLaughlin, 49 Ind. 370.
Freeman rn Judgments, Sec. 115 and 215.




Opinion by Barker, P. J.
The plaintiff has declared upon an un-
paid judgment recovered by him against
the defendant for $690, July 6, 1906, in the
Circuit Court of Johnson county, Mis«50uri.
The defendant has filed a special plea in
bar, setting up that the plaintiff in June,
1909, sued the defendant on the same
judgment in Wayne county, Indiana, and
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recovered against him, whereby liis right
of action on the judgment now sued on
was merged. To the plea tha plaintiff in-
terposes a general demurrer.
The question presented is whether a
judgment recovered upon an unsatisfied
judgment, certified from another State,
has the effect to end or destroy the vitality
of the pMor judgment. It is a new one in
Illinois, so far as 1 am advised, and there
is a conflict of opinion upon it in other
jurisdictions. Courts whicii iioid in the
afflrinative upon the proposition are moved
to tliat conclusion by the general rule that
a cause of action is merged in the judg-
ment recovered on it and the tliought that
a debtor should not be harrassed iti various
States by judgments over the same subject
matter. The editor of the American State
Reports in volume 92, at page 778, in a note
reviews the decisions and announces as the
better rule tlie extinguishment of the first
judgment on the recovery of the second.
To the same effect is the expression in
15 Am. and Eng Ency. of Law at page 336.
A contrary view is taken by ilie author of
"Judgments" appearing in 23 Cyc at page
1474, and a review of the autliorities will
show that the modern trend of decision is
in that direction. The mo'^t recent case
on the question is Lilly I.irackett Co. vs.
Sonnerman, decided by the Supreme Court
of California a short time ago, 163 Cal. 632.
That was a suit based upon a judgment
recovered by the piaintitf against the de
fendant in Massachusetts, which has also
been sued on in the State of Washington
aTid a judgment recovered. It was con-
tended thai the second judgment barred
any further right to recover on the Mas-
sachusetts judgment, but the Court took a
contrary view and held that a judgment
obtained in one State does not become
merged in a judgment based upon it in
favor of the plaintiff in another State.
Tiie reason for the general rule that a
recovery for the same cause of action is a
bar to a second action does not apply.
The reason, as universally understood, is
that the action has passed in rem judi-
catum and is determined by the judgment.
That reason does not exist where a judg-
ment is sought upon a judgment of another
State. One judgment is of the same
dignity as the other.
The contention that a debtor should
not be harrassed in various States by
several existing judgments, the product of
one original cause of action, does not appeal
to me. The debtor n,ay end the harrass-
ment and satisfy all the judgments by
paying oft" one of them.
The plea does not present a valid de-






Brief for the Plaintiff.
1. Statement of the case.
Plaintiff, a real estate broker, brought
defendant and one James French into a
contractual relationship. The contract
was binding and was capable of being
enforced by eiilier party by specitic per-
formance. By weight of authority, this
entitles the broker to his commission.
Easter vs. Newbury, 170 111. Ap. 494.
Davis vs. Pauler, 170 III. Ap. 317.
Wilson vs. Mabon, 158 III. 304.
Fox vs. Ryan, 240 111. 390.
Parmly vs. Head, 33 111. A p. 134.
Nagl vs. Small, 138 N. W 849.
2. The meaning of the written contract
is clear. The terms "acceptance of the
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offer" must be construed in their natural
and most obvious sense, i. e
,
in the sense
in which the word "acceptance" is used
in liie law of contracts.
Cameron vs. Sexcon, 110 III. A()p. 381.
3. It is well settled in this Stale that
parol evidence is not admissible to vary
the terms of a written instrument, but
that all prior negotiations leading up to
tlie executitjn of liie writing are merged
therein. "A contracted"' not exist partly
in writing and partly in parol."
Lane vs. Sharp, 3 Scammon 573.
13 111. 689 O'Reer v=. Strong.
Marshall vs. Grid'ey. 46 III 24-7.
Winnesheik Ins. Co. vs. Hazelgrafe, 53
111. 523.
Boylan vs. Cameron, 126 111. A p. 432.
Clark vs. Mallory, 185 111. 227.
Davis vs. Fidelity Ins. Co.. 208 111. 375.
4. The written instrument is, therefore,
exclusive evidence of the terras of the
contract and oral statements which may
have been made incidental to the drawing





Brief for the Defendant.
In construing a contract the Court will
admit parol evidence to explain am-
Ijiguous terms, in order to ascertain and
give the effect as was intended by tlie
parties at the time of making the contract.
Barret vs. Stow, 15 111. 423.
Sigsvvorth vs. Mclntyre, 18 111. 127.
Alexander vs. ToUeston Club, 110 111. 65
at 76, 77.
Starr vs. Milliken, 180 111. 458.
Osj^ood vs. Skinner, 83 111. App. 454.
Parish vs Vance, 110 111. App. 57 at 61.
Walker vs. .Johnson, 116 III. App. 145.
Cameron vs. Sexton. 110 111. App. 3S1 at
386.
Cochran vs. Vermillion County, 113 111.
App. 140.
Thomas vs. Wiggers, 41 111. 478.
Crane vs. Clemens, 135 111. App. 81.
Curtis vs. Haw'ey. 85 III. App. 429.
Whalen vs. Stephens. 193 III. 121.
Vt. Street Church vs. Brose, 104 111. 206
al 212.
Lehndorf \s. Cope, 122 111. 317 at .322
Ilolmquest vs. Dacer, 170 111. App. 101.
Kuechen vs. Voltz, 110 111. 264.
Piper vs. Connelly, 108 111. 646 at 651.
Turpin vs. Bait. O. & Chicago R. R. Co,,
105 III. 11.
Leavus vs. Cleary, 75 111. 349.
Where one party to a contract holds out
a situation and induces the other party to
act upon that situation and thus making
an irrevocable change in his condition, if
such representation is not true in fact
and such is known to the party making
the representation, then the party so
making the representation will be stopped
from denying that such representations
are not true. This can apply to the use
of a word as held out in a contract as to
its meaning tlierein intended.
(The doctrine of Estoppel.)
Clapp and Coffey,





Opinion by Harker, P. J.
This is a suit to recover $600, the
amount of commission claimed by the
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plaintiff. ;a real estate broker, for pro-
curing? tiie acceptance of a written propo-
sition made by the defendant to one James
Frenoli to convey certain property in
Peoria to French and pay him $1,200 for a
half section of land situated in William-
son courny, Illinois.
Tlie demand is based upon the follovvintj
clause in a written agreement si^aied by
lli8 plaintitl": "When llie sAJd Avery has
.secured from said French an acceptance of
the proposition made t>y said Drake to ex-
cliange iiis lot in block 4, Lojj^an's Ad-
dition to tlie cit.\ of Peoria, Illinois, for
N 14 of Sec. i;5, T. 10, R. 4, in Williamson
county, Illinois, owned by said French,
dated July 26, 1911, said Drake will pay
said Avery $600."
Tlie plaintiff induced French to si^j^n a
statement endorsed upon ihe defendant's
wriuen proposition acceptiiii>- the offer and
a^reein;? to furnisli an abstract of title to
tlie land within thirty days and execute a
deed to tlie defendant. On the same day
the defendant, in c >mpliance with iiis part
of tlie aj>reement., deposited his deed to the
Peoria properly and $1,200, in escrow witii
the Peoria Savinj^s Bank, to be delivered to
French on his deposit in>; in the bank for
the (iefendanl, within thirty davs, a deed
and abstract to the Williamson county
land
French, instead of depositinjr his deed
and abstract within tne thirty days,
notiiied tiie defendant that he would not
do so, atui has ever since refused to convey
to the defendant. His excuse for refusintj
is that the land is underlaid with a rich
deposit of coal, a fact of which lie was
i;,'norant at the time he accepted the de-
fendant's proposition. The defendant has
withdrawn from the bank the $1,200 and
liis d ed. and refuses to pay the $600 to
Avery upon tlie ground that the latter un-
ertook a consummation of the deal with
French. He testifies that at the time he
sis^^ned the ajrreement Avery told hhn that
unless the trade should be consummated
he would not require a payment of the
$600, and that is not disputed by Avery.
I am of the opinion that the defense in-
terposed should not prevail. The clau.se
quoted from the vvritiritjcinstituied a valid
contract binding upon Drake to pay Avery
the commission sued for up-jii !iis procuriny
an acceptance of Drake's olfer to French.
It could be impeached only by showinj^
that its execution vva*« obtained by duress,
fraud, unduri ioHuence. or that it was
without consideration. Thern is nothing
in the fads stated to .snow either fraud or
mistake Drake does not pretend that he
did not understand the contract before
signinj,'- it or that he was ijjnorant of its
conte..ts. His recollection as to what was
said negatives anv such idea, because he
testifies that at the time lie and Avery
signed the instrument, Avery said lo him
that unless the deal was put through, he
should not expect commissions. S'lch
statement upon the part of Avery was not
a representation that the agreementshowed
anything else than the words employed in
tlie instrument. It was at most a voluntary
promise on his part that he would, to that
extent, disregard or waive the agreement.
It is a familiar rule of evidence that all
contemporaneous agreements are merged
in the written instrument and that parol
testimony v*ill not be heard to modify or
change its terms. There are cases in which
there is such ambiguity in the v^riting as
justifies the introduction of parol testi-
mony. That is done for the purpose of
arriving at the intention of the parties,
but in this case there is no ambiguity,
whatever.
There are cases in which parol testi-
mony may be allowed where the contract
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ing pai ties are not on an equal lootinij, as
where the relationship between the parties
is of a ticiucidry character and one party has
overreaclied the other. Hut that is done
upon the ground of fraud and is usually
accomplished throu^li a oill in equity to
reform the u ritten instrument or to cancel
it. No such ca.se is presented ijy the facts as
uil) justify the Court in allowing the
statement made by Avery at the time lie
and Drake signed the corttract to control.




William Morton and Amos Ray, Partners
as Morton and Ray.
Case No. 14
Statement.
The plaintiff is an architect doing busi-
ness at Indianapolis, Indiana, making a
speciaty of drafting plans and specitications
for elevators and mills. The defendants are
dealers in grain, conduciiug an establish-
ment at Ctiicago, Olney, Carborjdale and
Nashville, Illinois. Desiring to erect two
elevators, one at Nasiiville and tlie otiier
at Olney, they applied to the plaintiff at
his otiice in Indianapolis for the plans and
specitications for an elevator at Olney with
a capacity of 100,000 bushels of grain and
one at Nashville with a capacity of 150,000
bushels. It was agreed be^tween the [jar-
ties that if the buildings should be con-
structed according to the plans and specifi-
cations furnished, the plaintiff should re-
ceive 5 per cent of the cost, but if the
[
buildings ware not constructed then he was
I
to receive as a flat rate for tlie plans of the
I
Olney elevator $500 and for the Nashville
i elevator $600. The plans were drawn and
elevator was contracted for a cost of $22,-
000 for which the plaintiff received the
commission of 5 per cent.
Tlie defendants advertised for bids as to
the Nashville elevator and the lowest bid
being iimch in excess of $30,000, the amount
which the plaintiff es-iinaied would be the
cost of its construction, the erection of the
building was given u;). The defendants
claimed that the ouihling could not be
constructed according to the plans and
specitications because it violated certain
ordinances of liie cily of Nashville When
the plaititiff was notified that the building
would not be erected he demanded pay-
ment of trie $600, which v.as refused by the
defendants upon two grounds: tirst, because
the plaintiff' had guaranteed that the cost
of construction vvould not exceed $30,000;
second, because the plans and specifications
were drawn in such a way that the eleva-
tor could nor be ooerated without violating
an ordinance of the city of Nashville.
For plaintiff', Whiteside & Wright.
For Defendants, Zetterlnjlm & Anderson.
Case No. 15.
Statement.
On the 1st of October. 1911, James Clark
was by the mayor of Urbana appointed
City Collector of special taxes and special
assessments for the term of one year. The
appointment was with the advice and con-
sent of the City Council, and Clark was di-
rected w ithin ten days to execute a bond in
the sum of $3,000 to tiie City of Urbana,
with two sureties to be approved by the
City Council, conditioned for the faithful
performance of his duty.
On the 8th of October, 1911, Clark pre-
sented his bond for the amount requested,
signed by himself as principal and by Jos
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eph Clark and Eli Rood, two farmers liv-
iri}^ ill the south part of CnampaiK^'i coun-
ty, us sureties, anci tlie City Council ap-
proved it.
During the winter and spring of li>12,
Clark collected a large amount of special
taxes and paid the uiost of it into the city
treasury, but appropriated to iiis own use
$2,400 over and above what was due him as
fees and commissions. He was unable to
make good his defalcation and eariy in
11)13 he absconded. When the sureties were
called upon to pay the amount embezzled,
tiiey employed an attorney who discovered
on examining the bund that it was made to
the City of Champaign instead of to the
City of Urbana. The mistake occurred by
reason of using a printed blank used in the
City of Champaign, in which the words
"Know all men by these presents that
as principal and as sureties, of the
county of Champaign, State of Illinois, are
lield and firmly bound to the City of Cham-
paign, Illinois, in the penal sum of
dollars, which payment well and truly to
be made, we and each of us bindouvselves,
our heirs, executors and administrators,
jointly and severally by these presents"
were printed. In the condition part of the
bond it was correctly recited that Clark had
been appointed to his otlice by Frank Hoggs,
Mayor of the city of Urbana. In fact, the
word "'Champaign" wherever it appeared
in print in the condition part was erased
and the word '"Urbana" inter. ined in its
stead. That the word "'Champaign" in
the first part of the bond was not so chang-
ed was a mere oversiglu and the sureties,
wlien tney signed, understood they were
obligating themselves for the faithful per-
f\)rmance of Clark in his duties as a special
tax collector for the city of Urbana. The
sureties refuse to make good Clark's defal-
cation. They contend that as they are sur-
eties only the obligation must be strictly
construed in their favor and can not be
made to include an obligee not named in
the bond.
For the City of Urhana, Cas~idy & Dil-
lon.
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Brief for the Petitioner.
Case Xo 5.
An administrator succeeds to tlie legal title
to the personal estate of his intestate and
the title takes effect by relation from the
death of ihe latter.
Makepeace .s. Moore, 5 Gilman 474.
There is no doubt that an executor or
administrator may effect an insurance of
the personal chattels of the deceased whom
they represent.
McLaughlin vs. Penny, 65 Kansas 523.
That the executor or administrator be-
came the absolute owner of a decedents
personal estate never was the law in this
country. Tiie right of a distributor at-
taches upon tlie death of the decedent.
Perryman vs. Greer, 39 Alabama 136.
Butford vs. Hollerman, 10 Texas 571.
Lewis vs. Lyon, 13 111 117.
The administralor, it is true, may have
the legal title to the personal estate, not,
however, in his own right but as trustee
and for a particular purpose.
When the debts are paid the cestui que
trust is entitled to the assets.
Lewis vs. Lyons, et al, 13 111. 117.
Every .vill furnishes its own law. The
language of such instruments is so various
that only the most genera! rules can be
laid down for guidance in this interpreta-
tion.
MuLaughlin vs. Penney, 65 Kansas 523.
A will should be construed in the light
of surrounding circumstances and parol
evidence is admissible to prove the cir-
cumstances.
Pert vs. Pert, et al, 229 111. 341.
To the same effect. Little vs. Giles, 25
>*'eb. 313.
Doe vs. Hiscock, 5 M. & N. 363.
Hawhe vs. Chicago & Western Inc. R. R.
Co., 165 111. 651.
Such evidence is admitted not for the
purpose of introducing new words of a new
intention into the will but so as to give an
intelligent construction to the words
actually used consistent with the real state
of tne testator's family and property—in
short so as to enable the Court to stand in
the testator's place and read it in the light







1. A special legacy is one which arises
from the manifestation of the testator that
the legatee shall have a particular thing.
Gardner on Wills, P. 556.
Or it is a bequest of a particular thing




2. A specific legacy can only be satisfied
by turning over the particular thing be-
queathed.
Thomlinson vs. Finke, 145 Mass. 346.
And the burden of proof is on the legatee
its existence and identity when title is
to vest in him.
Barbour vs. Davidson, 73 111. App. 441.
3. Title to chattels goes first to the
executor and vests only in the legatee upon
distribution.
Jaques vs. Ballard, 111 111. App. 567.
Gardner on Wills, P. 613.
4. An executor has an insurable interest
but need not insure as a matter of course.
Rubaltom vs. Morrow, 24 Ind. 202.
Dortch vs. Dortch, 71 N. Car. 188.
Lewis vs. Lyons, 13 111 117.
5. The well established principle in the
construction of wills is that the intention
of the testator, to be gathered from the
words of the will, must prevail.
Jennings vs. .Jennings, 44 111. 488.




Opinion by Harker, P. J.
On May 3, 1913, .Jane Lowle died leaving
a will by which she disposed of all her
property as follows:
To her brother, Henry Bates, she devised
lots 4 and 5, block 6, Haden's Addition to
the city of Champaign.
To her sister, Mary Carter, all the fur-
niture valued at $3,000, used in the two
rooming houses located on said lots 4 and 5.
To her grandson, .James Lowle, twenty
shares of stock in the Champaign National
Bank.
The houses with the furniture mentioned
were leased to tenants until July 1, 1914,
and it was recited in the will that the
rents as collected from month to month
should be paid to James Lowle to meet his
expenses while attending the University of
Illinois as a student. The will also con-
tained the following clause: "It is my will
that all money when collected, no matter
from what source, shall be divided equally
between my sister, Mary Carter, and my
grandson, James Lowle." The will was
admitted to probate in the county court
June 4, 1913, and Bates qualified as executor.
The furniture was covered by a fire in-
surance policy for $1,500 running to July 21,
1913, and on that day Bates renewed the
insurance for one year, taking the policy in
his own name as executor and paying the
premium out of money collected for the
estate. On September 1, 1913, the two
houses and furniture were destroyed by fire
and Bates collected $1,500 on the policy
covering the furniture. That sum he now
holds together with $6,500 other money
collected for the estate. All debts against
the estate and cost of administration have
been paid and all claimsdue the estate have
been collected. Bates reports that there is
nothing further for him to do as executor
and contends that the $8,000 in his hands
should be paid in equal parts to Mary
Carter and James Lowle. Mary Carter
contends that she is entitled to the entire
amount of insurance money collected and
files a petition in the county court in which
she asks that it be paid to her and that the
remaining $6,500 be paid to her and James
Lowle in equal parts.
Tiie will specifically bequeaths to the pe-
titioner all of the furniture in the two
rooming houses devised to Henry Bates.
Title to the furniture vested in her upon
the death of the testator. It is true that
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she was not, under the terms of the will,.
entitled to its immediate enjoyment. The
tenants under the leases running to July
21, 1913, were entitled to the possession.
Bates, as executor, was no more entitled to
the possession of the furniture than the
petitioner when we take into consideration
that there was no necessity of selling- per-
sonal property to pay the debts The rents
with which the tenants were chargeable
under the leases were to be turned over to
the grandson, James Lowle, to meet his ex-
pen.ses. So, it may be said that while title
passed to the legatee, she was not in a
situation to have immediate possession.
When Bates renewed the policy and touk
the same in his own name as executor, it
was for the purpose of protecting the
property to the end that James Lovvie
should liave the rents until Julv 21, 1913,
and »hat Mary Carter would be indemnitied
against loss by tire. Tliere would be no
equity in depriving the legatee of the in-
surance indemnity and in giving it to the
estate to be divided between the petitioner
and James Lowle. It did not belong to
them. In equity it belonged to her.
It has been repeatedly held that the in-
surance money takes the place of the per-
sonal property destroyed.
Wyman vs. Wyman, 26 N. Y. 253.
Haxail vs. Ship pen, 10 Leigh 536.
Culbertson vs. Cox, 29 Minnesota, 309.
Estate of Robl, deceased, 163 California
801.
The clause in the will which provides
that all money wlien collected, no matter
from what source, should be divided equally
between the petitioner and the grandson
clearly lias reference to money due the
estate at the time of her death. It cer-
tainly was not intended to include any
money that might be collected by the
executor. Sucli a contention would require
the rents under the lease to be divided
equally between them when a specific pro-
vision of the will was that the rents, when
collected, should all be paid over to James
Lowle to pay his expenses while attending
the University.
The petitioner is entitled to $1,500 in-
surance collected, less the amount of the
premium. The amount paid as premium
should be added to the $6,500 and the ag-
gregate divided equally between the pe-
titioner and James Lowle. I deduct the
premium because it is not equitable that
James Lowle should be charged with any







Where an agent contracts with a third
party witliout disclosing the name of his
principal the agent is liable on the con-
tract.
Wheeler vs. Reed, 36 111. 81.
Porter vs. Day, 44 111. App. 256.
McDonald vs. Bond, 195 111. 122.
Where the third party has reasons to
*jelieve that a broker is acting for an un-
disclosed principal, yet if he does not
know who that principal is, lie may hold
the broker personally on the contract.
Scaling vs. Knollin, 94 111. App. 443.
Ye Seng Co. vs. Corbitt & Macleay, 9
Fed. 423.
Cobb vs. Knapp, 71 N. Y. 348.
Knapp vs. Simon, 96 N. Y. 284.
Windsor vs. Griggs, 5 Cush. 210.
Welsh vs. Goodwin, 123 Mass. 77.
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Machetn on Agency, Par. 554.
Huffcut on Agency, page 260.
Story on Agency. Sec. 26.
A broker may be the agent of both the
vendor and the vendee.
Lincoln vs. Cotton Mills Co. 128 Fed. 865.
Pollatcheck vs. Goodwin, 75 N. Y. 86.
Where vendee of goods sold at a specific
price refuses to take and pay for the goods
vendor may resell them and charge vendee
with the difference between the contract
price and that realized at the sale.
Roebling's Sons' Co. vs. Lock Stitch
Fence Co. 130 111. 660.
White Walnut Coal Co. vs. Crescent Coal
Co., 254 111. 368.
Gray Harbor Commercial Co. vs. Turner
Joice Lumber Co., 163 111. A pp. 231.
Kingman & Co. vs. Hanna Wagon Co.,
162 111. A pp. 545.
Morris vs. Wicaux, 159 111. 627.
Rice vs. Penn Plate Glass Co., 88 111.
A pp. 407.
Olcese vs. Mobile Fruit Co., 112 111. A pp.
281.
lienjarain on Sales, 6th Ed. 744.
Corbly and Cummins,






1. Plaintiff must prove a binding con-
tract of sale between liimself and the de-
fendant.
One purchasing goods for another makes
himself personally liable if he contracts in
his own name witliout disclosing his prin-
cipal; and this, altho the seller supposes
the purchaser is acting as an agent, it is
not sufficient to clear the agent from
liability that the seller has the means of
ascertaining the name of the principal; he
must have actual knowledge.
Chase vs. Dubalt, 7 111. 371.
Scaling vs. KnoUen, 94 111. App.'443.
Cobb vs. Knapp, 71 N. Y. Rep. 348.
Mead vs. Attgred, 136 Ii:. 298.
But it is quite immaterial whether the
agent discloses his character or his prin-
cipal himself if it be actually known at
the time to the other party. In such case
the agent will nor, be bound, unless he
enter into such a contract as will bind him
at all events.
Chase vs. Dubalt, 7 111. 371.
Wheeler vs. Reed, 36 111. 81.
2. If there is any relation of contract
between the plaintiff and the defendant at
all, it is one of agency and not of sale. It
was customary for defendants to act for
plaintiff in tiiis relation; and in this case
and with regard to this particular transac-
tion sued upon they assume relations of
agency before the defendants come in con-
tact at all with the third party (the so-
call^-d undisclosed principal). It was their
intention. (See facts.)
A broker for certain purpose is the
agent of both buyer and seller, but for all
other purposes is the agent of the party
originally employing him; lie only becomes
the agent of the other party when the
bargain between the principals is definitely
settled.
19 Cyc. 191.
Wood vs. Rocchi, 32 La. Am. 210.
Boarman vs. Jenkins, 18 Wend. (N. Y.)
566.
Schlessinger vs. Texas Ry. Co. 87 Mo. 146.
(To the effect): Admitting that there
is nothing improper in a ^broker taking a
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commission from both buyer and seller
with knowledge and consent of both
parties, still defendants would not be al-
lowed to become agent of the plaintiff and
then work in interest of third party ad-
verse to interest of plaintiff.
45 L R. A. 33. Note and cases cited.
Cotton vs. Holliday, 59 111. 179.
Hafner vs. Herron, 165 111 242.
(To the effect): Nor may he in his own
right purchase from his principal, unless
the transaction is clearly free from fraud;
there is coiistruclive fraud upon the owner
presented in such case.
4 Am. and Eng. Enc. 966.
128 Sw. 431 (Texas).
Hughes vs. Washington, 72 111. 84.
Hinckley vs. Coiom, 233 111. 140.
3. Damages The measure of damage?
is the difference between the value of the
article on the day and at the place named
in contract and the contract price; and if
vendor fails to accept tlie commodity con-
tracted for and pay the purchase price,
there being no agreement for a delivery by
the vendor, the vendor may resell it if he
Sees fit and the measure of damages will be
the difference between the contract price
and the price realized at the re-sale; but
the sale must be in good faith and ihe
price brought, the fair market value at the
time and place of delivery.
Phelps vs. McGee, 18 111. 155.
Saladin vs. Mitchell, 45 III. 79.
Roebling Sons' & Co. vs. Lock Stitch




Opinion by Harker, P. J.
On October 1, 1912, the plaintiff informed
the defendants, stock brokers in Chicago,
that he desired to sell 200 shares of stock
in the Illinois Central Railroad Company
for $26,000 and asked whether they had a
client willing to pay that for them. The
defendants replied that they had not, but
th J t they would see what they could do
for him. On the following day defendant,
Mott, called the plaintiff by telephone and
said: "We can take that stock off your
hands for $25,000." Plaintiff accepted and
it was agreed that the parties should meet
at his office at 12:00 o'clock next day for
delivery of the stock and payment of the
$25,000. Although plaintiff was on hand
at the appointed hour defendants did not
appear. In reply to a phone call as to
why they had not curae to take the stock
and pay the $25,000 Mott said that the
purchaser of the stock had not come in and
it looked as if he v\as trying to back out.
Plaintiff responded that he should hold the
defendants to their agreement to take the
stock off his liands for the $25,000. A few
days later plaintiff made formal tender of
the stock certificate and demanded pay-
ment of the $25,000. Defendants refused
to accept the stock or pay the money.
Plaintiff then sold the stock for $23,500, its
market price, and now sues the defendants
for $1,500, the difference between the con-
tract price and what lie was able to get for
the stock when sold. The suit is defended
upon the ground that the defendants did
not agree to take the stock for themselves,
but were merely acting as agents for
another.
In support of their contention counsel
for the defendants point to the fact that
the plaintiff had many times before this
transaction bought and sold railroad stocks
and bonds through the defendants as
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brokers and urge that he must have under-
stood that they were not undertaking to
buy the stock but were merely acting for
another. In corroboration they refer to
Mott's telephone reply that the purchaser
had not put in an appearance and that
they feared he would back out and to the
two letters which followed, clearly indi-
cating that they considered themselves as
agents and not purchasers.
It would appear that the rights of the
parties should be determined by the
agreement of October 2, made over the
telephone. Without losing sight of the
fact that the plaintiff did on the day be-
fore apply to the defendants as brokers for
a sale of his slock 1 find there was nothing
in the agreement or defendants' oifer in-
dicating that they were not purchasing for
themselves. The defendants' proposition
came in these words: "We can take tliat
stock off your hands at $25,000;" and it was
accepted.
Furthermore, in no manner, through
letter, telephone, or personal interview, was
the name of the defendants' principal dis-
closed. If the defendants in fact were
acting as agents for one who had authorized
them to offer $25,000 for the stock, why did
they not disclose his name when pressed
for a performance of tne agreement, so as
to enable the plaintiff' to iiave recourse on
the principal?
In the words of the eminent law
writer. Chancellor Kent, "If a person
would excuse himself from responsibility
on the ground of agency, he must show that
he disclosed his principal at the time of
making the contract, and that he acted on
his belialf. so as to enable the party with
whom lie deals to have recourse to the
principal in case the agent had authority
to bind him."
The agent becomes personally liable
where the principal is not known, or where
there is no responsible principal, or where
the agent becomes liable by an undertaking
in his own name.
2 Kent vs. Cone, 630.
Anson on Contracts, 345.
Benj. on Sales, 235.
Wheeler vs. Reed, 36 III. 81.
Scaling vs Knollin, 94 111. App. 443.
Tlie finding will be for the plaintiff and




Walter Bates, Chairman, and Henry Fox




The assignment of the unearned salary
of a public otHcer is void both in law and
equity.
City of Chicago vs. People, 98 111. App.
517.
Dickinson vs. Johnson, 61 S. W. 267.
Holt vs. Thurman, 63 S. W. 280.
Bank vs. State, 94 N. W. 633.
State vs. Barnes, 73 N. W. 80.
Dunkley vs. McCarthy, 122 N. W. 626.
Walker vs. City of New York, 129 N. Y.
Supp. 1059.
Anderson vs. Branstrom, 139 N. W. 40.
In Re Wilkes et al, 97 Pacific 677.
Bliss vs. Lawrence 58 New York 442.
Nelson vs. Townsend, 111 S. W. 894.




The intention of the parties and the rate
of discount in excess of 7 per cent deter-
mines questions of usury and not the form
or device used.
Cooper vs. Nock, 27 111. 301.
Missouri Valley Life Ins. Cs. vs. Kittle, 2
Federal 113
III.
This assignment comes witiiin the pro-
visions of the Illinois Statute on Usury.
Chapter 74, Section 6, Kurd's Revised
Statutes 1912.
IV.
A board of supervisors i"? a judicial, dis-
cretionary body and can not be coerced to
audit accounts against county in a specific
manner in absence of fraud.
Fitzgerald vs. Harms, 92 111. 372.
Chapter 34, Sections 25 and 46, Kurd's
Revised Statutes 1912.
If an answer is filed to complainant's bill
traversing his bill and denying his relief in
equity, and plaintiff goes to trial upon bill
and answer, the answer stands admitted in
all respects where it traverses the bill.
Derby vs. Gage, 38 111. 27.
Fordyce vs. Shrives, 115 111. 530.




Brief of Complainant in Cofer vs Walter
Bates et al.
Assignment of wages to be earned in
future, by a public officer appointed for an
indefinite time, may in certain cases be
enforced in Equity.
A city marshal.
Brackett vs. Blake, 7 Mete. 335.
Unearned salary of a school teacher.
Johnson vs. Pace, 78 111. 143.
A jailer or a policeman elected for a term
of four years, with a fixed monthly com-
pensation, may assign fees or wages pay-
able in the future.
Webb vs. McCauley, 4 Bush (Ky) 8.
Manly vs. Bitzer, 91 Ky. 596, 16 S. W. 464.
Conway vs. Cutting, 51 N. K. 407.
Costs due a clerk of a court are assign-
able in Equity.
Ciples vs. Blair, Rice Eq. (S. C.) 60.
Salary of an officer to become due is a
possibility coupled with an interest and as
such is capable of being assigned.
State vs. Kastings, 15 Wis. 75.
Brackett vs. Blake, 7 Mete. 335.
Conway vs. Cutting, 51 N. K. 407.
McLellan vs. Walker, 25 Me 114.
Blin vs. Pierce, 25 Vt. 15.
Mulhall vs. Quinn, 1 Gray 105.
Kartley vs. Tapley, 2 Gray 562.
2 Kent's Lecture 39, Page 602,- 8th Edi-
tion.
The right of appeal from the decision of
a county tribunal rejecting a claim in
whole are in part, doesn't operate as a bar to
the right to maintain an independent act-
ion against the county at law or equity.
11 Lye 599.





Opinion by Barker, P. J.
One Easton Rude was deputy county
clerk for Jefferson county, Illinois, at a
salary of $1,000 per year, payable quarterly
in installments of $250. The method of
paying him was by warrant on the county
treasurer after Rude had tiled witii the
county commissioners his claim for $250
witli certiticale of tlie county clerk that he
had served for the quarter. After he had
been in service a year he began the practice
discounting iiis claim in advance of iis al-
lowance. He accomplished that by en-
dorsing on the back of his written claim a
request that order issue to tiie person
named. He iiad done Uiatsevesal times
in favor of Peter Gofer and the commis-
sioners had recognized that method of
orocydure by directing the order to issue
lo Cofer.
On .July 1, 1913, Gofer advanced Rude
$240 for the quarter ending September 1,
1913, and took from him Rude's claim,
made out in regular form, wilii the follow-
ing endorsement on the back. "For value
received, 1 assign the within claim to
Peter Gofer and reque-.t tlie county board
of .Jefferson county lo direct order for the
amount to be issued to him.
Easton Rude."
On September 1 Gofer presented to the
county board the claim which was ac-
companied by the certiticate of the county
clerk, tliat Rude had served for the quarter.
Owing to the board being occupied with
other matters it was not acted upon that
day. Tliat night Rude, after delivering a
like claim to one John Edwards with a like
endorsement to Edwards, absconded.
When Gofer called up his claim on
September 2, the clerk informed tlie board
that Rude had absconded and that Edwards
held a claim and endorsement like that
held by Gofer. Therefore, the board re-
fused to allow the claim and direct order
to issue to Gofer.
This suit is by Gofer to test the validity
of his claim and to procure a warrant in
his favor upon the county treasurer. There
has been some discussion as to the remedy
open to him. There are several. Having
failed to obtain an allowance by the board
he could have prosecuted an appeal to the
Circuit Gourt as provided by Sec. 35 Ch. 34
of til- Revised Statute. He may proceed
by mandamus. Perhaps mandamus is the
most appropriate under the circumstances.
It was the one selected by the petitioner in
the case from wliich this one was modeled.
Gounsel for Gofer have elected to begin in
a Gourt c»f equity. Without stopping to
consider whether the remedy is in law or
equity, we will pass at once to the sub-
stantial merits of the case. Under our
present statute a person liaving miscon-
ceived liis remedy may be allowed to
transfer his case from law to chancery or
from chancery to law.
Sec. 40 Gh. 110 P. 1744 Rev. Stat. 1911 Ed.
As to whether the assignment by a public
official of his salary before it becomes due
is contrary to public policy and void is a
question on wliich the authorities are not
harmonious. The English rule is in the
affirmative and that has been followed in
New York.
Bliss vs Lawrence, 58 N. Y. 442.
But in Wisconsin the rule is otherwise.
Bank vs. Hastings, 15 Wis. 78.
Galifornia follows New York and the
English holding.
Bangs vs. The Auditor of San Francisco,
66 Galif. 72.
In Illinois the rule and its reasons are
staled by Mr. Justice Waterman in city of
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Chicago vs. People ex rel, 98 111. App. 517
as follows: "The doctrine is well settled
that a municipal officer can not assign his
unearned salar3^ His undertaking so to do
is but an undertaking uninforcible and of
no validity." * * **** ^;***
'The performance of public service is
secured by protecting those engaged in
performing public duties and it is not upon
the ground of their private interests, but
upQn the necessity of securing an efficient
public service, by seeing to it that the
funds provided for the maintenance of
government officials should be secured by
them at such period as the law has ap-
pointed for their payment.
If assignments of the salaries of [.'ublic
offiicers were permitted then the assignees
would be entitled to receive the salaries
diiectly and tiius to take the place of the
assignors in respect to tlie emoluments
leaving the duties by said officers, a barren
charge, to be borne by the assignees. Such
a condition of affairs would eventually
produce results disastrous to the efficiency
of the public service.'"
It is contended that the rule does not
appiy to tiie case at bar for the alleged
reason that Rude was not a public officiil.
I can nut so hold. A deputy county clerk
takes the same oath as his principal, dis-
charges, in most instances, the same duties,
and is paid from the county treasury. He
is a public official and the reasons for the
rule as set forth by Judge Waterman apply
as forcibly to him as to his principal.
The finding is for the defendants.
Lucretia Allen
vs.




On May 21, 1910, Phillip Allen, a resi-
dence of St. Clair county, Illinois, made a
written application to defendant for in-
surance. The application was returned by
the company to Allen for amendment, and
on the 24 til of June, 1910, Allen signed his
second application. A medical examiner's
report, dated May 22, 1910, was attached to
the first application. No such report was
attached to the second.
On July 6, 1910, the defendant caused to
be executed and issued, a policy insuring
the life of Allen with the plaintiff, his
wife, as beneticiary for $2,000. It bore the
date. May 22, 1910, and referred to the
first application, a copy of which was an-
nexed. The policy recited that it was is-
sued in consideration of a premium of $80,
receipt thereof was acknowledged, and pay-
ment of a like sum upon the 22nd of May
in succeeding years. Each of the applica-
tions contained the following statements:
"During the period of one year follouing
the date of issue of the policy of insurance
for which application is hereby made, I
will not engage in any of the following
extra-hazafdous occupations or employ-
ments: retailing intoxicating liquors, hand-
ling electric wires and dynamos
,
un-
less written permission it expressly grant-
ed by the company.
"I also state that I will not die by my
own act, whether sane or Insane, during
the period of one year next following said
date of issue."
Among the conditions of the policy itself
were these:
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"Occupation. This policy is free from
any restriction as to military or naval ser-
vice, and, as to other occupations of the in-
sured, it is free from any restriction after
one year from its date as set forth in the
provisions of the application indorsed here-
on or attached hereto."
"Suicide. The company shall not be
liable hereunder in the event of the insur-
ed's death by his own act, whether sane or
insane, durin;,^ the period of one year after
the issuance of this policy, and set forth
in the provisions oi the application indors-
ed hereon or attached hereto."
On May 22, 1911, Allen paid the defend-
ant the second premium. On June 12,
1911, he committed suicide. His death,
consequently, occurred less than one year
after the day when the policy was in fact
sit>ned by the officers of the company, iiut
more t'aan one year after the day desiderat-
ed in the policy as its date.
All proofs as to death, etc., were regularly
made by the plaintiff but payment was re-
fused under the suicide clause. Attorney
for the plaintiff will draft a policy of in-
surance and also a declaration for tlie Cir-
cuit Court of St. Clair county, Illinois.
Under the plea of non assumpsit cause will
be submitted.
For Defendant, Watson & VViiburn.
For Mrs. May, Coffee & Corbiy.
Aima Troll, Administratrix of the Estate
of Arthur Troll,
vs.
Cairo Electric Company, a Corporation.
Case No 16.
Statement.
Defendant owns an electric power and
li{<hiing plant in the city of Cairo, and as a
part of its equipment, there was located on
Washington avenue at its junction with
12th street an arc lamp, suspended over the
center of Washington avenue, with a pole
on either side of the avenue and wires
extending between. Along the west side
of Washington avenue, extended on poles,
were the feed wires for the various
lamps located on the avenue. Two such
were extended from the west side pole at
12th street to the lamp at that place. They
were fastened tight at the pole, but swung
sufficiently loose to allow adjustment of the
amp.
The pole was about thirty feet tall and
fastened to it, near the top, were two cross-
arms, one extending north and south and
the other extending east and west. The
function of the cross-arms was to bear the
small feed wires, several in number. An-
other wire, called the hoisting wire, ex-
tended from the lamp mentioned to a pul-
ley at the top of the pole, five or six feet
aoove tiie topmost cross-bar. It passed
through the pulley along the south side of
the pole, and within four or five inches of
the two wires which fed the lamp, to a
small iron lock attached by staple to the
pole, about four feet from the ground.
Alvjut seven feet above the fastening was
an insulator. The hoisting wire was used
to raise and lower the lamp. Prior to July
7, 1913. the insulator had become so im-
paired that it was no longer a non-conduct-
or ot elictriciiy. The insulation on tha
wires running to the lamp was worn off,
also, and for a period of five or six weeks
immediately before that time there was
frequent flickering of the lamp.
In the locality of Washington avenue and
12th streets boys, between the ages of 10
and 15 years were wont to gather of sum-
mer evenings to play hide and seek and
kindred games, using the pole in question
for their goal. Arthur Troll, 12 years old,
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and the only child of a widowed mother,
the plaintiff, was among the number.
On the night of July 7, 1913, at about
9:00 o'clock he was so engaged with fifteen
or twenty other boys. Just after he had
made the goal, he picked up a piece of tin,
and crying out to his playmates that he
was going to play "electric man," seized
the hoisting wire, pulled it in contact
with the feed wire and received a shock
which resulted in his immediate death.
He and other of his playmates had on a
number of previous occasions received
slight shocks through the hoisting wire.
It liad been seized by them for the purpose
of being shocked, and was considered quite
a sport. At tliose times, evidently, the
wires were not heavily charged. On this
occasion the wires carried *j,000 volts.
The defendant liad iio actual knowledge
of tlie condition of its wires at the place in
question, but the condition described had
existed for six weeks before the accident.
The deceased, when not attending school,
was engaged in selling newspapeis, by which
means he was enabled partially to sup-
port liimself and his mother, a poor voman
wlio followed tiie oocupati )n. of a seam-
stress
For the Plaintill, Bar'ow & Brannon.
For the Defendant, Briltou & Brown.
John W. Jones and Alva Y. Jones (husband
and wife,) Plaintiff,
vs.
Alma Z. Voss, Defendant.
Case No. 17.
Statement.
Samuel W. Voss, a resident of Cham-
paign county, State of Illinois, and the
owfier of considerable land in W. % N. W.
34 of Sec. 19, T — R — in the said county^
died intestate on the 20th day of May, 1910.
He was survived by his widow, the defend-
ant above, three unmarried children, and a
married daughter, the plaintiff above, who
resides at Carbondale, Illinois.
The defendant was appointed adminis-
tratrix of the estate. She obtained from
her daughter, the plaintiff above, a deed to
all of her daughter's interest in the estate.
The defendant represented that she^ could
more easily administer the estate, by hav-
ing this title in her, and that she would up-
on the settlement and distribution of the
estate, deed back to her daughter, whatever
interest sae would be entitled to under the
distribution. Tlie deed is a straight deed
of conveyance, and does not set forth the
purposes for which it was given.
The other.three children also had assigned
or conveyed their interests in and to their
father's estate to iheir mt)ther. Upon the
set' lement and final distribution, the order
of distribution recited that she is entitled
to the residue of the estate after payment
of the costs of administration and of debts.
This distribution was made upon the
strength of tiie conveyance to her of the in-
terest of the children. This order was
made in .January, 1912. The defendant has
continued in possession of all the residue
of the estate, and tliough often requested
has failed and refused, and still fails and
ret uses to convey to the plaintiff", the in-
terest that she as a daugliter and an heir
of tlie decedent had in his estate, and which
she, by the deed had conveyed to her
mother.
Tiie plaintiff being unable to get her
mother to convey her the property she
would be entitled to her under the law, as
iieir of her fattier, and wnich the mother
promised to convey upon the final distribu-
tion, is desirous of enforcing her rights and
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recovering her interest in her father's es-
tate. Her mother claims there was no
promise on her part to re-convey. There
was no consideration paid by the mother to
the daughter on the execution of the deed,
although the deed recites as eonsideration
"Ten dollars, and other valuable considera-
tion." The deed is a regular deed used for
the purposes of conveying lands or interest
tiierein, and is regular in form, and prop
erly executed.
Attoyneys for plaintiffs will select the
proper remedy to be pursued to recover the
interest of the plaintiff in lier father's
estate, and will draft and tile the proper
pleading.
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Essington &
Finfrock.
Attorneys for Defendant, Fisher & Kess-
ler.




Samuel Adams dip.d testate April 9,
1897, in ilie City of Champaign, County of
Champaign, Stale of Illinois. At the time
of his deatii lie was tlie owner of large
tracts of land witliin tiie said county from
which there was no income on account of
the poor condition of tlie land, the same
being what is commonly called swamp
land.
By liis will, Mrs. William May, of Ro-
chell, Illinois, was left a legacy of $800.
David Adams, a son of the decedent for
whom no provision was made in the will,
contested the same wlien offered for pro-
bate. After nine years of litigation, dur-
ing which time the case was taken to the
Supreme Court twice, the will was declared
valid and the probate thereof allowed.
Shortly after the probate of the will,
John Williams, the executor named there-
in, died. Thereupon James Johnson was
appointed administrator with the will an-
nexed. On account of the real estate,
which was practically the only asset of the
estate, not bringing in any revenue, the
estate was really insolvent. In order to
get the account of the estate properly ad-
justed, James Johnson was compelled to
bring an action against Weston King, the
executor of the estate of John Williams,
for an accounting of the estate of Samuel
Adams. The controversy over tlie account
was in litigation for about five years, and
also we \l to tlie Supreme Court for final
adjudication.
By the establishmens of a drainage dis-
trict and the completion last year of a suc-
cessful drainage system, the real estate be-
longing to the decedent's estate, which was
practically useless theretofore, has become
very valuable, and by farming the land a
large income has been paid into tlie estate
this year.
The administrator in settling the estat«
by making distribution of the same accord-
ing to the terms of the will, on the 12th of
September, 1913, sent to Mrs. William May
a clieck for $800, which check w as refused,
and no payment of the legacy to Mrs. May
has been made. To the tinal account of
the administrator tiled in the Probate
Court on the 15tli day of September, 1913,
Mrs. May has tiled an objection, claiming
that in addition to the sum of $800, she is
entitled to legal interest on the said sum
from the date of decedent's death until
paid. Argument on tlie objection heard at
the time of the hearing of the linal account
of the administrator.
For Administrator, Bye & Clapp.















One who places in the hands of an infant
an article of such a dangerous character
that an ordinary prudent and careful man
would have realized it to be likely to re-
sult in injury to the child himself, or to
others, is guilty of negligence.
Binford vs. Johnson, 82 Ind., 427.
Palm vs. Ivorson, 117 Illinois, App.. 536.
Dixon vs. Bell, 5 M. & S., 198.
Carter vs. Towne, 98 Mass., 567.
Meers vs. McDowell, 110 Ky., 926.
29 Cyc. 460.
Dow ell vs. Grafton, 22 Out L. R., 550.
To make one liable for negligence it is
not necessary that he should have contem-
plated or even been able to anticipate the
particular consequences which ensued, or
the precise injuries sustained.
Dixon vs. Scott, 181 111., 116.
Benton vs. City of St. Louis, 154 S. W.,
473.
21 A. & E. Encyc. of Law 487.
Defendant, by his negligence in permit-
ting and consenting for the child to use a
dangerous weapon in a public place so as
to endanger the safety of the public, in
effect becomes an insurer of the public
c gainst the injuries suffered in consequence
of the act.
1. Thompson on Negligence, 725.
The placing of such a dangerous instru-
ment in the hands of a child and permitting
him to practice with the same in a public
p.n.rk, is tantamount to a nuisance.
Jenni vs. Sutton, 43 N. J. Law 257.
Conklin vs. Thom^pson, 29 Barb. 218.
Dowell vs. Guthrie, 99 Mo. 653.








I. A father is not liable for the toils of
his minor children by reason of his rela-
tionship to such minor child, but only in
case the act was committed with the father's
consent or in course of father's business.
Paul vs. Hummell, 43 Mo. 110.
Poulin vs. Howser, 63 111. 312.
V/ilson vs. Garrard, 59 111. 51.
II. A party injured by the negligence of
another must seek his remedy against the
person whose negligence It was that caused
ths injury and that person alone Is liable
even though he is a minor.
Paul vs. Hummel, 43 Mo. 119.
Wilson vs. Garrad, 59, I.. 51.
III. According to modern judicial con-
ception the father of a small boy violates
no social duty, commits no nuisance and is
guilty of no negligence in placing into the
hands of a small boy a toy gun or revolver
with which he injures another.
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Thompson on Negligence, S. 790.
Haggarty vs. Powers, 66 Cal. 368.
Johnson vs. Gliddcn 74, Am. St. 795.
Baker vs. Haldeman, 24 Mo. 219.
TV. Negligence is a question of fact in
this case for the detrmination of the tri-
bunal, the father not being liable unless
personal negligence is shown from the facts
of the case.
Defendant submits that under the facts
of this case that negligence is not shown.
Johnson vs. Glidden, 74 Am. St. 795.





Opinion by Marker, P. J.
This action is brought to recover dam-
ages sustained by the plaintiff in the loss
of an eye, directly caused by the negligent
act of the defendant's twelve year old boy.
A recovery is sought upon the following
facts: The defendant, residing near the
East Side Park, in Champaign, procured
for his boy an archery outfit, consisting of
two bows, twelve arrows, and a target, the
target consisting of a circular piece of soft
wood, with a painted bull's eye in the center,
and, when in use, rested upon a pedestal
about eighteen inches from the ground-. The
arrows were pointed with steel, so they
would stick into the target when shot from
the bow. After the boy had used the outfit
'" *he defendant's back yard for a few
^ c -s, he. With the knowledge and consent
(.1 the defendant, began practicing with it
in the East Side Park. He and other boys
\ e.-e went to so use it almost every after-
ii^uii. \jne aiternoon last June, the boy.
while so practicing in the park, shot an
arrow which missed the target and hit the
plaintiff in the right eye, thereby destroying
Its sisht. The plaintiff was, at the time,
si.r.ply passing along the walk which leads
throu.^h the park.
The common law rule that a father is not
responsible for the torts of his minor child
h::s been very generally recognized by the
courts of this country. As far as I am ad-
vised, there is but one state which has
announced a different rule, and that is the
state of Louisiana, where the civil law pre-
vails. The rule is different according to
the civil law. Under it, the doctrine that
fathers and others should be responsible
for acts of children under their care, v/hich
it is their power to prevent, prevails. The
civil law rule appears to me to be the most
reasonable, but of course the decision of a
case in a state where the common law, ex-
cept where modified by statute, prevails,
must be based upon the common law rule.
If the boy, without tiie knowledge or con-
sent of the defendant, had gone into the
park for archery practice, and while so
engaged put out the ye of the plaintiff, I
.should, following the common law rule,
hold that the defendant was not liable.
There is an element in this clause, however,
which in my opinion should take it out of
the common law rule. It seems that the
boy entered into this public park for the
purpose of practicing with other boys, with
the knowledge and consent of the defend-
ant. If he consented to the use of this
dangerous instrument, then, because of the
control which the parent has over the child,
he became in a sense, an accessory. What
do we understand by the term "consent?"
The latest lexicographers term it, "A vol-
untary accordance with, or concurrence in,
what is done or proposed to be done by
another." In law. consent is defined to be.
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"Capable, deliberate, and voluntary assent
or agreement to, or concurrence in, some
irental power." I take it, that the boy, after
using the outfit in his back yard, asked his
father permission to use it in the public
pari':, and that the father granted him such
permission. Under such circumstances, it
is clear to my mind that the father should
be held liable.
This case is very much like the case of
Hagarty vs. Powers, reported in 66 Cali-
fornia, 368. In that case the defendant de-
murred to a complaint in which he was
charged with willfully, carelessly, and negli-
gently suffering, permitting, countenancing,
and allcwing his son, eleven years of age,
to have in his possession, a loaded pistol,
^vhch the boy afterwards so carelessly used
as to shoot the infant child of the plaintiff.
A majority of the court decided that there
was no cause of action, but there was a
dissent and I think the better reasons are
with the judge filing the dissent.
The only remaining question is whether
lie insti'u ::ent which put out the plaintiffs
eye may be regarded as a dangerous weap-
on. Of course, a father would not be liable
"or ?.n injury occasioned by his minor son.
wh le in play with an instrument not neces-
sarly dangerous. For instance, his consent
to the boy playing baseball in the park
wculd not render him liable for aa injury
done by the boy in the use of an ordinary
baseball. This instrument was pointed witn
steel. It was necessarily dangerous in the
sam.e sense that a loaded pistol is danger-
ous when used in shooting at a mark. I
think that point is well substantiated by
arrow missed the target and struck the
the evidence, which shows that when the
plaintiff, the force was suflScient to destroy
his eye.
The finding will be for the plaintiff and






Lav>' of California governs this case for
(Jie succession to personal property is gov-
erned by the law of the actual domicil of
the intestate at the time of his death, no
i;;atter what was the country of his birth,
cr his former domicil, or the actual situs
of the property at the time of his death.
Russell vs. Madden, 95 111. 485.
Susan Johns is not entitled to all of this
money for
—
If the decedent leaves no issue, the estate
goes one half to the decedent's father and
mother in equal shares, and if either is
dead the whole of said half goes to the
other.
Sec. 1386. Par. 2, Civil Code of California.
Under this statute Jennie Cox, his foster
K-other, was entitled to one half of the
intestate's estate. She, however, has re-
nounced her share, by allowing the de-
fendant to administer the estate as she
did—for
The share in an nntestate's estate can
be released by an heir, and no formal doc-
uments are necessary to do this.
Riddell vs. Riddell, 70 Neb. 472.
Therefore, the plaintiff, natural father of
the intestate, is entitled to one half of his
deceased son's estate.










1. Conflict of laws:
The succession to personal property is
governed by the law of the actual domicile
of the intestate at the tirae of his death.
Russell vs. Madden, 95 111. 485.
Cooper vs. Beers, 143 111. 25.
14 Cyc. 21.
Therefore, the laws of descent and dis-
tribution of California apply in this case.
2. Descent and Distribution in Califor-
nia:
When a person dies intestate leaving no
issue, but leaving a husband or wife as the
case may be and a surviving parent or par-
ents, the husband or wife is entitled to
one half the estate of the intestate and the
parent or parents the other half.
Cal. Civil Code, Sec. 1386 (2).
3. Effect of adoption on the rights of
the parties:
(a) The effect of adoption is to confer
upon the parties the legal relation of parent
and child and entitle them to all the rights
and imposes all the duties of that relation.
Cal. Civil Code, Sec. 227, 228, 229.
And the relation between the natural
parents and the child are forever severed.
In Re Jobsons Estate, 128 Pac. 938.
Younger vs. Younger, 106 Cal. 379.
(b) A legally adopted child bears ex-
actly the same relation and is entitled to
exactly the same rights with respect to the
adoptve parents, as if born to them in wed-
lock.
Warner vs. Prescott (Maine) 17 L. R. A.
435.
In Ro Jobson's Estate, (Supra).
Tiffany, Dom. Rel. 222.
(c) "Wlien an adopted child inherits from
an adoptive parent and later dies intestate,
(he other heirs of the adoptive parents will
take in preference to the blood relatives of
the adopted child.
Humphries vs. Davis, 100 Ind. 275.
Estate of Evans, 106 Cal. 562.
Swick vs. Coleman, 218 111. 33.
(d) An adopted child inherits from the
adopting parents.
In Re Newman, 75 Cal. 213.





Opinion by Harker, P. J.
In this case the plaintiff seeks to recover
$10,000, being one-half of the amount of a
legacy v,'hich his son, Frank Cox Johns,
received under the will of his grandfather,
Frank Cox.
Tbe sou was adopted by his maternal
grandfather under the laws of California in
1S89. The plaintiff v/as, at that time, living
in California with his wife and consent for
tlie adoption was formally entered. The
son continued to reside with his grandpar-
ents up to the time of the death of his
grandfather, in 1906. The plaintiff, shortly
after the adoption of the child, removed to
Illinois, where he has lived ever since. The
adopted son married the defendant in Cal-
ifornia, and died in 1909, owning no property
except the legacy bequeathed to him by
his grandfather. It consisted entirely of
personal property. The only relatives left
by him at his death were his widow, the de-
fendant, this plaintiff, and his grandmother.
The defendant administered upon his estate,
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and after paying all costs of administration,
received the entire $20,000, in Ifill, when she
left California and took up her residence in
Illinois.
Quite uniformly have the states where
adoption legislation has been passed provid-
ed that the adopted child shall, for the pur-
pose of inheritance, be regarded in the
same light as a child by lawful wedlock, and
the adopting parents regarded in the same
light as a parent in wedlock. In other
words, a child adopted in conformity with
legislative provision comes to full rights
of inheritance as a natural child, and the
parent to the full rights, not only of con-
trol of the child, but of inheriting from the
child. By the adoption proceedings, a new
relation is established and the parent con-
senting to the adoption of the child, unless
there is statute to the contrary, releases his
right of inheritance.
The adoption in this case having been
under the laws of California and the prop-
erty in dispute being situated in California
at the time of the death of the plaintiff's
child, the rights of the parties must be de-
termined according to the laws of Cali-
fornia. In that state, it is held by the courts
th:it the right of inheritance of the subject
of adoption, with the rights and obligations
springing therefrom, are purely matters of
slrtutory regulation. In that state, it is
held that where there has been a regular
adoption that the natural relationship be-
tween the child and its parents by blood
consenting thereto is suspended. The courts
there are in harmony with the courts else-
where, where the adoption legislation is
similar, and take the view that as the act
of adoption confers upon the adopted child
I the right to succeed to the estate of his
adopting parent, it follows that upon the
I death of the child, the adopting parent is
entitled to inherit as a parent to the ex-
cursion of the parent by blood. The courts
(here also hold that the death cf the adopt-
'.1!? parent iJoes not have the effect to re-
vive in the natural parent a right of in-
heritance. In other words, upon the death
ot an adopted child, after the death of the
adopting parent, the parents by blood have
!'.o statutory rigiit of inheritance in the
child's estate.
If when, this child died, one-half of the
estate belonged to the widow and the other
half belonged to the grandmother, the
natural father, the plaintiff, could lay no
claim to it, even though the defendant took
the entire $L'0.000.







Brief for the Plaintiff
When a principal grants a right of exclu-
sive agency in a certain territory for a
specific period, that right given is exclusive
cf the prinlipal as well as of other agents
appointed by the principal.
La Favorite Rubber Mfg. Co. vs. Chan-
Ron Co., 113 111 Ap. 491.
IWarshall vs. Canadian Cordage Etc. Co.,
160 111. App. 114.
Wiggins vs. Consolidated etc. Shoe Co.,
161 Mass. 597.
Cincinnati etc. Co. vs. Western etc. Co.,
152 U. S. 200.
The sale by the principal need not be
made in the territory where the exclusive
right exists to allow the agent to recover
for a breach of an agreement for the ex-
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elusive agency if the sale be made by the
principal to a resident of the agent's terri-
tory while that purchaser is temporarily re-
siding outside the agent's territory, the
apeut may recover the commission.
Garfield v». Peerless Motor Car Co. 189
Mass. 395.
Marshall vs. Canadian Cordage Etc. Co.,







If the principal grants a right of ex-
clusive agency in a certain territory for
a specified time, and the principal sells
goods within the territory within the time
designated in the contract, he is not liable
to the agent for the commissions on the
sales.
Goldengate Packing Company vs. Farmers'
Union, 55 Cal. 606.
Thomas Houston Electric Co., vs. Berg,
SO S. W. 454.
If the principal gives the agent the ex-
clusive right to sell the former's products
within a certain designated territory for a
specified time, and the principal sells his
products, outside the territory, to a resident
thereof, and that person takes the product
into the territory, the principal is not liable
to the agent for commissions on such sales.
Wycoff vs. Bishop, 115 Mich. 414.
Haynes Automobile Co. vs. Woodill Auto
Co., 163 Cal. 102, 40 L. R. A. (NS) 971.
Gay Oil Co. vs. Muskogee Oil Co., 97
Ark. 502.
In an exclusive agency contract where
the principal does not expressly bind him-
self not to sell within the specified terri-
tory he may sell his product to a resident
of that territory and not be liable to the
agent for the commissions on the sales.
Golden Gate Packing Co. vs. Farmers'
Union, supra.
Thomas-Houston Electric Co. vs. Berg,
supra.
Wycoff vs. Bishop, supra;
Gay Oil Co. vs. Muskogee Ooil Ref. Co.,
supra.
Haynes Automobile Co. vs. Woodill Auto
Co., supra.
The owner of real estate, though he grants
to an agent the exclusive right to sell, may
sell the same himself and not become liable
to the agent for commissions imless the
agent has produced a buyer who is ready
and willing to purchase.
Woolf vs. Sullivan, 224 111. 509.
Dickinson vs. Owens, 134 111. App 5C1.
Gilbert vs. Coons, 37 id. 448.
Metzen vs. Wyatt, 41 id. 487.
Sievers vs. Grifl[in, 14 id. 63.
Dole vs. Sherwood, 41 Minn. 535.
4 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law 979.
31 Cyc. 1517.
To entitle an agent to his commissions he
must be the procuring cause of the consu-
mation of the transaction.
Attrill vs. Patterson, 58 Md. 226, and
cases cited.
Burkholder vs. Fonner, 34 Neb. I.
Blumberg vs. Sterling Bronze Co., Ill N.
Y. S. 529.
Odum vs. J. I. Case Co., 36 S. W. 191
(Tenn.).
Commercial Nat'l Bank vs. Hawkins, 35
111. App. 463.
If a sale by a principal works a breach
of contract with the agent, the action by
the agent should be for damages and not
for commissions.
Metzen vs. Wyatt. 41 111. App. 487.
Dickson vs. Owens, 134 111. App. 564.
Clark & Skyles on Agency, P. 356.
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Roberts vs. Minn, etc. Machine Co., 59
Am. St., Rep. 777.
Tlie agent who alleges that his exclusive
territory has been invaded by the principal
must show that the parties making the
purchases would, but for the act of the
principal, in selling to them, have purchased
from the agent in order to recover his com-
missions on such sales.
Hall vs. Spencer & Sewart, 58 la. 681.
Wilson Sewing Machine Co. vs. Sloan, 60
la. 367.
Clark & Skyles, P. 356.
Roberts vs. Minn. etc. Machine Co., supra.




Attorneys for the Defendant.
Opinion by Harker, P. J.
This suit is to recover $737.50, commis-
sion on two sales of automobiles manufac-
lured by the defendant and sold to Amos
Price and Leonard Watts, residents of Ur-
bana, Illinois. It is based upon the fol-
lowing contract and facts. In January, 1911,
he defendant appointed the plaintiff its
a^eat to sell the Oakland auto cars in the
cunties of Champaign, Douglas, Macon and
Piatt, on a commission of 25 per cent. In
consideration of the exclusive right to sell,
the plaintiff agreed to sell no other make
of automobile within the territory mention-
ed, for the period of three years. Something
over two years after the plaintiff had es-
tablished garages at Champaign, Tuscola,
Decatur and Monticello, where he kept the
cars made by the defendant on exhibition,
and after he had sold a large number of
them, Amos Price and Leonard Watts, who
had become familiar with the Oakland by
driving them about Champaign and Urbana,
visited the factory of the defendant and
bought two machines, one of them paying
$1375 for one and the other one paying
.$1575 for the other. The prices were the
same as those fixed for the plaintiff, plus
the freight charges to Champaign. The
purchasers drove the machines to Urbana.
After the plaintiff had learned of the pur-
chase, he made demand for the $737.50 as
commissions, which was refused.
The plaintiff does not contend that he
had anything to do with negotiating the
sales to Price and Watts. It does not ap-
pear, even, that he had by solicitation, dem-
onstration of the good qualities of the Oak-
land car, or otherwise, led them toward a
decision to make the purchase of that par-
ticular make of automobile. He bases his
claim for compensation solely upon the con-
tract which gave him the exclusive right to
sell within the district embraced by the
counties of Champaign, Douglas, Macon and
Piatt.
The plaintiff contends. First: That when
a manufacturer gives to another an exclu-
sive agency to sell its product in a certain
territory for a specified period, the company
is excluded as well as other agents, and
Second: That if it sell to a resident of the
territory while the purchaser is temporarily
without the territory, the agent is entitled
to commission on the sale. As to the first
contention, there can be no serious dispute.
Where there is an exclusive agency, and the
principal violates the contract by making
sales directly within the exclusive terri-
tory, he ought to be and certainly is liable.
In this case the plaintiff, in consideration
of the exclusive right to sell the Oakland
machine in the four counties mentioned, re-
linquished all right to sell another make of
automobile in the territory for three years.
The serious contention is the second one
made. The sales were not made within the
district. They were made to men living
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vv'tliiu the district it is true, but without
aid, solicitation or advice of the plaintiff,
so far as the evidence discloses. To reach
a correct decision of the case, therefore, we
ioust look to the peculiar language of the
contract. "The exclusive right to sell' was
in tlie counties of Champaign, Douglas, Ma-
iron and Piatt, not the exclusive right to
sell to people in those counties. In the
absence of any trade usage to the contrary,
tiie plaintiff would be entitled to recover
where sales were made to parties living
within the district who had been induced
by the efforts of the plaintiff to make the
purchase. What is meant is that the de-
fendant should not be allowed to take the
sale out of the hands of the plaintiff, after
he had, by solicitation, demonstration, and
other efforts, brought a resident of the dis-
trict up to the point of buying. Such case
is not presented. Under the facts presented,
there does not appear to be a breach of the
contract and for that reason the finding is
for the defendant..
In the Matter of the Estate
of
William F. Benson, Deceased
Case No. 19
Statement
William F. Benson died intestate on the
3rd of May 1912, in the City of Champaign,
State of Illinois. On the 6th of June, 1912,
his widow, Ida May Benson, is appointed ad-
ministratrix, and after qualifying, letters
testamentary are issued to her. The de-
cedent at the time of his death, had very
little personal property, but did have ccn-
aiderable real estate. In order to pay the
debts of the estate, the administratrix ob-
tained an order from the court to sell at
private sale a certain piece of the real
estate belonging to the estate.
The property was listed with James Going
a i-eal estate man in the City of Champaign,
and a net price of $6,000 was placed upon
the same. The property was listed with
Gordon by one of the heirs, Stanley Benson.
Cordon knew it to be property belonging; to
an estate, but did not know it belonged to
the estate of Benson. CJordon showed the
property to Max Schmidt, and negotiated a
sale. Schmidt offered $5,500 for the prop-
erty and made a deposit of §450 on the pur-
chase price. Gordon notified the testatrix
that the only offer he could get for ihe
property was one for $4,500.
The administratrix sent over a blank Conn
of bid to be filled cut by Gordon. Unknown
to and without the authority of Schmidt,
the bid v;as made by one Dan E. Hall, an
eniploye of Gordon, for $4,500, and thus $450
paid by Schmidt on the purchase price, was
deposited in Court with the bid of Hall.
After the bid had been filed in Court,
Schmidt made an additional payment of
!i'.2,300 on the prchase price to Gordon.
The administratrix filed her return of the
sale and petitioned the court to confirm the
same. The property has been appraised,
and the sum of $4,500 is under the law a
high enough sum for the property. Before
the day set for the hearing of the return,
it was learned by the heir, Benson, and by
the administratrix, that the property in
Question had been sold by Gordon to
Schmidt for the sum of $5,500. It is to the
interest of the estate that a sale to Schmidt
be made. He is willing to pay $5,500 for
the property upon the delivery to him of a
good deed. Gordon wants his $1,000 as a
commission.
Attorneys for the administratrix will take
the necessary steps to protect the estate.
Attorneys for the heir will take the neces-
sary steps , to protect his interest in the
estate.
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Attorneys for Hall and Gordon will object
to any steps taken by the administratrix or
the heir, which will entail upon Gordon the
loss of the $1,000 commission he is trying to









The County of Champaign
Case No. 20.
The plaintiff, a surgeon practicing in Ur-
bana, was, on the 4th of October, 1912, sum-
noned to attend a man by the name of
John Scott, who, while trying to mount a
moving freight train on the Illinois Central,
.vas injured near Tolono. Scott was a tramp
without means. Wlien the plaintiff arrived
at the place of the accident, he found Scott's
leg badly crushed and the blood flowing pro-
fusely. Prompt action was necessary to
stop the flow of blood and save his life.
He remained with him until morning, when
he had him removed to the Burnham hos-
pitalin Champaign. When he visited him
on the next day, he found it necessary to
amputate his leg to save his life, so he
called to his aid another physician and two
days later amputated the leg. After the
amputation he visited Scott at the hospital
twenty times. After Scott's discharge from
the hospital, he filed a claim with the
County Board of Supervisors for $200. His
bill was itemized as follows: $75 for at-
tending Scott through the night, $75 for
amputating the leg, and $50 for the subse-
quent visits. The Board of Supervisors re-
fused to allow the claim because the ser-
vices were rendered without authority from
an overseer of the poor, resident in the town-
ship. An overseer of the poor resides four
miles west of Tolono, and an overseer of
the poor resides in Urbana. The plaintiff
brings suit to the Circuit Court to recover
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Fraud which gives rise to an action of de-
ceit exists where a person makes a false
representation of a material fact susceptible
of knowledge, knowing it to be false, or
as of his own knowledge when he does not
know whether it is true or false, with the
intention to induce the person to whom it
is made, in reliance upon it, to do or re-
frain from doing something to his pecuniary
hurt, and the deceived person acts with
reasonable prudence
20 Cyc. 10, Sec. 6.
Eames vs. Morgan, 37, 111., 274.
Busternd vs. Farrington, 36, Minn., 320.
Ley vs. Insurance Company, 120 Iowa, 203.
No one can maintain an action for a wrong
[ when he has consented or contributed to
\ the act which causes his loss.
Rea vs. Tucker, 51 111., 110.
I
resentation for the purpose of maintaining
Lowe vs. Massey, 62 111., 47.
A person cannot complain of false rep-
resentation in an action of deceit, unless the
representations were made with the inten-
tion that they should be acted upon by him.
14 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, 148.
Where a man who has equal opportunity
with the other to judge of a particular fact,
voluntarily shuts his eyes, he must charge
his misfortune to his own credulity. The
maxim caveat emptor applies.
I Street's Foundations of Legal Liability,
413.











1. A demurrer to a declaration admits
to be true all the facts pleaded.
Samuel Arenz vs. County of Franklin, 43
111., App., 267.
2. Where untrue representations have
been made to influence a person's conduct,
and the person to whom such representa-
tions were made relying on them acted as
was desired and, as a result, suffered dam-
age which was a proximate result of such
untrue representations such person may
have a remedy for the deception.
Cooley on Torts, page 905.
3. Where one person makes a statement
to another which is untrue; and which the
person making it does not believe to be
true, whether knowing it to be untrue, or
being ignorant whether it is true or not;
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and which the preson making it intends or
expects it to be acted on in a certain man-
ner, by the preson to whom it is made, or
with ordinary sense or prudence would ex-
pect it to be acted upon; and on reliance of
which the person to whom it is made does
act in that manner to his own harm; then
the person making the statement is said
to deceive the person to whom it is made.
Burdick on Torts, pages 365-366.
4. In an action of case for deceit a dec-
laration which sets out the false representa-
tions, his knowledge of the defendant that
they are false, their falsity in fact, the ma-
teriality of the representations, the re-
liance upon them of the plaintiff, and con-
sequent damage is sufficient.
Brown vs. Lobdell & Co., 50 111., App. 559.
5. If a person damage another by false
representations made with intent to de-
ceive, knowing same to be false, he will be
liable to the person injured, in an action for
deceit, notwithstanding he may derive ho
benefit for the deceit.
Endsley vs. Johns 120 111., 469.
6. To recover in an action for deceit, it
is only necessary for the plaintiff to prove
that the representations were false, that
the party making them knew them to be
false, and that the plaintiff relied upon them
as true and induced to act upon them to his
loss and injury.
John Formell Co. vs. Nathonson, 99 111.,
App. 185.
7. Where one knowingly makes an untrue
statement, with regard to anything then
existing, or which has previously occurred,
material to the matter in hand, and he to
whom it is made, not knowing its untruth,
relies upon it and sustains damage, the per-
son making such false statement is liable
for damages accruing to the party injured.
Potter vs. Potter, 65 111., App. 74.
8. If a man represents as true that which
he knows to be false, and makes the rep-
resentation in such a way, or under such
circumstances as to induce a reasonable man
to believe it is true and is meant to be acted
oil, and the person to whom the representa-
tion has been made believing it to be true,
r.cts upon the faith of it, and by so acting
sustains damage here is fraud to support
an action for deceit.
Nolte vs. Reichelin, 96 111., 425.
9. Where the representations relate to
a material fact within the knowledge of the
person making them, or he assumes to make
them upon his personal knowledge, and
with respect to which the person to whom
they are made has not the present oppor-
tunity or ability to test or verify, the latter
v/ill have the right to rely upon such rep-
resentation in the absence of facts apparent
to reasonably arouse suspicion and throw
doubt upon their truth, and he will not be
bound to go further and make inquiries
thereof. ffi
Engley vs. Johns, 120 111., 469.
10. The motive which actuates a person
in making false representations are wholly
immaterial. The law infers an improper
motive, if what the party states is false,
within his own knowledge, and is the cause
of injury to the other.
Formal vs. Nathonson, 99 111., 185.
11. A person who makes a false state-
ment intended to be acted on must make
good the damage naturally resulting from
Its being acted on.





Opinion by Harker P. J.
In this suit the plaintiff seeks to recover
damages sustained by her through the loss
of her husband, who abandoned her be-
cause of her abuse and neglect.
The facts as alleged in the declaration
are as follows: After the plaintiff's hus-
band, who had for several years been an
employe of the defendant, quit his service,
the defendant en several occasions made
false statements to the plaintiff concerning
her husband's constancy. He stated to her
specific instances of illicit relations with
lewd women in Chicago, Peoria and else-
where. When confronted with the accusa-
tions the husband denied them strenuously
and demanded of the plaintiff the name of
her informant, which she refused to divulge,
being under pledge to the defendant not to
do so. The defendant is an uncle of the
plaintiff by marriage. His influence over
her was great, evidently, because she be-
lieved his false statements rather than her
husband's truthful denials. She continued
to accuse the husband, denied him admit-
tance into their home and refused to visit
him when dangerously sick at a nearby
hotel. Because of such treatment the hus-
band, as soon as he was able to travel, de-
parted the state, and has not been heard of
by her since.
The case is a novel one, the like of which
has never been presented to the courts of
this state, so far as I am advised. There
is abundant authority for sustaining the re-
covery of damages against a party for
alienating the affections of a husband or
wife, and if this was a suit by Henry Woods
against the defendant, undoubtedly he
should recoved. But this is a suit by one
concerning whom the false and slanderous
statements were not made. They were
made not for the purpose of injuring the
plaintiff, but to injure one who is not a party
to the proceeding. When first presented, I
was inclined to hold that the action would
not lie, but upon mature reflection, I have
reached a different conclusion.
While it is true that the immediate cause
of the separation was the cruel treatment
of the plaintiff, the cause of the cruel treat-
ment was the false and slanderous report
made by the defendant concerning the plain-
tiff's husband. As a general rule, an action
for damages for deceit will lie wherever
a party has made a false representation of
a material fact, knowing it to be false, with
the intention to induce the person to whom
it is made to do or refrain from doing some-
thing to his pecuniary loss, when such per-
son, acting with reasonable prudence is
thereby deceived and induced to so do to
his own damage. The case presented by the
declaration shows the separation of the
husband from the wife and that it was
caused by her cruel treatment to him, in-
duced through the action of the defendant
in making to the wife willfully false repre-
sentations concerning her husband, for the
purpose and with the design on his part to
so influence her as to bring about such sep-
aration. The defendant used the wife as
an instrument to wreak his revenge upon
the husband. The result of his conduct was
injurious to both and I feel convinced that
either has a cause of action against the de-
fendant.





Waite was hired as a clerk in William
Benson's grocery store, and had served there
many years. His duties consisted of making
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sales to customers, taking cash in payment,
and depositing it in the cash register. He
was often sent by Benson to the bank to
make deposits and to draw money on Ben-
son's checks, to be used as change in the
store. Ho had instructions from Benson
never to borrow money in the name of
Benson.
One of Benson's customs was to exchange
goods with a neighboring merchant, Archi-
bald Coolidge, when necessary for their
mutual accommodation. Waite was often
sent to get goods from Coolidge and re-
ceived such goods without a written order.
The difference between the two merchants
were settled at the end of each month by
a sight draft drawn on the party w^ho stood
debtor by the other.
Coolidge did not know that Waite was not
allowed to borrow money. He did know
that Waite was a trusted clerk who was
frequently sent to the bank by Benson as
above. For some reason Benson suddenly
discharged Waite, on June 30, 1912, paid
him in full, and told him to leave that noon,
as he might lawfully do. Waite, angered,
wished to cause Benson some loss, and
shortly after banking hours the same day
went to Coolidge's store, where the fact of
his discharge was not yet known, and told
Coolidge that he was sent by Benson to the
bank for $100 change, but had arrived too
late and that he would like to borrow it
from him. Coolidge gave him the money.
Before this transaction the balance for the
month had stood in Coolidge's favor. On
the evening of June 30th, Coolidge prepared
an account of the month's transactions and
mailed it to Benson, with a note stating that
he was drawing on Benson for the balance,
$234.50. The account contained the entry
of the loan to Waite that day. Benson did
not take time to examine the account when
it was received, but when the draft was
received he paid It. When he checked the
account up, he saw the entry, "June 30th,
(ash loaned per Waite, $100", and demanded
that Coolidge repay him on the ground that
Waite had no authority to borrow money
for him. Coolidge refuses to do so and









A. J. MacDonald was the owner of a one
story and basement building in Champaign,
111., which was leased on June 1, 1910, to
the Peerless Restaurant for the term of
five years at a rental of $100 per month.
The following are some of the provisions of
the lease:
1. "It is mutually agreed between the
above named parties that the premises here-
in demised are now in good, safe, and ten-
antable condition, and that all repairs which
may subsequently become necessary shall
be made by the lessee."
2. "In the event that the said premises
shall become untenantable through fire or
other cause, the said lease shall not be-
come void, but the lessor shall have sixty
days in which to restore the premises to
tenantable condition and the lessee shall
not be liable for rent for such period as he
is unable to occupy the premises. In the
event that the lessor is unable to put the
premises in proper repair within the said
sixty days, then this lease shall terminate
and become void."
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Due to improper construction of the build-
ing and defects existing at the date of the
execution of the lease, the basement was at
times flooded with water and sewage, was
improperly ventilated, and in an unsanitary
condition generally. On May 1, 1912 it was
condemned by the health officers and the
lessee was forced by them to vacate. A dis-
pute arising between MacDonald and the
lessee as ot who should make the repairs,
three months elapses before the building is
rendered satisfactory to the authorities.
MacDonald finally repairs, but the lessee
refuses to re-enter, and on January 1, 1913,
MacDonald brings this action for seven















Casper Allen is the owner of a hotel, Bud
Haynes, a servant of his, while sweeping
one morning, found a gold ring in the hotel
lobby and a nugget of gold worth $5.00 in
a room occupied by a guest the night be-
fore. The nugget of gold he sold to Tony
Lyman, a fellow servant and bona fide pur-
chaser. The former owner of neither article
appearing, Allen demands the ring of
Haynes and the nugget of Lyman. Allen now










Andrew White, seeing Jones, his old en-
e .'ly, going down town, went up behind
Jones and gave him a blow on the side of
the head. This blow so affected Jones'
brain as to deprive him of hearing. Jones
turned on White, drew his knife, and grap-
j)led with him. White called to Jones to
stop, that he had no desire to fight, and that
he would acknowledge Jones the better man,
but Jones, being unable to hear, held White,
and was on the point of stabbing him when
White pulled a pistol and killed Jones by
a shot. Prosecution of White for murder.








On May 1, 1913, A. L. Jones hired an auto-
mobile from the Smith garage for the after-
aoon for $10.00. Not being able to drive
the machine, he requests that a driver be
furnished. Smith, the owner of the garage,
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thereupon detailed Brown, who worked for
him in the garage, to take the car out.
Jones promised to pay the driver $2.50.
After leaving the city limits, Jones leaned
over to the chauffer and said "Go as fast as
you can. I want to see how fast you can
go."
Brown replied, "My employer does not
allow me to break the speed limit."
Jones answered, "Do as I tell you, damn
you, I am your master now." Brown ac-
cordingly put on full speed and while driv-
ing at a reckless rate, ran into and injured
A. B. White, the plaintiff, who was driving
along the road using due care.
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Parol evidence is admissible to explain
the terms of a written contract when the
saii:e are ambiguous or capable of two
constructions.
IT Cyc, 062.
Walker vs. Tucker, 70 111., 52 7.
Walker vs. Douglas, 70 111., 445.
Gray vs. Ellis, 129 Pac, 791.
Babcock vs. Deford, 14 Kan., 408.
Brown vs. Markland, 16 Utah, 360.
II.
Whenever one has received money
which in equity and good conscience
ought not to be retained, an action for
money had and received will lie to recov-
er back such money.
Town of Bleeker vs. Balje. 12 3 N. Y.
Sup., 809.
Allen vs. Stenger. 74 111., 119.
First National Bank vs. Gatton, 172
111., 625.
Board of Highway Commissioners vs.
City of Bloomington, 253 111., 164.
Wilson vs. Turner, 164 111.. 398.
III.
Money which has been paid to a party
for a particular purpose, but which has not
been so applied, may be recovered back
in an action for money had and received.
Critzer vs. McConnell, 15 111., 172.
Gray vs. Callender, 181 111., 173.
Gray vs. Ellis, 129 Pac, 791.
IV.
Both principal and agent are liable in
ail action tor money had and received,
when agent has wrongfully appropriated
the money received, and the principal has
received the benefit.
Gray vs. Callender, 181 III., 173.
Shipherd vs. Underwood, 55 111., 475.
Commercial National Bank of Chicago
vs. Soloman, 106 N. Y., Sup., 508.
Slaughter vs. Fay, 80 HI. App., 105.
Hoyt vs. Paw Paw Grape Juice Co., 158
Mich., 619.







Henry Enos and John Church and
The Central Trust Company.
llvief for Agents, Enos and Church.
I.
There was only one contract between
plaintiff and principal negotiated by the
agents of the principal. That this contract
is not ambiguous on its face, and in view
of this fact the oral evidence can not be
admitted. Oral evidence is only admissi-
ble to change the term of a written con-
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tract, when the contract upon its face






The agents are not liable on a contract
iiade for their principal when they act
within their authority, unless the agent
anrees to be bound.
77 111.. 372.
169 111., 482.
Ill 111. App., 10.
III.
That agent was acting within his author-
ity. That his authority was implied by
custom; that by custom the agents were
in the habit of contracting in like manner
lor principal. Therefore, since the agents
were acting within the scope of their au-
thority, and disclosed their principal, they
cannot be held responsible.
82 111. App., 77.
SEED and SEARING.
Brief of Defendant, Central Trust Co.
I.
Oral evidence is inadmissible to vary
the term of written contract, and all pre-
vious agreements are merged Into the
written instrument.
O'Rear vs. Strong, 13 111., 689.
Marshall vs. Gridley, 46 111., 247.
Urnesheik Ins. Co. vs. Holzgrafe, 53
111., 522.
Clark vs. Mallory, 185 111., 227.
Davis vs. Fidelity Fire Ins. Co., 208
111., 375.
II.
A special agent cannot bind his prin-
cipal beyond the scope of his agency, and
the third party dealing with such agent
is bound at his peril to determine the ex-
tent of the agency.
Day vs. Snyder Brokerage and Stor-
age Co., 130 S. W., 716.
Peabody vs. Hoard, 46 111., 242.
Baxter vs. Lamont, 60 111., 237.
Dumser vs. Underwood, 68 111. App.,
121.
Forbis vs. Reeves & Co., 109 111. App.,
98.
Young vs. Harbor Point Club House As-
sociation, 99 111. App., 290.




OPINION BY HARKER, P. J.
This is a suit to recover $1,000 paid to
Enos and Church, agents for the Southern
Trust Company, and turned over to the
Central Trust Company.
The Southern Illinois Telephone Com-
pany is an operating company formed by
the consolidation of a number of local
telephone companies which had been
operating in twenty-two counties in South-
ern Illinois. The Central Trust Company
and the Southern Trust Company are hold-
ing companies for its stock and bonds,
each capitalized for $200,000. Each has
a distinct board of directors and a distinct
set of officers, except that both have the
same man for president. Subscription
books for stock were opened at Cairo and
Centralia. Enos and Church were selling
t.gents at Cairo.
The plaintiff desiring $2,000 of stock in
the Southern Trust Company, applied to
Enos and Church, and paid them $1,000 in
advance, being fifty per cent of the pur-
chase price. At the same time he signed
a subscription instrument used by subscrib-
ers and which had been signed by others,
reciting an agreement to pay Enos and
Church the sum placed opposite his name.
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$2,000, fifty per cent cash and the balance
when called for, being payment on ac-
count of purchase of stock of the Central
or Southern Trust Company. On the fol-
lowing day, Enos and Church, learning
that all the stock of the Southern Trust
Company had been taken, sent the $1,000
lorp their commission, to the Central Trust
Company, which issued and mailed to the
plaintiff a certificate for 2 shares of its
stock to the plaintiff. The plaintiff imme-
diately returned the certificate and called
upon Enos and Church for a return of the
$1,000. They refused upon the ground
til at under his written subscription he
Authorized the purchase of stock in either
company.
It may be observed that the written
instrument did not specifically authorize
Enos and Church to select the stock in
either of the companies.
The words, "purchase of stock of the
Central or Southern Trust Company" are
used merely in connection with and as
explanatory of what the subscription of
$2,000 was for. Enos and Church werp
agents authorized to obtain subscriptions
to the capital stock of two different cor-
pr.'ations and as the subscription paper
slaned by the plaintiff did not specifically
authorize them to place the stock In
whichever of the two they might elect
tr-ere is no violation of the rule of evidence
rcntended for by them and the other de-
fendant In allowing proof that the plain-
tift gave specific instructions as to which
company the stock should be in. When
the plaintiff applied to them he made it
clear that he wanted stock in the South-
ern Trust Company, assigning as a reason
that he knew its oflicers. The placing of
the money with the other company was an
unauthorized diversion of It. I see no
reason to doubt their liability to the plain-
tiff.
In behalf of the Central Trust Company
it is urged further that it had no informa-
tion concerning the subscription other
than what appeared in the subscription
lii-t signed by the plaintiff. If there was
an unauthorized diversion of the money
to it by Enos and Church, its agents, ig-
norance of the specific Instructions given
by the plaintiff cannot shield it from II-
ahility. It cannot profit by reason of the
unauthorized acts of Its own agents and
must be held to hold plaintiff's money
without right and under an Implied
promise to repay the same.
.Judgment against the defendants for
31,000 and costs.
CASE NO. 13.




Suicide is no defense to a suit on a life
iv.-durance policy by the beneficiary, unless
so stipulated In the policy.
Supreme Lodge vs. Kutscher, 72 111.
App., 462.
II.
Issuance and delivery of policy is con-
clusive proof of approval of application.
Van Ardale vs. Osborne Brokerage Co.,
115 Pacific, 779.
III.
Policy becomes effective for insurance
p.'.rnoses from the day of Its date.
Monahan vs. Fidelity Mutual Life Insur-
ance Company, 148 111. App., 171.
IV.
The life insurance policy with applica-
tion attached must be construed as a single
( nntract.
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Satterfield vs. Fidelity Mutual Life In-
surance Company, 55 So., 200.
Blasinganie vs. The Royal Circle, 111
111. App., 202.
V.
As in the case of other contracts the ex-
press intention of the parties control in
the interpretation of the contract of insur-
ance.







Missouri State Life Insurance Company.
Brief for Defendant.
I.
No contract of insurance arises until
there has been a valid acceptance of the ap-
plication therefor, and an application for
an insurance policy is not a contract until
a policy has, in fact, been issued.
10 111. App., 348.
53 111. App., 530.
72 111. App., 5G9.
102 111. App., 348.
II.
While the parol evidence rule forbids
the introduction of evidence for the pur-
pose of varying or contradicting the
terms of a written agreement it is a well
established exception that the date of a
document's execution may be established
by proving the actual time of the contract,
regardless of any statement of the date
contained in the writing.
Greenleaf on Evidence, 16th Ed., Vol. 1,
Art. 285.





OPINION BY HARKER, P. J.
This is a suit upon a life insurance policy
issued to Philip Allen, in which it wafi
stipulated that the company should not
be liable "in the event of the insured's
death by his own act, whether sane or in-
sane during the period of one year after
the issuance of this policy." The policy
was dated May 2 2, 1910, but was not really
executed and delivered until July 6, 1910.
On June 12, 1911, less than one year after
the delivery of the policy but more than
one year after its date, Allen committed
suicide. The defense is under the con-
dition mentioned.
Written application for the insurance
was dated May 21, 1910. A medical ex-
aminer's report was attached to it. Be-
cause of some informality the application
was returned for amendment and on the
24th of June, 1910, Allen signed and sent
in a second or amended application. The
policy recited as consideration an annual
premium of $80, payable on the 22nd of
May of each year. The second premium
was paid on the 22nd of May, 1911.
A decision of the case hinges upon
whether the date of the policy or the phys-
ical fact of its execution determines its
issuance. Of course the words "issuance
of this policy" are not in ordinary accept-
ation synonymous with the words "date
of this policy." But in considering a writ-
ten contract the usual definition of a single
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word or term is not a conclusive test of
the meaning to be attributed to it. The
true intention of the parties is to be ascer-
tained from an examination of the entire
instrument, read in the light of the cir-
cumstances attending its execution, and
the interpretation placed upon the contract
by the parties themselves.
While it is true that the company re-
turned the application received by it on
May 22, because it was defective, it after-
wards, when it exercised the physical act
of executing the policy, elected to adopt
that date as the beginning of the insurance.
It accepted the first premium of $80 as of
that date and accepted the second annual
premium of the 22nd of May, 1911, and
specified that the premiums for the suc-
cessive years should be payable on the
22nd of May. It is entirely competent for
parties to agree that a policy shall be ante-
dated, and when that is done, it takes ef-
fect from its date. City of Davenport vs.
P. M. & F. Ins. Co., 17 Iowa, 2 76; Light-
body vs. North American Ins. Co., 2 3
Wend., 18: Anderson vs. Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 164 Cal., 712.
As the suicide was committed more than
one year after the date agreed upon as the
commencement of the insurance, the de-
fense must fail and judgment be entered




Joseph Clark, et al.
Brief of Plaintiff.
I.
Penal bond is valid, though wrong ob-
ligee is named. The naming of the obli-
s-ee is a mere formality.
1 Brandt on Suretyship, Sec. 32.
Bay County vs. Brock, 44 Mich., 45, 6
N. W., 101.
City of Orlando vs. Gooding, 34 Fla.,
244, 15 So. 770.
Skellinger vs. Yendes, 12 Wend, 306.
Stephens vs. Crawford, 3 Kelley (Ga.)
499, at page 508.
Riggs vs. Miller, 52 N. W., (Neb.), 567.
Thomas vs. Hinkley, 19 Neb., 324.
II.
A provision in a contract totally repug-
nant to the contract itself is void.
Banjamin vs. McConnell, 4 Oilman,
536.
III.
Contract for suretyship must have a
reasonable interpretation according to in-
tention of parties.
Ewen vs. Wilbor, 99 111. App., 132.
McDonald vs. Harris, 75 111. App., 111.
IV.
Where a contract is capable of two con-
structions, construe it so as to make it
operative.
Thompson vs. Seavor, 189 111., 158.
Doyle vs. Teas, 4 Scam., 202.
V.
Contract will be construed strongly
against maker.
McCarty vs. Howell, 2 4 111., 341.
Norton vs. Brophy, 56 Til. App., 661.
Walker vs. Kimball, 22 111., 537.
VI.
Parol evidence is admissible to explain
ambiguity.




OPFMON BY BARKER. P. .T.
.Joseph Clark and Eli Rood, sureties on
the bond of James Clark, collector of
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special taxes in Urbana, are sued to recover
a shortage of $2,400, which the collector
appropriated to his own use.
They defend upon the ground that the
bond did not run to the City of Urbana,
hut to the City of Champaign. While the
recitals in the bond show that James Clark
was appointed collector of special taxes
for the City of Urbana, and that the con-
dition was for him to faithfully discharge
the duties of that office and pay over to
the proper custodian all taxes so collect-
ed, it recites that the principal and sure-
ties are "bound to the City of Champaign,
Illinois, in the penal sum of Three Thou-
sand Dollars." The mistake occurred by
using a printed blank used by the city
officials in Champaign and by failing to
erase the word "Champaign" and insert
the word "Urbana."
It is a familiar rule in suretyship that
a surety is not to be held beyond the pre-
cise terms of his contract. His liability
is strictissimi juris and cannot be extend-
ed by construction. Field vs. Rawling, 1
Gilm., 581; Stull, et al, vs. Hance. 62 111..
52; Cooper et al vs. The People, for the
use of Madison County, 85 111., 417.
Through an application of this rule these
defendants, sureties on the bond in suit,
seek to escape a recovery against them.
The defense is purely technical. It is not
claimed that the defendants were misled
by the recitals in the bond. They knew
that James Clark had been appointed City
Collector of Special Taxes for the City of
Urbana, and that the bond required of him
was to be to that city—not to the City of
Champaign.
Looking solely at the intention of the
parties the obligation was to the City of
Urbana, and the defendants should not es-
cape liability because of this purely cleri-
cal mistake.
Judgment in debt for $3,000 to be satis-
fied on payment of $2,400 damages and




Plaintiff had a contract to work for
Mitchell & Company, which the defendant
induced him to break.
Plea.
Defendant wished to obtain the plain-
tiff's position for himself and offered to
v'ork for lower wages without any malice
toward the plaintiff, but knowing that
such an offer would probably result in
the plaintiff's discharge. Demurrer—re-
joinder.
Second Ck)unt:
The plaintiff was desirous of obtaining
;.nd applied for a position with Watson &
Company, which he would have obtained
but for the defendant, who threatened
to call out Watson's other employees if
plaintiff were employed.
Plea:
Defendant was an officer of the Mechan-
ics' Union and adopted this course of ac-
tion in discharge of his duties, in bona
fide belief that it was for the best inter-
est of said Union, and without any per-
sonal desire to injure plaintiff. Demur-
rer—rejoinder.









Schindler made a verbal agreement
with one L. E. Dunn, in October, 1911, lo
cut and haul lumber for Dunn during
that winter. Schlinder performed his part
of the agreement, receiving frequent ad-
vances for Dunn, and on Dec. 2 8, of the
same year, the contract was reduced to
writing and signed by Schindler and
Dunn. In fact Dunn was the agent for
the defendant Cox and so informed Schin-
dler at the time of the making of both
the oral and written contracts, and the
contracts were made by him for Cox, but
the written agreement described himself
(Dunn) therein as the party with whom
the plaintiff contracted and did not men-
tion the defendant. There being a de-
fault in payments under the contract, the
plaintiff now brings this action against
E. S. Cox for the amount due, $1,000,







Fdwin R. Harris, Thomas Whalen, and
Robert Leiter
vs.
William Worthington, Frank T. Hayes,
and Samuel Worthington.
Statement.
William R. Jones was elected to the
ofPce of County Clerk of Clinton County,
State of Illinois, at the regular election
in the year 1906, and entered upon the
duties of his office on December 1, of that
ye^-r. He gave a bond in accordance with
the form of the statute, for the sum of
$5,000, upon which the plaintiffs in this
ccue were his sureties. On July 1, 1908,
he appointed William Worthington, one
of the defendants, as deputy County
Clerk and Deputy Clerk of the County
Court of Clinton County, and the said
Worthington served in that capacity for
the balance of Jones' term of office. Be-
fore entering upon his duties as deputy,
the said William Worthington, as prin-
cipal, and Prank T. Hayes and Samuel
Worthington, the other defendants, as
sureties, executed and delivered to the
plaintiffs the following bond:
"Know all men by these presents that
William Worthington, as principal, and
Frank T. Hayes and Samuel Worthington,
as sureties, of the County of Clinton, and
Stale of Illinois, are held and firmly bound
unto Edwin R. Harris, Thomas Walen, and
Robert Leiter, in the sum of $5,000, good
and lawful money of the United States of
America, to be paid to the said Edwin R.
Hayes, Thomas Walen. and Robert Leiter,
or to their certain attorneys, executors,
administrators or assigns; for which pay-
ment well and truly to be made, we bind
ourselves, our heirs, executors, and ad-
ministrators firmly by these presents.
"Sealed with our seals and dated this
l£l day of July, in the year of Our Lord,
1908.
"The conditions of the above obliga-
tion are such that if the said William
Worthington, who has been appointed
Deputy County Clerk and Deputy Clerk
of the County Court of Clinton County,
Llinois, which save and keep harmless tlie
said Edwin R. Harris, Thomas Walen. and
Robert Leiter, and each and all of them
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from all loss and damage and from
ihe payment of any sum of money ou ac-
count of them, or any of them, being
siM-eties upon the bond of William R. Jones,
as County Clerk and Clerk of the Couoty
Court of said County of Clinton; and if
the said William Worthington shall well
and truly perform the duties of such offices
of Deputy County Clerk and Deputy Clerk
cf the County Court of said County of
Clinton, and shall turn over all moneys
which may come into his hands by reason
of said offices; then this obligation to be
void, otherwise to remain in full force and
virtue.
WILLIAM WORTHINGTON (Seal)
FRANK T. HAYES. (Seal)
SAMUEL WORTHINGTON (Seal)
"Signed, sealed and delivered in the
presence of William R. Jones."
Suit is now brought by the obligees rn
the above bond against the obligors to
recover the sum of $2635, which the said
William R. Jones collected as fees duiing
his term of office over and above his sal-
ary and other proper allowances, and fail-
ed to pay over to the County Treasurer, in
accordance with the law. The plaintifi:«,
as sureties for the said Jones, \vere com-
pelled to, and did pay the above sum to
the said County of Clinton, on October 1,
1911. Of the said sum, $2,000 was for
jees collected after the said William
Vv'orthington became deputy, and $635
was for fees collected prior to that time.
There is no claim that any of the short-
age was due to the acts or default? of the
deputy, but were due entirely to the wrong
doing of the said William R. Jones.
Evidence of facts not included in the
above statement to be introduced at the
trial and for guidance in preparing pluud-
ings, will be furnished to the attorneys
for the respective parties, concerning
v/hich they shall apply for information to
Professor Decker at as early a date as
possible. The trial will be before a jury.
For the PlaintilT:
BRITTON. GUNNBLL and PATTERSON
For the Defendant:
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THE COLLEGE OF LAW.
ITS ORIGIN AND QEOWTH.
This is the first of a series of articles that
will appear in the various issues of the
Moot Court Bulletin during the remainder
of the school j'ear. The chief purp.jse of
the articles is to acquaint legal practition-
ers and others interested in legal education
with the plans under which the law school
is being conducted, the methods of instruc-
tion used and what it as a department is
doing to aid the State University in the
fieldof endeavor undertaken by it.
Upon tlie recommendation ot President
Draper, the school was authorized by the
Board of Trustees in 1897, and opened for
student enrollment in September of that
year. The sum of $2,500, only, was avail-
able for equipment and the most of that
was expended in the purchase of about 500
volumes of law books Four rooms on the
second floor of University Hall were as-
signed to its use and two law teachers were
retained to give instruction. President
Draper was acting Dean for the first two
years, but was unable to do more than ex-
ercise a general supervision over the school.
The course of study covered a period of
two years—the length of time then requir-
ed by the Supreme Court for admission to
the bar. The courses offered were about
three-fourths in number of those now ap-
pearing in the law school curriculum. The
total enrollment for the first year was 39.
The teaching force was increased to three
the next year and in September, 1899, Dr.
James B. Scott was retained as Dean. Dr.
Scott remained in the school for four years,
during which time the attendance increas-
ed to 110. The law library had not been
generously treated, as the limit of the ap
proplition which he was able to secure was
only $500 per year. In September, 190.3, a
newly elected Dean was able to secure an
appropriation of $3,000 fur law books, and
the aunual appropriation since that time
has been $4,000. Ten years ago, the libra-
ry was only rudimentary in character, and
consisted of a few text books and copies of
reports of courts of last resort in about
one-tifth of the States of the Union. Th
sum total of the volumes did not exceed
5,000. Today it has 17,000 volumes and is
an excellent working law library.
Two years after the law school was estab-
lished, the Supreme Court of the State, in
its amended rules for admission to the bar,
took an advanced stand in legal education.
Students were required to have a general
ed'ication equivalent to that of an Illinois
high school and three years of law instruc-
tion. The faculty of the law school wel-
comed the change and at once increased its
curriculum to three years and added a
number of new courses. The requirement
for admission to the law school at that
time was a certificate from an accredited
high scliool showing four years of success-
ful work, although special students were
admitted. The requirement for admission
has since been raised to the completion of
one year of college work. The number of
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special students has been reduced from 33
in 1904-5, to 14 in 1913-14. The raising of
requirements for admission has had the ef-
fect to bring to the school a much better
class of students. Of 52 first year students
registered in the law school this year, 3
have degrees, 10 have had three years of
college work, and a number have had two
years. The standard of scholarship has
been distinctly raised. The students work
more earnestly, and leave the school much
better equipped for practicing the profes-
sion than formerly. The faculty has been
increased so that it now consists of six
teachers besides the Dean, who devote their
entire time to the work.
That the standard of student work is
high is shown by the fact that the per-
centage of students who were not accorded
passing grades last year was greater in this
college than in any other of the Universi-
ty; that the percentage of students drop-
ped lias been greater in this than in other
colleges; and yet a much larger per cent
of the students remain in the school and
complete the course than in any other col-
lege. A recent report issued from the reg-
istrar's office shows that undergraduates
who did not return after the summer va-
cation of 1912 were, in the College of En-
gineering 33 per cent, in the College of
Literature and Arts 26 per cent, in the
College of Science 18 per cent, and in the
College of Law less than 10 per cent. This
Indicates that the law students prosecute
their studies earnestly, persistently, and
with final success.
The school is now conducted in a build-
ing devoted to its sole use. It is the old
Chemical Laboratory remoddled and refur-
nished. While not so large as some of the
law school buildings at other Universties,
it is admirably arranged for law school
work. In addition to a number of class
rooms, it has a commodious lecture room, a
large, well-lighted, reading room with con-
sultation rooms attached, offices for the
Dean and professors, and a five story fire
proof book stack, capable of holding 22,-
000 volumes.
Anna Troll, Administrator of the
Estate of Arthur Troll,
Cairo Electric Company, a Corporation.
Opinion by Ratcliff, J.
This is an action brought by the adminis-
trator of Arthur Troll to recover damages
for the benefit of the intestate's mother
for his death, which is alleged to have been
due to the wrongful and negligent conduct
of the defendant. Tlie action is supported
under Chapter 70 of the Revised Statutes
of Illinois. Tlie facts so far as they are
necessary to state are these: The defend-
ant owned and operated an electric light
plant in the city of Cairo. At the junction
of 12th street and Washington avenue an
arc light was suspended across the street.
The electric current was carried to this
and to other lights by means of several
feed wires which were attached to poles
situated at various intervals on tlie west
side of Washington avenue. Two of the
feed wires led from the pole at 12th street
to the lamp in question. The lamp was
raised and lowered by means of a hoisting
wire which extended from the lamp to a
pulley at the top of the pole; thence down
the pole to a point about four feet from
the ground, and was there fastened by
means of a small iron lock attached by
staple to the pole. An insulator was at-
tached to the hoisting wire about ten or
twelve feet from the ground.
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The deceased was a bo.v about twelve
years of age. and had been accustomed of
summer evenings to play with other boys
of the neighborhood under the light at the
corner of Washington avenue aud 12th
street. On the evening of July 7. 1913, the
deceased together with fifteen or twenty
other boys was playing at the game of hide
and seek, using the pole which bore the
•hoisting wire as their goal.
Prior to this date several of the boys at
different times had touched the hoisting
wire, and received a slight electric shock.
This vi'as due to the fact that the insulator
on the hoisting wire was so mi paired that
it was no longer a non-conductor of electric-
ity. The insulation on the feed wires
which were connected with the lamp was
alsb worn off. and this allowed leakage of
the electricity which had charged the
hoisting wire.
On the night in question, the deceased
picked up a piece of tin, and telling his
playmates that he was going to play
"electric man," seized the hoisting wire,
and swinging on it, brought it in contact
with the feed wire. He received an elec-
tric shock which resulted in his immediate
death.
The case presents two principal ques-
tions: first, was the defetidant so negligent
In maintaining its lighting system that it
is liable to respond in damages for the in-
jury complained of; secondly, did the neg-
ligence of the deceased contribute to the
injury so as to bar this action.
There seems to be but little doubt about
the first question. The defendant con-
tends that it had no knowledge of the im-
perfect state of repair of the wires, and
was. therefore, not negligent in failing to
replace tlie defective parts. There was
evidence that there had been frequent
flickerings of the liglit in question for a
period of five or six v eeks prior to .July 7,
but there was nothing to show tliat the
defendant knew of this. The fact, how-
ever, that the defendant did not have act-
ual notice of the defects, does not excuse
its liability. The system it is maintaining
is one of a dangerous character, and it will
be held to a high degree of care not only in
repairing any defect it may know about,
but also iii inspecting the system. In the
case of the City of Pana vs. Broad man,
117 111. A pp. 139. the court held that the
owners of an electric lighting system
would be charged with corjstructive notice
when such system became defective, even
for a short time. This case is supported
by other authority, and the general rule
which it states seems to be based on good
policy and sound reasoning. In the case
before us the defect had existed for five or
six weeks; so we think it clear tliat the de-
fendant was chargeable with notice of its
existence, and that it was negligent in not
repairing the same.
The second question is one that requires
more careful consideration. It is evident
that if the deceased had been an adult, his
conduct was sucii that he vvould have been
guilty of contributory negligence. In this
case the deceased was but twelve years of
age. Was he of sufficient age to be charge-
able with contributory negligence? In the
case of City of Pekin vs. McMahon, 154 111.
141, at page 154, the court uses this lan-
guage: ''But where a child has passed the
age of seven years, as was the case of the
appellee's deceased intestate, that he is
bound to use such care as children of his
age, capacity, and intelligence are capable
of exercising." The rule of this case
makes it evident that the plaintiff's intes-
tate was of sufficient age to be chargeable
with contributory negligence. The case
also points out the test of the degree of
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care which the deceased was bound to ex-
ercise: that is, such care as children of his
age, capacitj', and intelligence are capable
of exercising-.
The evidence shows that the deceased
and other boys had often taken hold of the
hoisting wire in question, and had on
tliese occassions received only slight shocks.
Undoubtedly the deceased as well as the
other bo\s knew that the wire was charged
with electricity, but their conduct would
seena to show that they had no apprehension
of the real danger. If boys of tiais age,
and with intelligence sucli as the deceased
and his playmates had, really understood
tiie danger that existed in this case, it is
only natural to suppose that some of them
would have reported the defect to the
proper authorities. It is unreasonable to
suppose that all boys in this neighborhood
were reckless of their lives. It seems reas-
onable to believe in this case that the de-
ceased acted as a boy of his age and experi-
ence would ordinarily act. To him tlie
charged wire was only a plaything. It had
never been dangerous, and there was noth-
ing in his experience or knowledge to warn
him of the danger. So he used it as we
should naturally expect a youth of his age
to use a thing which to him was interest-
ing and unusual.
Therefore, as there is not sufficient evi-
dence to show that the plaintiff's intes-
tate's death was due to his own negligence,
judgment will be given for the plaintiff for
the amount of three thousand dollars.
In the Matter of the Estate of Samuel
Adams, Deceased.
Case No. 18.
Opinion by Harker, P. J.
Under the will of Samuel Adams, who
died in 1897, Mrs. William May wcs be-
queathed a le acy of $800. The estate con-
sisted of a large body of unproductive
swamp land. Soon after qualifying, the ex-
ecutor nacned in the will died, and one
James Johnson was appointed administra-
tor with the will annexed. The will was
contested by a son of the deceased, and the
litigation continued for nine years, at the
end of which time the will was held valid
by the Supreme Couri. The administra-
tion v.'as delayed live years longer because
of litigation for an accounting against the
estate of the executor, who had died.
Because of the establishment and com-
pletion of a drainage system in 1912, the
land became quite productive and has
yielded a rich income for one year.
Out of it the administrator now proposes
to make distribution in accordance with
the terms of the will and asks the sanction
of the court to that end. He proposes to
pay Mrs. May the $800 legacy left her and
settle up the estate. Mrs. May, appearing
as objector, declines to accept the $800
in full of her legacy, and insists that she is
entitled to that amount and interest on
the same since the probate of the will.
The sole question is over the matter of in-
terest.
It is not contended that the will makes
any provision for interest. The claim of
the legatee must rest, therefore, upon some
provision of the statute or the common
law. Section 114 of the Administration
Act provides for interest charge against an
administrator or executor as follows: "All
moneys, bonds, notes and credits which any
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administrator or executor may have in
his possession or control as property or as-
sets of the estate, at a period of two years
and six months from the date of his letters
testamentary or of administration, shall
bear interest, and the executor or adminis-
trator shall be charged interest thereon
from said period at the rate of ten per
cent, or after two years and six months
from any subsequent time that he may
have discovered and received the same, un-
less good cause is shown to the court vvliy
such should not be taxed."
The objector can not base her claim upon
this provision. It was intended as a pen-
alty. Its pu'"pos« was to make it unprofit-
able for executors and administrators to
hold the funds of an estate in their hands
and use them in their own business and
for their own benefit, instead of distribut-
ing such funds to those entitled thereto.
The administrator in this case has been
guilty of no such conduct. At the first op-
portunity after receiving money from which
to discharge the legacy, he has applied to
the court for authority lo pay it.
If the objector is entitled to interest, it
must be at the rate of 5 per cent upon the
theory that tlie legacy was due and payable
at the end of one year following the pro-
bate of the will. Under the statute quoted,
the interest is payable by the executor or
administrator personally, and an order re-
quiring that of him d. es not have the
effect to diminish the estate. If the allow-
ance is made under the other theory, it
does diminish the estate, and the contest is
really one between the objector and the
residuary legatee.
Whether legacies bear interest under
conditions like the one presented in this
case is a question which has never been
presented to the Appellate or Supreme
Courts of this State, so far as I am ad-
vised. A few years ago. Judge Cutting, of
the Probate Court of Cook County, in the
matter of the estate of oi.e Jane A. Greene,
deceased, held that a legacy should bear
interest at the rate of 5 per cent after the
same became due and payable, even if there
was no provision in the will to that efl'ect.
Conditions there were not the same as here.
As a matter of first impression, I am inclined
to hold that a legatee is entitled to
interest at the end of one year from the
probate of the A'ill, provided the postpone-
i!..ent is found to have been of benefit to the
residuary legatee. The most frequentcases
of postponement in distribution arises from
the inability of the collector to collect as-
sets, and it follows that in the majority of
cases, such postponement is to the advant-
age, rather than the disadvantage of the
residuary legatee. The postponement in
the case at bar was occasioned by the pro-
tracted litigation instituted by the testa-
tor's son and the litigation attending the
efforts of the administrator with tlie will
annexed to secure an acoounting and a set-
tlement witli the administrator of the ex-
ecutor named in the will. The legacy was
a charge upon the land; but at no time du-
ring the nine years consumed by the litiga-
tion could the administrator have obtained
an order to sell land to pay off the legacy. Had
there been no contest, either over the will
or over the accounts of the t deceased exec-
utor, and had the administrator seen fit to
apply for and obtain an order to sell land,
it would have been sold at a sacrifice; be-
cause it vvas then unproductive. It has be-
come productive and valuable because of
the completion of the drainage district. In
other words, the postponement of the ad-
ministration and the postponement of the
payment of the objector's legacy has re-
dounded to the benefit of the residuary leg-
atee. I feel quite sure then, that he should
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bear the interest charge, and the adminis-
trator elect is authorized to pay Mrs. May
out of the funds in his hands the $800 and
the interest at the rate of 5 per cent since
the end of the tirst year following the pro-
bate of the will.
Adamson
Illinois Central R. R.
Case No. 30.
Henry Adarason, having transacted cer-
tain business at the depot of the Illinois
Central R. R., was standing upon the plat-
form of the depot to allow an approaching
east bound freight train to pass, before
crossing the tracks. After the train had
passed, he was found lying between the
tracks and the platform with his skull
fractured by a blow received upon the fore-
head. Adarason brings suit against the
railroad company for damages for personal
injuries. At the trial plaintiff's evidence
shows the above facts, and further, that
the train was travelling at about thirty
miles per hour, tliat there was a round
wound upon plaintiff's forehead "likeatifty
cent piece." that plaintiff's left iiip was
bruised, that there was a round hole in the
front of the crown of plaintiff's hat, and
pieces of the hat and a splinter of wood
were removed from tlie wound in the head.
Plaintiff's testimony was that after the
engine and two or three cars had passed
him "as he !oo.<ed at the train, he saw
something, the outline of which he could
not exactly describe and he couldn't tell
what it was that hit him." When I saw
the thing that I saw the hazy outline of
it, it seemed very clear to me. * * * * I
couldn'o say how near it was to me when 1
saw it, because as I saw it, that was the
last I can remember." No other evidence
was given as to negligence in the operation
of the train or defects in any of the cars.
Upon examination it was shown that
the platform was 1% feet wiJe and its
edge was 5% f^et from the nearest rail
To the west of the station 94 feet on the
same side of the track was a mail craine.
the post of which stood i% feet from the
nearest rail.
At the conclusion of plaintiff's case, the
defense moved that the plaintiff be non-
suited. The motion was denied, the jury
found for the plaintiff, and upon this ap-
peal it is urged that the court was in error
in denying the motion for nonsuit.
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Fin frock. Han-
nah and Lee.
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Its Aims and the Methods of Attaining
Them
No enterprise can justify its existence
w!iich does not have for its object a sub-
stantial contribution to the welfare of soc-
iety. The law school can attain this object
The law school can attain this object
in no small degree by devoting its energies
primarily to the production of an increas-
ngly better-trained, broader-minded and
h gher-principled lawyer. The report comes
from almost every side that the legal pro-
fession is overcrowded. But; such report is
usually accompanied by the assurance that
there is always and everywhere room^ yes,
a real demand for a high-principled, able
and well trained lawyer. Quality not quan-
tity is the need. We render our service,
therefore, at once to society and to the in-
dividual whom we send out by insisting
that he be a superior product and by devot-
ing our energies to making him such.
Society is interested in having its law-
yers trained into breadth of vision. Nar-
rowness, extreme technicality, reactionism,
and pettifoggery go hand in hand. The law
student should, therefore, be imbued with
the consciousness that tihe legal profession
is but one small unit in the great structure
of society and that each individual member
of the profession is in a larger sense a mem-
bei of society as a whole. And thus he
should be brought to the more important
realizat'on that every rule of law promul-
gated and every principle advocated should
be examined in the light of social need and
its worth determined on the basis of wheth
er, on the whole, it serves or fails to serve
such need. In other words, t'he train.ng of
the lawyer does not consist in teaching him
law only, nor in teaching him, parrot4ike,
rules handed down to us from a former
generation, but rather in providing him
with a general education as a foundation,
and later in impressing upon him the prin-
ciple underlying the rule of law and lead-
ing him to inquire as to the correctness of
such principle. If it is found that the rule
does no^ accord with correct principle and
sound reason, the foundation is laid for se-
curing a change of the rule when the stage
of practice is reached. Thus a lawyer of the
constructive type is developed, one prepar-
ed to contributie to the growth of the law
along the right lines. Society receives its
benefit through the elevation of such men
to the Bench and other positions of trust
and through their honest and efficient labors
as counsellors in business and advocates at
the Bar.
To accomplish this object in the case of
tihe individual student, and especially to see
that the one by disposition somewhat slow
is given the needed personal attention and
assistance so that he may not be weeded
outi without sufficient cause, and further to
see that the best in the more able student
is brought out, requires the services of a/
teacher whose heart is in his work and who
is willing and able to devote sufficient time
to the work of teaching alone. With this
purpose in mind, the work of the school is
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carried on by those who devote their en-
tire time to teaching and whose energies
and thoughts are not diverted by the ab-
sorbiing demands of active practice. The
careful supervision that can thus be main-
tained over the work of the student from
(lay to day by those who are devoting all
their time to tlie work of teaching, enables
them to be more exacting, to require more
careful preparation by the student and to
see that the studenti lacking in honest en-
deavor, as well as the one deficient in legal
ability, is eliminated before he has proceed-
ed far in his course'. The student, as well as
the profession and society as a whole, is
thereby the gainer.
To this same end entrance requirements
have been repeatedly raised. When the
school was founded, a high school graduate
was admitted as a regular student and ca;i-
(lidate for the degree of Bachelor of Laws.
Thereaftier it was provided that a degree
would only be conferred upon a student
who had obtaincl one year of college cred-
it's before' entering upon his third year of
law study, or who had, in lieu of such
year of college work, demonstrated his spec-
ial legal abilirj bv securing an average of
85 per cent in all his law courses. (The
passing grade is 70). The next step was tio
require the year of college work as a con-
dition precedent to entering the law school
as a candidate for a degree. This is the rule
now in force. Beginning with the school
year 1915-16, one more step in this march
of progress will be taken. The new Law
School announcement, soon to be publish-
ed will contain the following notice:
The requirements for admission to the
College of Law for the year 1915-16 and
thereafter will be as follows:
"For admission as a regular student and
candidate for the degree of Bachelor of
Laws, an applicant must be matriculated
and have 60 hours of credit in a college of
this University; or have completed two full
years of work as given at another college
or university of recognized standing; or
have received by transfer 60 hours of uni-
versity credit here.
The faculty of the College of Law may, in
its discretion, prescribe from time to time
subjects which shall be required as part of
lihe preliminary col.ege work, subject to ap-
proval by the University Senate.
A student who is 21 years of age and is
entitled to admission as a regular student
to another college of this University, will
be admitted as a special student in the col-
lege of Law. If he attains in the courses of
the first year ar average grade of 80 or
over, he will be admitted to regular stand-
ing, and he may receive the degree of
Bachelor of Laws if in all the courses he
presents for the degree his average grade
in 80 or more."
In line with the increase in entrance
requirements are our efforts to encourage
men to acquire /voluntarily even
more of a preliminary education than is
actually required and to do even more than
a passing grade of work. This is done, in
part, by offering a special degree to such
men as demonstrate superior legal talent
and in addition secure an A. B. degree or
its equivalent before entering upon the sec-
ond year of law work. This degree is called
Doctor of Law (J. D.) and is granted only
to those who comply with the following
conditions:
1. Complete the course of law study re-
quired for the degree of Bachelor of
Laws.
2. Secure a Bachelor's degree in Arts
o rscience prior to the completion of
the course in law.
3. Obtain a minimum average grade of
85 "n the College of Law.
4. Present a thesis approved by the
Faculty of the College of Law.
In this particular Law School of the
University of Illinois is setting a higher
standard for this degree than has been
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established generally in the better law
schools of the country.
Mention should here be made of the fact
tr.at a student may attain a degree both
from tlhe College of Literature, Arts and
Science and. from the College of Law in
six years. This is made possible by the fact
that a senior in the College of Literature,
AriS and Science is permitted by regist-
ering in the Law School to count substant-
iallj' all the first year of law work toward
h.'^ literary as well as toward his law de-
gree. This is what is known as the com-
bined six year course in Literature, Arts
and Science, and Law.
Another and not unusual means of en-
couraging better work is the offering of
prizes to a lim ted number of students who
excel in their law work. Eighti scholarship
prizes are open to matriculated students of
the first and second years. These prizes-
four for $50 each and four for $25 each
—
arc awarded at t'he end^ of each year and
are available in discharge of tuition fees the
year following.
The American Law Book Company, of
New York offers an annual prize consisting
of the Stmdents' Edition of Cyc, which is
awarded to the member of the senion class
making the highest average' during his
scn'or year. Callaghan & Company, of
Chicago, offers an annual prize consisting
of the Cyclopedic Law Dictionary which is
awprded to the member of the second year
class making the highest average during
his second year.
Membership in the Order of the Coif is
also offered as inducement to better schol-
arship. Each year ten per cent of the Senior
Class (or a minimum of four) are eligible
to election to the Order of the Coif, an
honorary law society organized to promote
scholarship in law. The L^niversitiy of 111'-
nois has the distinction of having given this
organization its incept-on. The first chapter
was formed here in 1907. In 1912 it was reor
ganized and given the distinctive legal
name above indicated. It now has chapters
in the leading law schools of the United
States.
ii. conclusion it is believed that through
these various means, we have been turning
oc t irom year to j'car a more efficient law-
yer, a more profound student, and a better
citizen.
This article is to be followed by one deal-
ing more in detail with our courses, and our







r. Money paid under a mistake, tho' due
to carelessness, can be recovered. It would
be inequitable not to allow such recovery.
Woodward on Quasi Contracts Sec. 15.
W'lson vs. Turner, 164 111. 398 at p. 403.
II. This money was paid under a mis-
tak of facti; Benson tho't, when he paid
it that he was paying a debt.
III. Benson didn't owe Coolridge this
money, for Waite had no authority to bor-
row it,
1. Waite was a mere servant, and not
an agentl of Benson. iMechem's Agency
p. 6.
2. Assuming that Waite was an agent,
he was not a general one. A general
agent has power to transact all of his
principal's business.
Halladay vs. Underwood. 90 111. Ap-
p. 130.
Waite had only special authority, given
at different times.
IV. Assuming tJiat Wa-ite was an agent
of Benson, still he was expressly forbidden
to borrow money. The power to borrow
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money is very closely guarded, and it is
not implied power of an agent.
Wider vs. Branch 12 111. App. 358. Undi-
closed P
Martin vs. Great Falls Mfg. Co. 9 N. H.
51. Court said no general authority.
I The volume of business transacted by
an agent does not Determine the extent of
his authority.
52 111. App. 214.
2. Every agent in the execution of his
express authority has implied authority to
ac: (only) in accordance with the establish-
ed usages and customs of the particu'ar
business which he is employed to transact
or of the particular agency in which he is
employed, unless his principal has indicated
a contrary intention.
Tiffany on Agency, p. 174—par. 44.
V. It would be inequitable to allow the
defendant to retain this money.
1. Waite is liable to Coolridge. Even an
agent who has obtained money from tlhird
person illegally will be liable to the person
paying it, tho' he has paid it over to his
principal.
2. A person dealing with an agent, know-
ing him tlo be such, takes the risk of the
extent of the agent's authority.
Schneider vs. Lebanon Creamery Co. "JZ
II.'. App. 612.
Reynolds vs. Feree. 86 111. 570.
Davidson vs. Porter. 19 111. 456.
VI. The burden of proof is on the third
person to show that the agent had authority









To recover in this case the plaintiff must
show that it would be inequitable for the
defendant to keep the money in question.
Keener on Quasi Contracts. Page 43 et
seq. and cases there cited.
Woodward on Quasi Contracts Sec. 9 (2)
Whether it is inequitable must be deter-
mined by applying the rules of agency to
see whether Coolridge could have received
the $100.00 from Benson not paid the draft
made on him by Coolridge.
II. Principal and Agent.
1. A former agent may bind his forme.-
P'-incipal to parties knowing of the appar-
ent scope of the agent's authority, whether
fuel, apparent scope is true or not, until
not'ce of the termination of the relation of
Principal and Agent.
Union Bank & Trust Co. vs. Long Lum-
ber Co., 74 SE ( W.VA.) 674-
Meeker vs. Mannia, 162 111. 203.
2. A person may be estopped to deny that
another is his agent if his course of con-
duct would lead one to that conclusion
which a third party has acted upon.
Meechem Outline of Agency Sec. 67 et
seq.
Huffcut on Agency, Sec. 50 et seq.
Union Stock Yards Co. vs. Mallory 157
III 554.
Applying the facts of this case to the law
as set out, supra, it follows that judgment
should be entered for the defendant.
Respectfully submitted.
Watson, Cassidy and Stephens,





Opinion by Pillsbury, J.
J.1.1S was an action tu recover ttie sum of
$i'0 00 paid by the plaintiff to the defend-
ai.r under an alleged nustiaice of lact, the
mistake consisting n the payment of an
accuunt without noticing the prescence of
an iieni which the plaintiff alleges he did
no. owe. I'ne detense is tnat the sum in
question was in fact owed by the plaintiff
by reason of its having been borrowed by
the agent of the plaintiff, one Waite, for
use as change in the plaintiff's store the
next day.
The facts showed that: Waite had in fact
been discharged by the plaintiff a short
time prior to the borrowing of the money
as stated above, and that Waite had been
instructed never to borrow money, but that
neiiher of these facts were known to the
defendant. The defendant did know, how-
ever, that Waite was a tirusted employee of
iiH^ plaintiff, was accu^^tomed to make sales
n plaintiff's store for cash and to depos t
the money in the cash register, to take
money to the bank and deposit it for plain-
tiff and to draw money on plaintiff's check -.
also to get goods from the defendanlfa
store without an order for the accommo-
dation of plaintiff's business under an ar-
rangement for the mutual accommodation of
two stores.
It is 'ttrell settled that money paid under
a mistake of fact, even though due to care-
lessness, can be recovered back by the ac-
tion of indebitatus assumpsit, on principles
of quasi-contractL Recovery is not aHowed,
however, where the money is justly due
the defendant -n law for equity, though
paid by mistake. The sole issue to be here
decided is whether on ordinary principles
of aeency the plaintiff is bound by the acts
of his former employee and so owes the
money to the defendant. ^No equitable prin-
ciples are involved except as stated above,
and the equitable maxim of "c.ean hands" or
II. c uucaiue ui balanc.i.g of equites are iu-
appiioable to action in quas.-contract.
iJid Waite have real ostensible authority
:o borrjw .his money on behalf of the
.diiiiiii: 'Ihe fact of i.is previous d.schargc
!.idy oe disregarded. Cojlr.dge was entitled
lu le.y upon all representations made to
i.ini by Benson, eit..er expressly or by im-
piicaiiion from tiie known course of ii.s busi-
ness, as to the authoriiy of an eniploj-ee,
i;ntil notified of the discharge of that em-
ployee. The fact that Wa.te was forbidden
by Benson to borrow money may also be
disregarded for the same reason.
The burden of proof is upon the defend-
ant to establish the agency. The plaintiff
has sued upon a payment made under a
mistake the fact that the defense is that
plaintiff is bound by the act of his agent
and really owes the money, though paid by
mistake. The defendant hav ng set up the
agency, must prove it. This he has failed to
do. The act of making casli sales implies
no authority to extend credirt ti customers
or contract with them. Similarly, depos t-
ing the employer's money in the bank or
cashing the employer's checks involves no
extension of he cred.t of the employer. The
only argument open to the defendant was
that obtaining of change for the next day's
business until the bank opens s not in sub-
stance the borrowing of money or capital
for investment in the business but is instead
to be classed under the known power of ihe
agent to borrow or exchange goods for the
mutual accommodation of the two business-
es. While this v ew was strongly urged at
the tirial and might well prevail if the
amount borrowed were smaller, I am of
opinion that it is not a valid inference un-
dei the circumstances. The more reasonable
inference of fact would be that Coolridge
advanced the money suposing it were need-
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ed to pay bills early in the morning, and
not for use as "change" as such.
The defendant failing to make out an
ostensible or actual authority in Waite to
make the loan in question, judgment musti






In order for the Plaintiff to recover the
rent for tihe period from May i^ 1912 to
January i, 1913 it is necessary that he show
a liability on the part of the Lessee under
the terms of the lease.
It is admittled that prima facie, the defen-
dant is liable for the rent under the terms
of the contract.
The contention of the defendant! cannot
he maintained that the defendant is relieved
from such liability by reason of the terms
of the covenant, viz:—thati "In the event
that the sa'd premises shall become unten-
antable through fire or other cause, t!he
said lease shall not become void, but the
lessor shall have sixtly days in which to re-
store the premises to tentanable condition
and the lesse shall not be liable for rent for
such period as he is unable to occupy the
the premises"
I. When th's covenant is read in connec-
tion with the other covenants of said lease
and in connection with the common law it
does not appear that the plaintiff was under
any duty to make this repair,
A. By a rule of construction, where the
partis have reduced their agreement to
writing, purporting to set forth all the
terms, the extent of the liability of each
shall be determined from this writing^- and
in terpreting it we must look to the in-
tention of the parties, interpreting that in-
tention in the light of the common law
govening such contracts.
Reinhart vs Holmes 143 Mo. App. 213.
Buckhorn etc. vs. Consol.dated Co. 47,
Colo. 516.
B. Where the tenant has agreed to make
"all necessary repairs which may subse-
quently become necessary" he is obliged to
make all such rep irs, even tiiough they be
such as are ordered by the municipal
health officers, and even though their neces-
sity be due to original defects.
Simk ns vs. Cordelle, Compress Co. 39
S .E. 407.
C. In order to render the lessor liable for
repairs, it is necessary that the lessee notify
him of their necessity; and where the tenant
fails to do so, but continues in possession
and pays rent for several months after the
existence of the condition whic hcaused the
alleged breach, he will be regarded as waiv-
ing his object on.
Orcutt vs. Osten 70 111. App. 102.
Leiferman vs. Osten 167 111. Ap.p 97.
Higbie & Co. vs Wayman 126 111. App. 243
Barrett vs. Boddie, 158 111. 479.
Boston & Corp. vs. Ripley, 13 Allen 41.
2. The Lessor of premises in the absence
of express stipulation is under no duty to
make repairs.
A.
Quinn vs Crowe 88 111. App. 191.
Sunasack vs. Morey 196 111. 569.
Beedle vs. Reed. 33 Ind. 539.
B. There is no warranty on the part of
the Lessor that the premises are in good
tinue so
Gridley vs. City of Bloom'ngton, 68 111.
4;-
Mondell ve. Fink. 8 111. App. 378.
Watson vs. Moulton 199 111. 560.
Taylor vs. Finnagan 189 Mass. 568.
Onsley vs. Mumpe 128, Iowa 675.
Lazarus and Cohen vs. Parmley 33 111.
App 624.
C. The mer efact that the landlord later
by agreement entered and made repairs is
no admission of his liabil'ty to make re-
pairs.
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Gridley vs. City of Bloomington 68 111. 47
McKeon vs. Cutter, 156 Mass. 396.
The premises were never at any time
rendered untenantable since.
A. In order to become "untenantable" it
is necssary tihat there be a total distruc-
lion, or such a distruction of the premises
tliat they no longer exist as premises, cap-
able of being tenanted. The mere fact that
they become unpleasant, unsanitary, or con-
demned by mun cipal authorities is no de-
fense.
Smith vs. McLean, 123 111., 210.
Huniston, Keeling & Co., vs Wheeler, 175
111. 514.
Cit3' Bank of Sherman vs. Dugan, 24 S.
W 954.
B. The fact that the Lessee continued to
occupy the premises for two years, tihe
caise of the alleged untenantableness hav-
ing always existed, is evidence that the
premises were never rendered untenantable
at anj' time.
,
Suyden vs. Jackson 54 X. Y. 450.
I
Talliman vs. Murphy, 120 X. Y. 345.
Where the parties have expressly agreed
o cons der the premises, in their present
nndition at the time of the letting as ten-
artab'e, as between Lessor and Lessee tihey
hall be so regarded irresoective of any ex-
sting defects, and such shall be the criter-
on of tenantableness, and thus all presen'
lefects. viz: defective walls, are waived.
Friedman vs. Schwabacher 64 111. App. 422
Cycle Works vs. Fraser etc. no. App. 126.
In order that the premises be rendered
intenantable through fire or other cause
vith-n the' meaning of the lease so as to
ender the Lessor liable for repairs it is nec-
essary that they be rendered untenantble
y some cause arising subsequent to the
ime of the letting: thus where the alleged
ntenantableness arises from causes viz:-
efective' walls, existing at the date of the
emise it const'tutes no defense.
Reedv vs. Chicago Vinegar & Yeast Co.
T 111. App. 153.
Daly vs. Wise, 132 X. Y. 306.
City Bank of Sherman vs. Dugan 24 S. \\".
954-
By the terms of the lease the Lessor was
under no duty to make this particular re-
pair, for where a document or contract
enumerates a class or classes of persons or
ll.ings, and mmediately fo'lowing and class-
ed with such enumeration the clause em-
braces "other" persons or things, the word
"other" should be read as "other such like"
so that persons or things therein comprised
may be read as ejusdem generis, with and
not of a quality superior or d fferent from
ll ose specifically enumerated.
Sacediman vs. Breach i B & C. 96.
Saner vs. Belton. 7 Ch. D. 815.
Manchester & Co. vs. Carr, 5 C. P. D 507.
Everth vs. Smith, 2 M. & S. 278.
Philpott vs. Swann. 30 L. J. C P. 358.
Ins. Co. vs. Adler, 65 M D. 162.
Brush vs. Lemma, '"j 111. 496.
Misch vs. Russel, 136 111. 22.
Benton vs. Benton, 63 X. H. 289.
2 Arnold on Insurance 3rd. Ed. 27.
Stroud's Jud'cial Dictionary Vol. 2 p.
1359 et seq.
RespecttfuUy subm tted,
H. J. Hannah & P. C. Kera-i
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Brief for Defendant.
The Plaintiff cannot recover in this case
if the Defendant can show that the prem-
ises became untenantable from fire or other
cause.
f. .\lthough there is no impl ed contract
on the part of the landlord that the prem-
ises demised are tenantable or that the
premises are fit for the nnr.oses for which
triey were let, and thus no liability on the
pjTt of the landlord to put the premises in
tenartable condition, such liability arises
when lessor covenants that the premises are
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in tienantable condition at the time of the
demise.
1 Wood on Landlord and Tenant,Sec. 303
Cromwell vs. Allen, 151 111. App. 404.
Watson vs. Moulton, 100 111., App. 560.
(a) In view of the common law rule, we
construe covenant No. i merely as a cove-
nant on the part of the lessor tlhat premises
are in tenantable condition.
2. The operatlion of the last clause of the
Ic&se prov ding that in case the premises
should be rendered untenantable by fire or
other cause the lease should become void
if premises were not put in tenantiable con-
dition by the landlord in sixty days, is en-
tirely consistlent with the other clause of
the lease and simply amounts to a proviso
in case the premises, by fire or other cause
should be rendered untenantable.
John Morris Co. vs. Southworth, 154 111.
ri8
Bolman vs. Lohman, 79 Ala., 63.
McCarty vs. Howell, 24 111. 341.
Walker vs. Tucker, 70 111. 527.
Parker vs. Roberts, 140 111. 9.
3. Where the performance of a covenant
depends on an act t)o be done by the lessor,
and parties have expressly stipulated that
lessee shall not be bound unless the lessor
perform such act, the doing of that act by
tlie lessor is a condition precedent.
Surplice vs. Farsworth, 7 M. & G. 576.
4. The construction of these covenants is
a question of law for the court. The court
must endeavor to place itself in the position
of the parties at the time they entered into
the lease and in the light of surrounding
circumstlances give effect to each provision
in the' lease according to the intention of
the parties.
Spragins vs. Whitle, 108 N. C. 449.
2 Parsons on Contracts, 516, 517.
Watters vs. Snow, 32 N. C. 292.
We contend that the premises became un-
tenantable and since the' lessor did not re-
store tlo tenantable condition within sixty
days the lease became void, under which
circumstances the lessor could not recover








Opinion by Pillsbury, J,
This is an action for arrears in rent un-
din- a lease. The due execution of the lease
ijtld by the defendanti and subsequent fail-
ure to pay ihe installments of rent sued for
are admitted. The defense is made thaC the
building was in an unsanitary condition
iroui and prior to the tame of the execution
ui tlie lease, and was condemned by the
municipal health officers, the defendants be-
ing forced to vacate. That the plaintiiff was
called upon to make the necessary repairs
and refused to do so for over 60 days, tihat
uniier these circumstances the defendant
was justfied in refusing to resume posses-
sion and pay rent for the remainder of the
lease period.
It is clear that tihe facts, as stated, do not
entitle the defendant to avoid the lease in
the absence of special provisions in he
lease to the effecti In Smith vs. McLean,
123 111. Rep. 210, and in Humiston vs. Wheel
er, 175, 111. Rep. 514, it is held that the de-
struction of a building by fire not caused
be either party does not relieve tihe tenant
from paying rent in the absence of a cove-
nant by the landlord to rebuild or repair.
Of course, if the landlord were under a
duty to repair the premises and the con-
demnation by the health authorities was
caused by his failure to do so, he could not
exact rent from the defendant for the period
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lor which the building was idle or there-
after, but there is no covenant here that
ihfc landlord shall repa r, and in the absence
ot such stipnlaiion, the landlord is under
no duty to make repairs. Humeston vs.
Wheeler Supra, and Sunasack vs. Morey,
196 111. Rep. 596. In the latter case, the
court said. "The tenant takes the premises
as he sees them, subject to his own risk,
and there is no impl ed covenant on the
part of the landlord that they are fit for
il'e purposes for which they are rented or
hat they are in any particular condition."
These authorities dispose of all defects in
' X stence at the time of the execution of
the lease, and by express covenant in the
lease, the tenant has assumed the duty of
repair of defects arising subsquently. The
defendant therefore properly rested his case
upon a covenant in the lease to the effect
that "if the premises should become unten-
antable through fire or other cause," the
lease should become void unless the land-
lord should restore the premises with-n 60
days. The question is therefore presented
whether condemnation by health authori-
ties for unsanitary condition not the ft^ult
of e'ther party can be brought with n "fire
or other cause."
The defense has cited no case in their
brief in support of this contention. In Tays
vs. Fcker, 24 S. W. Reports (Texas') 954.
cited by plaintiff, a provsion for avoiding a
lease after the premises became untenant-
able bv reason of "fire or other unavoidable
c;.suaity'' was oeid not to apply to defects 01
^.ustruclion of the building at the time of
tl.c lease whereby it was later condemned
as unsafe. The court emphasizes, the word.v
linavo dable casualty" as to extend to sud-
<ie! and violent natural force. The wording
';f ti.e covenant therefore stronger than in
;.;.' case at bar, although both are appar-
rently designed to accomplish the same pur-
pose, I believe the decision to be in point
in ti:e present case. The phrase "fire" or
other cause" should, under the ejusdem
^ener s rule, be read "fire" or other like
carse," which clearly means some sudden,
•ytcrna' and violent source of damage, and
excludes the idea of ordinary delapidation
•T unsanitary condition existing for a lone
period of t me. By interpretation of the
'r?sr. the same result is obtained, inas-
•'v,irh as defects existing at the date of the
lease are waived by Clause i, and ordinar3'
'•epairs later becoming necessary are also
covered in the same c'ause. The provision
p.vo ding the lease for fire, etc., should there-
fore only to causes of damage not other-
>v"se covered, namely extraordinary damage
arising suddenly during the term.
Provision 2 of the lease is as much an ac-
'c'.iowledgement by the lessee of present
eood cond tion as a warranty by *he gran-
tor to the same effect and does not effect
the riehts of the parties.
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THE COLLEGE OF LAW
No. 3.
Its Aims and the Methods of Attaining Them
It has been well said by some one that
"System is only the anatomy of the law.
Its lifoblood is reason." Rules of law as
seated in an encyclopedia or text book, no
matter how carefully committed, are not
long remembered. Their very number puts
it bej-ond the power of the human mind to
retain them all. Again, it is one thing to
know a rule of law and quite another thing
to be able to a^ply it. Divorced from the
nethods by which the rules are evolved
and the reason and principle back of them,
rules of law are at best but as ''sounding
brass and a tinkling cymbal." It is the
i'urpose of the law school, therefore, to
give to the student not merely the hollow
husks of information but first and primar-
ily to familiarize him v.'ith methods of legal
reasoning and to equip him with legal
habits of thought—in short to develop in
him, so far as is possible, the sccalled "legal
mind." This accomplished, the student is
prepared to evolve anew the fo-rgotten rule,
to evolve new rules where they are needed,
and to apply correctly the old rule or prin-
ciple to a new situation. It is believed
that these objects are best accomplished
by the cas? method of instruction. The
case method of instruction and its advant-
ages are so clearly set forth in an article,
rrblished a few years ago by Professor
Elliott J. Xorthrup, then a member of the
faculty, that the subject is now presented
again In his language. Professor Northrup
"The power of legal reasoning is an ab-
solutely essential p'art of the equipment of
a lawyer. One might have so prodigious
a memory and such indefatigable industry
as to memorize all of the statutes and
rpinions of Illinois, but if he could not ap-
ply legal reasoning to the solution of the
({uestions submitted to him, he would be
a failure as a lawyer.
We find, then, two things that the stu-
dents should get from the law school; first
a knowledge of the settled legal principles,
and second a power to reason with those
principles in a legal way concerning a nev,-
siate of facts. The latter is by far the
n.ore important. It is the principle busi-
ness of his teacher to so guide him as to
enable him to acquire that power. I use
the phrase "enable him to acquire" advis-
edly, because a teacher cannot directly im-
part that power. He could with some de-
cree of success state to his class the course
of reasoning applicable to a particular case.
But the students would acquire slight power
of doing the same thing by listening to
such expositions and taking notes on them.
The only way to learn legal reasoning is
to reason legally.
The way in which that is sought to be
done at Illinois is by the study of cases.
The students use collections of decided
cases. In studying the case the student
I
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learns the legal principle decided by it and
something at least of the process of reason-
ing by which the decision was arrived at.
Thus he is getting the two things a Isiwyer
needs to acquire. The more legal princi-
ples he knows the better. They are the
tools of his trade. A knowledge of them
comes largely as an incident to the study
of the reason of the case.
In the preparation of his lesson the stu-
dent is supposed to read the case carefully
hna in the light of the rasoning of the
opinion determine just what facts are es-
sential to the decision as made by the court
in accordance with his line of reasoning.
He usually makes a brief written abstract
stating those essential facts, the decision
and the grounds' upon which it is placed
by the court. He should also consider
whether he thinks the decision right and
whether he agrees with the court's reason-
ing.
fn the class room a student is called
upon for a case. He "states" it as we say.
That is, he states substantially the con-
tents of his abstract, perhaps reading it
verbatim. The chief function of the in-
structor is to call forth and, if need be, to
guide a disch'ssion of the case by the stu-
dents themselves. So far as they will do
it, this is left to their spontaneous action.
When they do not undertake it the discus-
{.ion must be stimulated by questiorts from
the instructor. He asks, for example, the
student who stated the case whether he
thinks it right; meaning rightly decided.
He is asked for his reasons for his answer.
Another is asked if he agrees, and if not,
why. Others may volunteer opinions. The
best results are achieved when a genuine
argument ensues between the members of
the class or with the instructor. The lataer
often must defend his opinion quite as if
he were one of the students.
Thus, either on the initiative of the class
or as a result of questions by the instructor
the discussion is pursued until all points
of view that may profitably be taken of the
case are brought to the attention of the
class. The different grounds upon which
it can be placed and the different conclu-
sions that can be reached by pursuing dif-
ferent lines of reasoning are examined, and
opinions as to which should be regarded
as correct are expressed. To aid in this,
i-'ome variation of the facts of the case may
be suggested and the case discussed on
that hypothesis. The holdings in previous
and analogous cases are referred to and
compared with the reasoning and result in
the case under discussion to test the cor-
rectness of the latter.
I'erhaps it will appear that the case was
v/rongly decided, i. e., that the decision is
not consistent with settled principles of
the law; or, it may be rightly decided but
on wrong grounds. Facts regarded by the
court as immaterial may prove to be the
decisive ones and vice versa. Questions by
members of the class will develop addi-
tional lines of inquiry not brought out by
the instructor, perhaps not thought of by
him. In this way the discussion is carried
along and becomes on the part of the stu-
dents a genuine original investigation of
the principle of law involved in all its
phases. Questioning by the instructor
should be a cross examination. Nothing is
taken for granted; no statement of opinion
goes unchallenged; the student must al-
ways give his reasons for his answers. The
constant effort is to stimulate an indepen-
dent spirit of inquiry into the correctness
of all decisions considered and intelligent
criticism of them from the point of view
of principle. With such methods, it is sel-
dom that any important phase of a case
e?capes the attention of a class interested
in the subject and always encouraged to
object to any views advanced by instructor
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or student. Indeed, our difSculty is usually,
ncc to create discussion but, rather, to con-
fine it within such bounds as are abso-
Ijtely pTescribed by the limits of the time
ai our disposal.
The discussion on a series of cases
toaches other points than just those in-
volved in the cases taken up. The princi-
ples developed are fitted into their proper
places in the scheme of the law and their
relation to others shown. ******
And the method is the historical one.
Oui- law is a growth. It was never a per-
fected system newly created. It has been
developed as cases arose calling for deci-
sion. To understand it rightly its history
must be studied. The cases on a particular
doctrine are taken chronologically. The
student works it out just as it has been
developed by the courts. Of course, the
further the subdivision of subjects is car-
ried, thg more the chronological approaches
to the logical order. This method differs
radically from the use of illustrative cases
in which the student studies the princi-
ples of law from a text book by which
they are presented to him in their com-
pleted form, and then, by way of illustra-
tion, is referred to a case where some
specific doctrine was applied.
That is the antithesis of the true case
sy«-tem. With us the student goes to the
original sources and from each case he gets
the principle there decided, and out of the
individual principles he constructs for him-
self the general scheme. It is the labora-
tory method applied to the study of law.
There is a certain plauHibility in the argu-
ment that as the courts have worked out
these results it is time lost for the student
to do it over again, since we can place in
his hands text books in which able men
have done this very work and reduced the
results of the cases to an orderly system
and stated the law as it is and he can
learn it from such books. The difficulty Is
that he does not learn it or remember it
so well when he tries to get it from text
books, and he certainly does not acquire
skill in reasoning by reading the results
of others' reasoning. Just as in those sci-
ences in which laboratory work is feasible
it has been found to be the most successful
method of teaching to have the student per-
form for himself experiments that have
been done thousands of times and the re-
sults of which can be found in many books,
so in law the surest way to knowledge and
ability to use it is for the student himself
to go through the same process of develop-
ing the law that has been followed by the
courts and to work out the principles for
himself from the original sources.
What I have attempted to describe as the
teaching of law is, perhaps, the ideal. It
may not always be possible to realize it to
its full extent. With some students it falls
fa- short of that. With some it is nearly
if not quite reached. It requires men in-
terested in their work, attentive in class,
industrious in preparation and, above all,
an absolute essential, the power to perform
the mental processes. You cannot teach
that power. If a man has it you can help
him to learn to use it if he is willing to
pay the price; but you cannot supply
brains. If he lacks the power to reason
all you can really do is to teach him some
rules of la"w as you would a parrot. He
ought not to try to be a lawyer. * * * * *".
It is a further p-urpose of the law school
to prepare men, primarily, for practice in
the state of Illinois. We are especially im-
pressed with the idea that a state univer-
sity should teach the law of the state
which supports the school, and to that end,
while the broad and deep study of the gen-
eral principles that lie at the foundation
of the common law are by no means ne-
glected, especial attention is given in all
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courses to grounding the students thorough-
ly in the law as determined in the courts
of Illinois. Throughout the entire course,
the students are required to comsult fre-
quently Illinois decisions and statutes,
which are made the basis of discussion in
class by student® and instructor. In the
Moot Court and through the course in Illi-
nois Procedure, especial attention is paid
to the rules of pleading and practice that
obtain in the State of Illinois.
Professor Northrup, with reference to this
branch of our work, says:
"I have spoken thus far principally qf
the teaching of the substantive law. The
work of the student in practice and court
procedure is a rather distinct branch and
requires different treatment. The funda-
mental p-inciple and the ultimate purpose
is, of course, the same in teaching practice
as in teaching substantive" law; namely, to
equip the student for the successful prac-
tice of his profession. The application of
the principle, however, varies as the nature
of the subject to be taught. As legal rea-
soning power is the most important ele-
ment of a mastery of substantive law, so
the object of the teaching of the latter is
to train the student's reasoning power and
ground him thoroughly in theory. The pur-
pose of the practice work, on the other
hand, is to acquaint him with the ma-
chinery of the law. There is not much
theory about it to be learned. The rules
of procedure and the methods by which a
party presents his case to the court, prose-
cutes an appeal and practically secures the
relief that the court has awarded him and,
in general, the details of the forms of legal
proceedings have been developed as the
result of what experience has shown to
be convenient and expedient. What the
students needs, therefore, is a knowledge
of what is actually done, e. g., how a law-
yer draws' his papers, what the rules re-
quire him to file and serve upon his op-
ponent, what motions he may and should
make to bring before the court for its con-
sideration points he thinks to be in his
favor.
It is obvious that what is here required is
not reasoning but knowledge and a facility
in the application of more or less arbi-
trary rules.
The object of all the work in the school
is ultimate practicality. We believe this
to be best secured in the realm of sub-
stantive law by training in theory and rea-
soning. On the same principle we ought
to give the student a detailed knowledge
of the rules of procedure and develop in
him skill in applying them. In other words,
in both branches of the work the student
should learn as a student to do the things
he will have to do as a lawyer.
With respect to practice work and pro-
cedure, the means employed to accomplish
this result is the practice court work in
what we call the Moot Court, supplemented
by a course on procedure.
In the court work, cases that have arisen
in actual litigation before the courts are
assigned to the students, counsel being ap-
pointed for each side. They perform the
duties in respect to the preiiaration for
trial and the argument of appeals that
would devolve upon attorneys conducting
the case. Pleadings, motion papers and
briefs are prepared in accordance with th«.
rules of practice. While, generally, the
actual trial of the case is omitted and the
cases are argued only as if on appeal, some-
times trials, involving the selection of a
jury, examination of witnesses, summing
up to the jury and the other incidents of
a trial are had.
The court is presided over by the dean
of the school, who renders written deci-
sions. Students are also appointed to hear
arguments and deliver opinions. A student
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is selected to act as sheriff and another as
clerk who keeps the docket and with whom
papers are filed. The proceedings of the
court, containing statements of the facts
in the cases to be argued and the opinions
of the presiding judge, are published in the
]Moot Court Bulletin. All students in the
upper two classes are required to attend
the sessions of the court and are quizzed
upon the cases argued. The student's at-
tention and work, therefore, are not con-
fined to only those cases in which he is
engaged as counsel.
A two-fold object is served by the Moot
Court. The student learns the details of
practice and in the preparation of his ar-
gument further trains himself in legal rea-
soning. Oftentimes, cases are purposely se-
lected on which he can find no authorities
directly in point. He is compelled to argue
them on principle. He is brought into di-
rect competition with others and his ability
as a lawyer tested and improved by doing
a lawyer's work. In the Moot Court the
theory of the class room work in sub-
stantive law is subjected to the test of
practical use.
The work in substantive law is a neces-
sary foundation for the practice work and
the latter is an equally necessary comple-






In order to win his case, the plaintiff
must show that his guest lost the article
replevied in the hotel and that the plaintiff
is responsible for its safe return to the
owner and therefore entitled to possession.
1. The finder of a lost article is entitled
,::i possession as against all the world ex-
cept the true own^r only when there is
no responsibility on the part of another
to see it returned to the true owner.
Bridges v. Hawks Vorth, 7 Eng. I. & Eq.
Rep. 430.
McAvoy V. Medina, 11 Allen Ola,s^.{ 519.
2. Innkeepers are bound to protect the
property of their guests and in case of loss
can only absolve themselves from liability
by showing that they are not at fault.
Johnson v. Richardson, 17 111. 302.
3. An innkeeper is liable for the goods
of his guests, including money and if they
are brought within the inn a responsibility
is created.
Houser v. Tully, 12 P. F. Smith 92.
Packard v. Northcroft's Admin. 2 Mete.
439.
Berkshire Woolen Co. v. Proctor, 7 Cush.
417.
Edwards on Bailments, 2nd Ed. Sec. 459.
Story on Bailments, Sec. 471.
Jones on Bailments, 95.
Addison on Torts. Wood's Ed. Vol. i,
pp. 755, 752.
4. He is bound to keep honest servants,
and is responsible for their honestj'.
Houser v. Tully, supra.
Gile V. Libby & Whitney, 36 Barb. (N.
Y.) 70.
5. To allow servants to retain money
found in an inn would encourage them to
be dishonest. The better rule is to require
them to deliver property so found to theii-
employer to be held for the true owner.
Mathews v. Harsell, 1 E. D. Smith's re-








BRIEF FOR THE DEFENDANT.
Case 133.
For the plaintiff to recover in this action
of replevin he must show that the servant
Haynes acquired no title to the chattel as
a finder, and that he transferred no title
to the defendant.
1. To acquire title to a chattel by find-
ing it must be shown that the chattel was
lost or abandoned.
Regina vs. Peters, 1 Car. & K. 44.
not lost in the sense that he who picks it
An article that has been misplaced is
up gets a good title. McAvoy vs. Medina,
11 Allen (Mass.) 548.
2. When an article is- found on the prop-
erty of another and not in a public place
the article belongs to the owner of the
locus in quo and not to the finder.
South Staffordshire Water Co. vs. Shar-
mon, 2 A. B. 44.
Elmer vs. Briggs, 33 Ch. Div. 562.
Hence Bud Haynes, the servant, by picR-
ing up the chattel acquired no title and
having no title himself, he could transfer
none to the defendant.
Dyar and Bones, 29 111. App-. 166.











(1) In order for the plaintiff to recover
in this action of replevin, the burden ot
proof is upon him to show a right to pos-
session of the article claimed. This is axio-
matic, and needs no citation of authority.
If the plaintiff is to recover in this action,
it is because he is an inn-keeper, and as
such is responsible to his guest for the arti-
cle in question.
(2) Conceding for the purpose of argu-
ment what may well be doubted to be the
law in Illinois, that an inn-keeper is an
absolute insurer of his guests' goods, there
is an exception to this rule, whenever the
goods of the .guest are lost or destroyed by
the negligence of the guest, and whenever
a case falls within the exception, the inn-
keeper is not liable.
(a) .loanson v. Richardson, 17 111. 302.
(b) Kelssy v. Beny, 42 111. 46S.
(c) Eden v. Drey, 75 111. App. 102.
The cases which hold an inn-keeper lia-
ble to the guest because of a loss do bo
on the theory that the goods were in the
possession of the inn-keeper, even though
the anest never surrendered the actual pos-
session of the goods. This is but a fiction
of law raised to protect the guest and is
of negative application so far as the inn-
keeper is concerned. That is, he cannot
deny it when it is alleged in the declara-
tion. But the inn-keeper can never make
use of the fiction affirmatively by making
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it the basis of an action to recover pos-
session of the article. If this be true, it
is apparent that the reason of the fiction
was tc hold the inn-keeper to the liability
to his guest which the law thought was due
the guest. Hence, -nhen the reason of tlie
rule fails, the rule itself fails, and with it,
the plaintiff's cause of action.
(3) With respect to the finding of lost
articles, the finder has the right to posses-
sion against the whole world except the
true owner.
(a) McAvoy v. Medinia, 11 Allen (Mass.)
548.
(b) Lawrence v. Buck, 62 Maine 275.
And the place of finding^ is immaterial.
(a) Bowen v. Sullivan, 62 Ind. 2S1; 30
A. S. R. 172 (with a very instructive note).
(b) Haymaker v. Blanchard, 90 Pa. 377.
(c) Tatum v. Sharpless, 6 Phila. 18, (Nisi
Prius).
(d) Bridges v. Hawkesworth, In the
Queen's Bench, unofiicially reported, 15 Jur.
1079.
(e) Durfee v. Jones, 11 R. I. 588.
(f) Schouler Per Prop., Section 14, et seq.
The conclusion is therefore irresistable,
that as plaintiff cannot show a right to
possession, first, because he is not liable
eve" to his former guest, and second, be-
cause the rights of the defendant's vendor,
as finder, were superior to all the world
except the true owner, that the plaintiff is










Opinion by Pillsbury, J.
Both of these cases involve the right to
the possession of lost property as between
the finder and the owner of the premises
where th« goods were found, either by
reason of such ownership or because of
special pri\aleges given him by the law in
view of his occupation as an innkeeper,
la neither case has the real owner appeared
to claim the lost article.
The distinction is often drawn between
lost and mislaid property. In the former
case the first person to assume actual pos-
session of the articles is said to have a right
of possession good against every one but the
true owner, v>-hile in the latter case, ex-
isting where the owner has laid the goods
down intentionally in some particular place
and latter forgotten to resume possession,
the courts say that the ov/ner of the place
where they were mislaid is entitled to the
possession as against the actual finder.
This result is reached on the theory that
the owner impliedly made a bailment of the
property in the place where found, and it
is the privilege, and perhaps the duty as
well of the proprietor of the premises to
take and preserve the property for his cus-
tomer. In the cases at bar, however, the
goods must be treated as lost, the ring be-
cause found on the floor of the lobby of the
hotel while sweeping, where the true owner
could not have deposited it intentionally.
As- to the nugget found in the hotel room
occupied by a guest the night before, it is
possible that it may have been discovered
on a washstand, in which case the inference
would be that it had been mislaid, or it may
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ha,vc been found upon the floor. The bur-
den ie upon the plaintiff however to show
that he has the better right, and he has
not succeeded in establishing the fact of
its having been mislaid.
Assuming both to have been lost, the de-
fendants are entitled unless the plaintiff
can show a better right by reason either
of his ownership of the hotel building of
of the privileges of his occupation as inn-
keeper. The first ground cannot well be
asserted in the United States, as the weight
of authority here, though otherwise in Eng-
land, is that the finder of goods lost in a
public, semi-public or even private place,
is entitled as against the owner of the pre-
mises.
Is an innkeeper entitled to lost property
found in his hotel because of his duties
iiud privileges in such calling? If
this be true, it is because of the pre-
s;.uMpt.ion that it was lost by a guest, com-
billed with the duty to protect the property
of guests. The burden i'Si therefore upcu
tire plaintiff to show that the article w^as
1 iciriimably lost by a guest. This burden
tho plaintiff fails to establish in the suit
against Hayijes, as the ring sued for in
this action was found in the hotel lobby,
v/here many persons other than guests are
accustomed to congregate. Judgment must
therefore be for defendant Haynes in the
first action.
As to the nugget found in a bedroom of
the hotel, the inference clearly would be
that it bad been lost by a guest. No cases
have been cited by either side holding di-
rectly that an innkeeper has the right to
such lost as distinguished from mislaid
property. It seems reasonable to hold,
nevertheless, that insofar as he is liable
to the guest for the safekeeping of his
liroperty, the owner should also have the
right to reclaim such property where taken
or found by others within the hotel. Such
liability can exist, however, only while the
relation of innkeeper and guest continues,
and is terminated by the departure of the
guest after paying his bill. A? to property
intentionally left with the innkeeper by
the guest on departing, the liability of the
former is only that of a gratuitous bailee.
(22 Cyc. 1088) The liability would seem
to arise from the fact of the receipt of the
goods on principles of ordinary bailments,
rather than from any duty as innkeeper.
In the present case the former owner had
apparently left the hotel so it would seem
as if the innkeeper were under no obliga-
tion as to the safety of forgotten property
of a departed guest, before he had actually
taken pcssescion of it, and consequently
had no right to tlie possession of it as
against the finder thereof.
I believe that the superior right of the
inckeej/er to that of the finder can never-
thaliss be established upon another ground.
In McAvoy v. Medina, II Allen (Mass.) 549,
it was held that the owner of a barber shop
was entitled to the possession of goods mis-
laid therein by a patron and not called
for, as against the finder. If a construct-
ive bailment can be made out in such case
from the fact of the mislaying of goods
by a patron within the shop and the pre-
sumed intention of the owner that the pro-
perty of the shop should keep them for him
there would seem to be no reason why the
same constructive bailment could not be
found from the losing as well as mislaying
of an article within a private room of a
hotel. Guests habitually look to the pro-
prietor of a hotel to search for and send
to them property supposed to have been
mislaid or lost at the hotel, and such in-
tent can be inferred without the grant of
express authority as easily where articles
have been presumably lost in a hotel as
where mislaid in a barber shop, and for-
gotten. Judgment will therefore be for the




James Wilts executed a will March 4, 1909,
30 days before his death, which contained
the following clause: "I give, devise and
bequeath my farm of 160 acres, being the
Northwest Quarter (N. W. 1-4) of Section
Twenty-two (22), Town Nineteen (19)
North, Range Eight (8) Blast, to my son,
Albert Wilts, and his bodily heirs; but in
the event that he should have no bodily
heirs, then to Jane Wilts and Mary Brown,
my sisters." Two years after the death
of James Wilts, Albert Wilts conveyed his
estate in the premises to Walter Hays, a
stranger, for the expressed consideration
of $30,000. One year thereafter, Hays re-
conveyed to Albert, v.'ho now files a bill
in the Circuit Court to quiet title to the
land. Albert Wilts was the only child of
deceased and the will contained no residu-
ary clause.
For the Complainant: Howe, Strong and
Keran.
For the Defendants: Kessler. Lewis and
AIcKnight.
Hays E. Passow vs. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
Case No. 32.
Jitmes Bowman liought fron-; H. E. Passow
crtain tables for his ulace of business at
a cost of $1000. paying a deposit of $100.
The contract contained the provision that
ujjon breach by the vendee, the full pur-
chase price should become duo and layable
and the vendor would be entitled to recover
the whole of said purchase price. Before
the arrival of the goods, Bowman was pur-
suaded by the salesman for a rival supply
house to break his contract, which he did.
refusing to accept delivery of the tables
whtu they arrived. Passow sued upon the
contract for $900, the balance due upon the
purchase price, and attached Bowman's
stock in trade. To release the attachment.
Bowman procured the Fidelity and Guar-
anty Company to execute a release of at-
tachment bond for $1800, the bond under-
taking and guaranteeing "that Bowman
would, on demand, pay any judgment that
might be rendered against him in said ac-
tion." The bond being duly approved and
filed, the attachment was released. At tll^
trial tho above facts were shown in evi-
dence, also that the tables were still at the
freight depot and the shipping documents
in the possession of Passow. The attor-
ney for Bowman then stipulated that titlo
to the tables was in Bowman free from all
liens or incumbrances of any sort and ac-
cepted delivery thereof. Passow's attorney
assented, stating that he was relying upon
the bond, and judgment was accordingly
entered by consent for plaintiff for $900
and costs of $7.5. A year having elapsed
since then, Bowman and the tables having
disappeared, and the judgment being un-
paid, Passow demands that the Fidelity &
Guaranty Company pay the am.ount of the
judgment, and upon their refusal brings
this action.
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Luney & T.-eopold.
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BEIEF FOR THE PEOPLE.
I.
When the People have proved the corpus
delicti they liave established a prima facie
case of murder (The People vs. Hotz, 261
111. 239) and the burden of showing excuse
or extenuation is on the accused. Murphy
vs. The People, 37 111. 457.
II.
When excuse is shown, the People must
show malice aforethought.
III.
In the case at bar, premeditated malice
is shown
1. By deliberate injury inflicted upon
the deceased. Davison vs. People,
90 111. 221; Spies vs. People, 130 111. I,
123 U. S. 131.
2. By the fact that the accused was
armed without any apparent reason
therefor. Steffy vs. People, 130 111.
98, 101.
3. By the fact that the accused was
engaged in an unlawful act by strik-
ing and injuring the deceased with-
out excuse. Adams vs. People, 109
111. 444; Morello vs. People, 226 111.
388; 1 W(\ar. Grim. Law (11th ed.)
§146. In such a case it is not neces-
sary that the accused intended to
kill.
IV.
The accused's plea of self defense avai's
him nothing; in this case because
1. The evidence shows he was the as-
sailant, and furthermore that he did
not endeavor really and in good faith
to decline further struggle before the
mortal blow was given People vs.
Hubert, 251 111. 514. The rule applies
however iminent the danger was in
which the accused found himself dur-
ing the progress of the affray. Mack-
in vs. People, 214 111. 232; Kinnev vs.
People, 108 111. 519, 526.
2. He was actuated by a motive of re-
venge, the deceased being his old en-
emy. Com. vs. Drum, 58 Pa. St. 9;
State vs. John, 30 N. C. 330, 335; 49
Am. St Rep. 397: Whar. on Hom.
(3d ed.) §163, §328.
3. He did not notify tlie deceased of
his desire to abandon the contest,
his apparent attempt at notification;
however imminent the danger or how-
ever fierce the return assault, does
not relieve him. even though it
should have been made in good faith,
when it is because of his own wrong-
ful act that the deceased is unable to
comprehend his meaning. People vs.
Button, 106 Cal. 628. 23 L. R. A. 591,
46 All. St. Rep. 259, 39 Pac. 1073
(citing Stoffer vs. State, 15 Oh. St. 47,
86 Am. Dec. 470: State vs. Smith, 10
Nev. 106); People vs. Hecker, 109 Cal-
451, 30 L. R. A. 403; Whar. on Hom,
(3d ed.) §335.
Respectfully submitted,
M. E. Xewell and
T. I. McKnight,
Attorneys for the People.
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1. Murder is the unlawful killing of a
human bein^ in the peace of the people,
with malice aforethought, either express or
implied. (Chap 38, Sec. 140, I. R. S.)
And where the act may or may not be
malicious, it is for the government to show
that it is malicious; otherwise the defend-
ant is entitled to the most favorable con-
struction of which the facts will admit.
(May on Grim. Law, 207, 210.)
2. Malice aforethought is an essential
element of murder, and the burden of
proving malice, like any other fact, beyond
a reasonable doubt, rests upon the prosecu-
tion. (Clark on Grim. Law 194.)
3. The malice necessary and requisite to
the crime of murder is not an inference of
law from the act of killing, but must be
found by the jury on competent evidence.
(Wharton on Homicide, 117. State vs.
Greenleaf, 71 N. H. 606.)
4. Though the killing is admitted, if the
admission is coupled with a declaration
showing justification, no presumption of
malice or that the homicide is murder
arises. Wharton on Homicide, 117, 124 Ga
6.)
5. In order that a party may avail him-
self of the plea of self-defense, he must
reasonably believe that there is danger of
losing his own life or of receiving great
bodily harm. (Healey vs. People, 163 111.
372.)
A. In this case the defendant did not
commit an assault on the deceased that
would have justified the deceased in taking
his life. Therefore, the defendant was not
the aggressor in the sense that he is de-
prived of his right of self defense. (People
vs. Ilecher, 109 Calif. 451. State vs. Evans.
128 Mo. 406. State vs. Foutch, 95 Tenn.
711.)
B. Whenever an aggressor in good faith
withdraws from the conflict, his right of
self defense revives. (Stoffen vs. State, 15
Oh. St. 47. McSpatton vs. State, 30 Tex.
A pp. 617. Cotton vs. State, 31 Miss. 504.
People vs. Bush, 65 Calif. 129.
(a) The question of faith of the re-
treating party is of the utmost im-
portance and should generally be sub-
mitted to the jury with the fact of re-
treat, especially where there is room
for conflicting inferences on the point
from the evidence. (Parker vs. State,
88 Ala. 4.)
(b) It is necessary only that the ad-
versary have reasonab'e grounds to be-
lieve his assailant has withdrawn.
(State vs. Dillon, 74 la. 653. People vs.
Button, 106 Calif. 628 )
6. The fact that the defendant was
armed should not be taken against him.
(Cotton vs, Hale, 31 Miss, 502. Alford vs.
State, 33 Ga. 303.
7. Tiie burden of proof is not on the
accused to prove self defense, or any other
defensive fact, but it is on the prosecution
to prove that accused was not acting in
self defense. (State vs Bone, 114 Iowa
557. People vs. Coughlin, 5 Mich, 704.)
And malice not necessarily implied from an
intent to do a personal injury. (Field vs.
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OPINION BY PILL5BURY. J.
The facts in this case are, briefly, that
the defendant, seeing Jones, an old enemy,
going down the street, went up heJiind
Jones and gave hitn a blow on the side of
the head. This blow so affected Jones'
brain as to deprive iiira of hearing. Jones
thereupon turned upon thedefendant, drew
his knife and grappled with him. The de-
fendant called to Jones to stop, that he had
no desire to tight and that he would ac-
knowledge Jones the better man, but Jones,
being unable to hear, lield White and was
on the point of stabbing liim when Wiiite
drew out a pistol and killed Jones by a
shot.
Two questions arise in this case. First,
whether thedefendant is to be acquitted on
the ground of self defense. Second, if self
defense is not established, whether tlie de-
fendant is gitilty of murder or man-
slaughter, the latter question depending
upon whether the element of malice afore-
thought is present.
In regard to the second question, I am of
the opinion that the prosecution have not
succeeded in ebtablishing malice to the ex-
clusion of a reasonable doubt. The prose-
cution admit in their brief that where
facts tending to show excuse are in evi-
dence, thes'aie must prove malice as a
fact. Deliberate or unlawful injury in-
flicted upon the deceased at a time ante-
cedent to tlie ki'ling will not in itself prove
malice unless it amounts to a felony, .vhich
was not shown in this case, or unless it be
by an act likely to cause death or serious
bodily injurv. Some of the facts in evi-
dence do tend to show malice, such as tiie
prior enmity, the carrying of a deadly
'weapon without reason shown therefore.
and the assault itself bv defendant. Never
tljeless it may reasonably be doubted
whether the defendant contemplated any-
thing more than assault and battery until
placv^d in a position where his own life was
at stake. The conviction should be for
manslaughter, if at all.
The remaining questi(jn is whetlier tlie
defendant was entitled under all the facts
to act in self defence. If defendant had
not been the assailant at the outset there
would be no difficulty in acquitting him, as
he was in immediate peril of his life and
had no other means of escape. The defend-
ant was the assailant, iiowever, perhaps
not with murderous intent, but tliis ap-
pears to be immaterial in Illinois. A per-
son obliged to kill to save himself after
starting a mere assault (non-murderous) is
however guilty of manslaughter instead of
murder. Adams vs. The People, 47 111. 379.
Kinney vs. The People, 108 111. 526.
Defendant has therefore forfeited his
right to self defense, unless it be sliown
that "he had really and in good faith endeav-
ored to decline any further struggle before
the mortal shot was fired." Kinney vs. The
People, supra. While it is possible that
the whole affair was deliberately planned
by the defendant for the purpose of killing
the deceased under the pretense of self
defense, in which case his right to protect
himself would not be restored, such in-
tent is not established beyond a reasonable
doubt, and we must therefore assume that
the defendant in good faith did all in his
power to decline further Struggle. Were it
not for the holding in People vs. Button,
106 Calif. 628, the defendant should be ac-
quitted.
By this case, however, the rule is enun-
ciated that where an aggressor has so in-
jured his adversary that the latter is rend-
ered incapable of appreciating that the
former is endeavoring in good faith to
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withdraw, and the prior aggressor is com-
pelled to kill to save hiraself,the plea of self
defense can not be asserted. Whether this
rule is sound or not may well be ques-
tioned, but in my opinion the case is not
here applicable, as it is not shown that the
deceased was incapable of rficeiving notice
of defendant's attempts to withdraw
through other senses than that of hearing.
Defendant's actions doubtless gave the
impression of liis desire to withdraw, even
if his words were not heard. The defend-
ant should therefore be acquitted.
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PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF.
The master is liable for the torts of his
servants done in the course of the employ-
ment.
Johnson vs. Barber, 5 Gillman 425.
Tuller vs. Voght. 13 111. 285.
Moir vs. Hopkins, 16 111. 313.
Cutler vs. Callison, 72 111. 113.
Where the owner of an automobile liires
out his machine with a driver, to be used
for conveyance of the hirer from place to
place, the driver does not become the ser-
vant of the hirer, but remains subject to
the control of his general employer, the
owner, who is liable for his negligence in
driving.
Shepard vs. Jacobs, 204 Mass. 110.
Because the hirer of au automobile or-
ders the driver to drive slower or faster is
not such an exercise over the driver as to
create the relation of master and servant
between hirer and driver.
Johnson vs. Coey, 237 111. 88.
Though the driver to whom an automo-
bile owner intrusts with the running and
management of his ear is paid by the
hirer, yet the owner is liable for the driver's
negligence.
Yeates vs. I. C. R. R. Co. 241 111. 205.




1. General Proposition: That a master
is liable for the torts of his servant com-
mitted while acting within the course of
his employment, and while upon his mas-
ter's business. — Plaintiff's brief.
2. No relationship of Master and Ser-
vant between the owner of the car and the
driver with reference to the particular act
complained of has been shown.
A. One who is the general agent of an-
other may be loaned or hired by his
master to a third party for some spec-
ial service, and as to that particular
service, he will become the servant
of the third party. Consolidated Fire
Works Co., vs Koehl, 190 111. 145.
Grace & Hvde Co. vs. Probst, 208 111.
147. •
B. The master is the one who has the
direction and control of the servant
in the particular service. Grace &
Hj-de Co, vs. Probst (supra).
C. The question of direction and con-
trol of the servant at the time of the
particular injury is always a question
of fact for the jury. Buckler vs. City
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of Newman. 116 111. App546. Liitle
vs. Hackett, 116 U. S. 3GG.
D. Tne method and mear?s by which a
chauffeur in charge of an automobile
receives his compensation is material
upon the question whether he is the
servant of the owner, so that the lat-
ter will be liable for his acts, or an
independent contractor for whose
acts the owner is not liable. Minor
vs. Stevens, 65 Wash. 423 (42 LRA ns
1178).
E. Where the nef,Migent act (/f the
driver causing tlie injury is the di-
rect result of the active interferance
or command of the hirer, ihe owner
of the vehicle is not liable.
M'Laughlin vs. Pryor 4 M & G 48.
Standard Oil Co. vs. Anderson, 212 U.
S. 215.
Webber vs. Becker, 136 N. Y. Sup. 119.
Ewinir & Gains vs. Shaw & Co., 83
Ala. 333.
Little vs. Hackett, 116 U. S. 366
Respectfully submitted,






Opinion by White and Esalbora.
The facts in this case are, briefly, that
on May 1, 1913, A. L. .Jones hired an auto-
mobile from the Smith garage for the af-
ternoon for $10.00. Not being able to drive
the machine, he requests that a driver be
furnished. Smith, the owner ofthe;.ar-
age, thereupon detailed Brown, who work-
ed for liim in the garage, to take the car
out. .Tones promised to pay the driver $2.50.
After leaving the city limits. Jones leaned
over to the chauffeur and said: "Go as fast
as you can. I want to se^ how fast you can
go." Brown repiiftd: ''My employer does
not allow me to break the speed limit."
Jones answered: "Do as I tell you, damn
you, I am your master now." Brown ac-
cordingly put on fall speed and while driv-
ing at a reckless rate, ran into and injured
A. B. White, the plaintiff, who was driv-
ing along the road using due care. Plain-
tiff sues Smith, the owner of tlie garage, for
damages.
The questiou for deteruoination in this
case is, whosa serva:it was the chauffeur at
the time of tlie accident.
The question being argued before the
court without a jury, the c )urt is CiUed up-
on to determifie a question of fast, iiaving
regard however to al! the principles of law
pertaining to the matter involved, some of
which are the following:
The relation of master and servant is the
relatioii existing between two persons, one
of whom (tho master) has authority over
the other (th3 s^.rvant), with the power of
directing iiis services as to time, manner
and place.
The general rule as to liability of the
master for tlie negligent act of his servant
is tliat the master is liable for all injuries
caused by the act of his servant while act-
ing within the scope of liis duties as such,
whether the injury results from acts of
commission or omission.
Another rule laid down in the case of
Consolidated Fire Works Co.. vs. Koehl,
190 111. 145, is: One who is the general ser-
vant of one party may be lent or hired by
his master to another for souje special ser-
vice, so as to become, as to such service,
the servant of the other, the test in such
cases being whether, in the particular ser-
vice, the servant continues to be under the
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direction and control of his raasier or of
the other party. Tiiis rule is upheld in the
case of Coughlan vs. Cambiidi>e, 166 Mass.
268. Also by Pioneer Fireproof Construc-
tion Co. vs. Hansan, 176 111. 100 at p 108,
where it is said: "He is the master who has
the choice, control and direction of the
servant. The master remains liable to
strangers for the negligence of iiis servant,
unless he abandons their control to the
hirer."
With these principles in mitid vve now
proceed with the discussion and decision of
the case.
The burden of proof in this case is upon
the plaintiff, hence he is calle upon to
show that the relation of master and ser-
vant existed betweer» the defendant (gar-
rage owner) and the chauffeur. The facts of
the case do not show liow the defendant
carried on his business. Ha may hava been
in the business of simply hiring auUrnio-
biles to parties, who wished to use them as
they pleased. On ihe other hand it might
iiave been his rule to always send a driver
with every car rented, at the same time re-
taining complete control over machine and
driver. There is no evidence in the case
pointing to the exact way in which he car-
ried on his business.
I. think we are not justified in liolding
there is a presumption upon tliis particular
point. Then what evidence is tliere to sup-
port the plaintiff's case?
The facts show Jones hired the automo-
bile for ten dollars. This part of the trans-
action seems to have been settled when
Jones saying that he was not able to drive
a car requested that a driver be furnished.
The fact that the garage owner had made
no allowance for a driver when lie named
his price as ten dollars, would seem to in-
dicate that no one in his employ should be
in charge of the machine. So far the con-
trol of the machine seems to have been put
in the hands of tlie hirer and points to the
idea of complete control in him. If the
defendant had been in control of the ma-
chine there would have been no need of
asking for a driver. Does the request for
a driver and a promise in any way negative
this idea? No, it rather seems to strength-
en the defendant's position. Jones did not
expect to have a driver turnished him at
the price of ten dollars, so tie decides to
hire one of his own accord, and lie natural-
ly turned to the garage owner to find a man
for him. The garage owner detailed a man
who was working in the garage and to tliis
man the hirer promised to pay two dollars^
and fifty cents.
Minor vs. Stevens, 65 Wash. 423, points
out that tlie means and method by which a
chauffeur in charge receives his compensa-
tion is material upon the question whether
lie is the servant of the owner, so that the
latter will be liable for his acts. The pay-
ment in this case was by the hirer, and
must be regarded as compensation for the
driver's service. The fact of the promise
before the uridertaking and the relation of
amount paid to the services rendered clear-
ly show that this was a compensation and
not a mere "tip". This evidence by the
defendant clearly shows that the servant
was not within hi control, and the hirer
could give any direction to the chauffeur
that he pleased, whether as to direction or
speed, and the chauffeur was bound to obey.
Tlie test of control solves the issue as to
the relation existing between the chauffuer
and the hirer.
Also the courts say that the hirer can
instruct the driver when and where to
drive, but that when the hirer attempts to
say how to drive, it is a different thing,
and is said to be an assujaption of control
sutHcient to hold the hirer for injuries re-
sulting from his active interference or liis
commands. He thereby specifically directs
and brings about the negligent act. Here
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the orders to drive faster came from the
hirer; therefore the hirer actually assumed
control, specificially directing and hringiiig
about the negligent act.
The fact that the chauffeur thought that
he was in the employ of the garage owner
does not alter the case. Previous acts and
agreements have fixed his duties tu tiie
hirer. His refusal to drive fast can have
no greater meaning in this case than a
manifestation to drive in no other way
than that in which his general employer
permits him to drive.
Since the driver in this case was the
special agent of the liirer and completely
under his control, the relation of master
and servant between the said hirer and
driver was created.




In determining whether in a particular
act the servant is the servant of the old
master or tiie one to whom he is temporar-
ily lent, the test is as to which is tiie per-
son in control as a proprietor, so that he
can at any time step in or continue it,
and determine the way in which it shall be
done, not merely in reference to the result
to be reached, but in reference to the
method of reaching the result. Or shortly,
to whom does the "particular and detailed
management" belong. In a case directly
in point, Shepherd vs. Jacobs, 204 Mass 110.
where the owner of an automobile let it
with a licensed chauffeur in charge of it un-
der an agreement by wliich he was to re-
ceive $50 for the use of the car with the
driver for two days, the owner was held
liable for an injury to a third person caused
by the negligence of the driver in operat-
ing the car during the period of hiring and
wiien the driver was ob.^ying the orders of
the hir«ir, as to when and where he shall
drive.
The condition that tiie driver was to be
paid by the hirer and not by the defendant
does not avoid the conclusion that the
driver was not the defendant's servant at
tiie time of the accident; tlie detailed
management and contri)! of the driver was
still in the defendant as was evidenced by
the reply of the driver, wiieii told by Jones
to drive faster; it was, '"my masterdoes not
allow me to drive faster than tiie speed
liuiit," and it was only wlien actually
threatened by Jones lliat he brolte the de-
fendant's instructions to him.







I. The defendant in his plea states tiiat
he liad no malice but that he desired the
position for liimseif, (for his own benefit)
knowing such act would probably result in
the plaintiff's discharge. It is well settled,
however, that injuritig the plaintiff or ben-
efiting the defendant at the expense of the
plaintiff, is in itself malicious and action-
able if injury ensues,
Luraley vs. Gye, 2 Ellis & Blackburn 216.
Bowen vs. Hall, 6 Q. B. Div. 333.
Walker vs. Cronin. 107 Mass. 555.
Doremus vs. Hennesy, 176 111. 608.
II. The plea is double in that tlie de-
fendant has put in a plea of not guilty,
and immediately thereafter sets up mat-
ter that amounts to a special plea.
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III. The plea is aru-umeiitxiive, lo-wil:
the defendant allej^es that he watited the
posilion for himself, that hekriywtiie plain-
tiff would probably be discharjjed, which as
a raaiter of law he had a le^al right to do,
that he had no malice, etc.
Second Count.
I. That the defendant only desired to
benefit his unio \ and had no ill will toward
tlie plaintiff is not a sutlicie;nt justitication.
Dorem us vs. Hennesy, 176 111. 608.
O'Brien vs. People, 216 111. 353.
Barnes vs. Typographical Union, 232 111.
424.
Respectfully submitted,
Jno. W. White and O. V. Seed,
Attorneys for the Plaintiff.
BRIEF FOR DEFENDANT.
Since the defendant in answer to the
first count of the Plaintiff's declaration, al-
leged as his sole and only ground of de-
fense the want of malice on liis part and
his action to procure the plaintiff's position
being caused by liis desire to procure the
position for himself and since ttie plaintiff
has admitted tliese facts to be true by iiis
demurre*" to the said plea of the defendant,
it is incumbent upon liim to show that
lack of malice and a proper motive in doing
the act are not a good defense.
Secondly, since the defendant in answer
to the second and last count of the plain-
tiff's declaration answered as a defense,
that he, the defendant, acted in bona fida
belief that liis actions were for the best in-
terest of the Union of which lie was an of-
ficer and that tiie strike was to be carried
upon legally and peacefully, and since the
plaintiff has by demurrer admitted these
facts to be true, it also is incumb entupon
him to show that that does not constitute
a good defense to the said second count.
A demurrer admits all sucli matters of
fact as are well pleaded.
City vs. Water Co. 178 i;i 299.
Where one party has interfered vvitii an-
other's business or has induced a breach of
contract of employment, said act in order
to be actionable must have been done malic-
iously and with the sole purpose of injur-
ing or destroying that person's business, or
of inducing third persons to break their
contract of employment.
J. F. Parkinson vs. Building Traders'
Council, 154 Cal. 581.
Doremus vs. Hennessy, 176 111. 603
O'Brien vs. People, 216 111 354.
Mahoney vs. Roberts, 86 Ark. 130.
Wells etc. Co. vs. Abraham, 14-6 Fed. 190.
Affirmed 149 Fed. 408.
Hine vs. Hodge vs. Lumber Co. 121 La.
653.
Legris vs. Marcotte, 129 111. App. 67.
Men can combine to increase their wages
and can use their influence the same in
argument, persuasion, and bestowal or re-
fusa of these advantages which they
would not otherwise control.
Guether vs. Altaian, 26 Ind. App. 587.
Nat Pro. Ass. vsCummings, 70 N. Y. 315.
Threat to strike, or boycott or witiidraw
patronage is not coercion in the legal sense.
Boutwell vs. Marr. 71 Vt. 1.
Burdick on Torts, page 72.
A Union may accomplish things for its
benefit by a peaceful strike, or by promises
or solicitation, by a peaceful strike, mean-
ing where no force or coercion is used, as
picketing or physical force.
Wilson vs. Hey et al. 232 111. 389.
Barnes vs. Ttie Chi. Typo. Union 'So. 16,
232 111 424.
Individual liberty would be unduly and
improperly infringed were union to be
denied the right to strike, that is to cease
6
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work, in order to secure closed shop—to de-
mand other workmen to join union or to
be discharged. Wiien the purpose of the
threat of tiie strike is to secure the advant-
aj,'e vvliich tlie ur)ion men iioneslly are to
derive from a closed sliop or discharge of
work uen.
London Guarantee Ace Co. vs. Hone, 206
111 493,
Ulery vs. Chi. Live Stock Co. 54 111 App
233.
Kemp vs. Division No. 241. 153 111 App.
637.
Vegelahn vs. Gunter (Holmes dissenting
Opinion) 167 Mass 92.
Plant vs. Woods 176 Mass 492. (Holmes
dissenting opinion.)
A'len vs. Flood 1898 A. C. 1.
Kemp vs. Division No. 241, 255 111. 213.
Labor unions acting through agents by
threatening to call out men if non-union
men are not discharged are not liable for
damages as suit of discharged workmen.
Kemp vs. Division No. 241. 255 111 213.
Respectfully Submitted,
Mehl, Mercer and Terril,
Attorneys for Defendant.
OPINION BY SHOBE, J.
The declaration in this case consisted of
two counts. The first stated a contract
between the plaintiff and Mitchell & Co.
and charged that the defendant induced
Mitchell & Co. to break the contract. The
defendant pleaded to tliis count that he
wished to obtain the plaintiff's position for
himself and offered to work for lower wages
without any malice toward the plaintiff, but
knowing that such an offer would probably
result in his discharge. The second count
charged that the plaintiff was desirous of
obtaining a position with Watson & Co.,
which he would have obtained but for the
defendant who threatened to call out Wat-
son's other i.mployes if the plaintiff were
employed. To I his count the defendant
pleaded that he was an officer of the Me-
chanic's Union and adopted that cour.se of
action in the discharge of his duties in the
bona tide belief that it was for th-; best in-
terest of the union, and that he had no
personal desire to injure the plaint ff. To
both pleas the plaintiff and tlie defendant
filed a rejoinder.
The plaintiffs have depended much on
Lumley vs. Gye, 2 Ellis & Blackburn, 216;
and Bowen vs. Hall, 6 Q. B. Div. 333, in
support of their first count. In Lumley
vs. Gye the defendant induced a singer to
break her contract with the plaintiff, who
was a theatrical manager, and tlie Court
allowed the plaintiff to recover. In Bowen
vs. Hall the plaintiff had contracted with
one Pearson to furnish the plaintiff with
glazed brick for which Pearson had a
patent process. The defendant, Hall, in-
duced Pearson to break his contract with
the plaintiff and work for him. The plain-
tiff sued Hall and was allowed to recover.
In the case before us counsel for the de-
fendant have strongly maintained that
there should be no recovery because tiiere
was no malice on the part of the defendant,
Brondon, but they have failed to distin-
guish between criminal and civil malice.
In Lumley vs. Gye the Court said: "It
must now be considered clear law tliat
one who wrongfully and maliciously or,
what is the same thing, with notice, in-
terrupts the relation subsisting between
master and servant, commits a wrongful
act for which he is responsible at law."
And in Bowen vs. Hall the Court said: "If
the persuasion be used for the indirect pur-
pose of injuring the plaintiff or benefiting
the defendant at tlie expense of tlie plain-
tiff, it is a malicious act which is in law
and in fact a wrongful act. and therefore
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an actionable act if injury ensues from it."
These cases show that an act need not be
done with the malicious intent required by
our cridjitial law but only wiih a Icnowledue
of the facts and a belief tljat tlie aci, if
carried out, will cause an injury to Uie
plaintiff. Roth the cases of Lumley vs.
Gye and Howen vs. Hall are cited with ap-
proval by the Illinois Supreme Court in
Barnes vs. Typographical Ufiion, 232 111.
424, and can tliereforebe assumed to be tiie
rule in Illinois and to be followed in the
case before us. The demurrer of the
plaintiff to the defendant's plea to the first
count will tlierefore be sustained.
The extensive authorities cited by
counsel for the plaintiff in support of their
second count are revitwed by the Illinois
Supreme Court in the recent case of Kemp
vs. Div. No 241, 255 III. 213. It is true
that every employee has a right to protec-
tion in his employment from the vvronj,'ful
and malicious interference of another re-
sulting in damage to the employee, but if
sucli interference is out the consequence of
the exercise of some legal right by another
it is not wrongful and caii not tlierefore be
made tiie basis for an action to recover the
consequent damages. K-;ni vs. Div. No
241 Supra, '"Labor unions liave been formed
in our country by the workmen for their
protection against unscrupulous employers
and their only source of strengtii is their
banding together. So to remain alive they
must compel workmen in the several .rades
to band with them or suffer non-employ-
ment. The only way they can enforce such
membership is to require the workman to
join them or, by striking, force the employ-
er to discharge him." In this light strik
Ing, so long as it is carried on in a peaceful
manner, is lawful, since it gives life to the
labor unions which are the only hope of the
laboring man for conditions under which
his burden becomes bearable and the iron
hand of the employer over him forced to re-
lax. Whatever one has a right to do an-
other has no right to complain of. A la-
borer may quit the employ of his master at
the end of his contract and refuse to re-
new it if he wants to and make as a con-
dition of his new contract the discharge of
a fellow employee beside whom he objects
to work. Tne Courts of this State have
objected to the above views in some in-
stances, but those cases were reviewed and
overruled in the case of Kemp vs. Div. No.
241, supra, and we choose to stand Uy the
majority opinion in that case and there-
fore the demurrer to the defendant's plea
to the second count will be overruled. But
on the first count.
Judgment for the Plaintiff.






1. If an agent, >vhile acting within the
scope of his authority, enters into a con-
tract, his principal being known, the pre-
sumption is that the contract is for the
principal, and the principal will be bound,
even tliough the agent contracted in his
own name.
Hopkins vs. Laconture, 4 La 64.
Cooper vs. Ratcliff, 116 S. W, 748.
James vs. Lewis, 26 La. Ann. 664.
DaviS & Co. vs. Gemraell, 70 Md. 356.
Dyer vs. Burnham. 25 Me. 9.
Edwards vs. Gildemeister, 60 Kan. 141.
Eustis Mfg. Co. vs. Soco Brick Co. 198
Mass 212.
Anderson vs. Timberlake, 114 Ala. 377.
Hearne vs. Chillocothe, etc., R. R Co., 53
Mo. 324.
Jones vs. Wattles, 66 Neb. 533.
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Jones vs. Gould, 108 N. Y. S. 31.
Lowe vs. Pent! Iron Works Co., 54 So. 742.
Fountain vs. West Lumber Co., 76 S. E.
533.
2. When an agent discloses liis principal
the burden of showing that exclusive credit
has been given to the agent is on the party
asserting it.
John Spry Luinber Co. vs. McMillian, 77
111. App. 280.
Anderson vs. Timberlake, 114 Ala. 377.
Meeker vs. Claghorn, 44 N. Y. 349.
Butler vs. Evening Mail Assn., (31 N. Y.
634.
Respectfully submitted,
Cassidy, Newell & Ratcliffe,
Attornevs for Plaintiff.
DEEPENDA NT'S BRIEF.
1. A party although an agent and acting
within his aut'.iority who contracts in writ-
ing in his own name, is liable on the con-
tract himself, the fact of agency having
been disclosed, and the principal can not be
made liable by setting up by parole evi-
dence that the contract was made for the
principal.
Chandler vs. Coe, 54 N. H. 561.
Harvey Silver vs. Eben D. Jordan, 136
Mass. 319
William vs. Journal Printing Co. 43
Minn. 537
2. If an agent contracts with a third
party and the third party knows he is an
agent but the parties see lit to make a
written contract that names the agent and
third party as the contracting parties with
no allusion to the principal, then the agent
and not the principal is bound by the con-
tract.
Sealing vs. Knowlin 94 111. App. 443.
Savage vs. Rix 9 N. H. 269.
Arfridson vs. Ladd 12 Mass. 173.
Dokarty vs. Tillotson 64 Neb. 432.
Watte vs. Tn,iyer 53 III. App. 282
Vail vs. Njfth .western Life ins. Co. 192
111. 567.
3. Parol evidence is not admissible to
vary or explain th J tirms of a writtjn in
strument.
Town of Kane v.s. Farrelly 192 [II 521.
Kempshall vs. Vedder 79 III. App. 369.
Snow et al. vs. Maafarlane 51 III. App.
448.
5. After the parties have reduced their
agreement to writing all prior negotiations
leading up to the execution of the writing
are merged in the writing and cannot be
brought in by parol to explain or varv it.
Lewis H. Davis vs. Fidelity Ins. Co. 208
111. 375.
5. Agency is a fact the burden of prov-
ing which rests upon the party affirming
its existence.
31 C>c. 1643 authorities there cited.
Respectfully Submitted,
Brannon, Anderson and Barlowe,
Attorneys for Defendant.
OPINION BY xMERCER. J.
This case arises upon a verbal agreement
made in October, 1911, between the plain-
tiff, Schindler, and one L. E. Dunn, the
latter acting as agent for E. S. Cox, the de-
fendant in this case. By this verbal agree-
ment Schindler undertook to cut down
trees located upon Cox's premises, cut them
into logs and haul them to a designated
place. Schindler performed his part of the
contract, receiving advances from Dunn
from time to time. On December the 28th
the contract was reduced to writing, but
unfortunately the agency of Dunn or the
principalship of Cox was not mentioned.
There was nothing in the writ! ng to indi
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cate but that Dunn was the real party to
the contract. The language in fact nomi
nated Dunn as "the party of the second
part." Default having been made in the
payments to Schindier, he brought this ac-
tion against Cox, seeking lo liold him liable
as Dunn's principal. One thousand dollars
remains due and unpaid.
Accoiding to all principals of law and
justice. Cox is liable upon tlie contract if
tlie verbal agreement can be taken into
consideration. Counsel for the defendant
insisted that tlie parol evidence rule pro-
hibited the introduction of the verbal
agreement. As a general ruie a written
contract can not be explained or altered by
parol evidence if the written contract is
clear and unambiguous on its face.
Admitting this well established rule of
evidence, one feature of this case negatives
its application. The party relying upon
this rule is the defendant, who was not a
party to the written contract. It is funda-
mental law that one not a party to a writ-
ten instrument or privy to it can not urge
the parol evidence rule as a defense.
Wigmore on Evidence Vol. IV. Sec. 2042
and authorities cited.
Judgement will be for the plaintiff.
Mehl and Stambaugh J. J., concur.
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PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE
MOOT COURT.
The Moot Court Bulletin will appear
regularly during the academic j'ear, and
will contain the rules of court, the cases
and various pleadings and briefs of counsel.
The publication will be in fact, as well as
in theor}', the bulletin or journal of the
Moot Cour. . A copy of the bulletin will be
kept by the clerk of the court and filed
among the records: copies will be placed
and preserved in the library, so that they
may be open to students for examination at
any time.
The cases are intentionally practical.
They are actual cases—cases that have
arisen and are pending in the Circuit, Ap-
pellate and Supreme Courts of the State,
and at the time of argument in the Moot
Court the cases in question are either unde-
cided or the judgments of the respective
courts have not been reported. The venue
and the names of parties are necessarily
changed, and not infrequently the facts oj
the cases are modified in the interest of
simplicity.
In. this way, fanciful or fictitious cases
are not considered, and the student has the
advantage of preparing and trying actual
cases in his undergraduate days. It is felt
that this practical training should be of
great service to the young practitioner.
Dean Oliver A. Harker takes entire
charge of the Court and will regularly pre-
side.
MOOT COURT RULES.
1. The Moot Court will be held at 1:00
o'clock p. m. on Mondays and Tuesdays.
2. All members of the second and third-
year classes will be required to attend regu-
lar sessions of the Court.
3. The clerk will keep a docket of all
cases, and keep on file and open for inspec-
tion all papers in pending cases.
4. Two students will be appointed as
counsel on each side of every case.
5. Immediately after receiving the state-
ment of facts, the attorneys for the plain-
tiff or complainant shall draw the declara-
tion or bill and file two copies of the same
with the clerk before 9:00 a. m. the Monday
following. Attorneys for the defendant
must tile two copies of plea, answer or de-
murrer, by the Friday following.
6. The case must be called during motion
hour on the second Monday for the settle-
ment of issue.
7. Counsel holding the affirmative must',
on or before the third Monday following
the assignment of the case, furnish one
copy of their brief to the clerk of the
Court and one copy to opposite counsel.
Counsel holding the negative will furnish
one Copy of their brief to such professor
and one copy to the opposite counsel by the
Friday following.
;
8. Oral arguments will be limited, to<
thirty minutes on a side,
, -1;)
9. Students not engaged as counsel will
be required to draft pleadings, motions and
affidavits on statements given out by the
judge of the Moot Court, and to comment
on cases after trial.
10. All freshmen in the College of law







On May 1, 1914, .James Green, who had
undertaken to construct a grain elevator
with a capacity of 80,000 bushels of wheat
at Elkville, .Jackson County, Illinois, and
have it ready for the reception of the
wheat crop of 1914, made a proposition
with Walter Ross, that if he did not have
the elevator finished and ready for the re-
ception of grain by July 15, 1914, he would
pay Ross the sum of $500, and that if the
elevator should be finished and ready for
the reception of grain by that date, Ross
should pay him $500. The proposition was
accepted and there was deposited with the
Elkville National Bank, by Green, a note
as follows:
"Elkville, 111., May 1, 1914.
For value received. I promise to pay
Walter Ross or order Five Hundred Dol-
lars on July 15, 1914, if the grain elevator
now being constructed by me under con-
tract with the Board of Managers of the
Wheat Grower's Association of Elk Town-
ship is not finished by that date.
James Green."
At the same time Ross deposited with
the bank a note for a like sum, payable to
Green, if the elevator should be finished by
July 15, 1914. The elevator was not finish-
ed or ready for grain until July 25th, and
on the folio vving day the bank delivered
the two notes to Ross. Suit is now brought
on the note executed by Green.
The Elk Township Wheat Grower's As-
sociation had voted a bonus of $400 to
Green to be paid in the event of his having
the elevator ready to receive the first
wheat threshed by a member of the Associ-
ation. Henry Wolf, a member, was the
first to finish threshing, which was on
July 23d, and on the 25th he began deliver-
ing at the elevator. He had not offered to
deliver earlier. The bonus, which was
raised by voluntary assessment of mem-
bers, was paid. Ross was a member of the
association and had contributed to the
bonus. He was not one of the Board of
Managers, which contracted with Green for
the construction of the elevator.
Eor the plaintiff: Anderson and Barlow.
For the defendant: Britton and Bro.vn.
Case No. 2.
STATEMENT.
Samuel Bates and William Carr, from
1904 to 1913, were engaged in buying and
selling live stock as partners at Champaign,
111. Their contract provided that they
should share equally in the profits and
losses.
In 1913 the firm became in"?olvent. Judg-
ments were recovered against them and all
the partnership property was taken and
sold on execution. The firm owed Henry
Horn $2400, but no steps were taken to col-
lect his debt because he was "abroad" when
the firm failed. When he returned in No-
vember, 1913, he had an interview with
Bates and Carr in which he pressed them
to pay or secure liis debt. The only prop-
erty owned by Carr not exempt from execu-
tion was an automobile worth about $1100.
The only property owned by Bates was
forty shares of stock in a cold storage com-
pany of doubtful value. Carr offered to
turn his automobile over to Horn in satis-
faction of his part of the debt, and Bates
offered to assign his shares of stock to Horn
in satisfaction of his part of the debt.
Horn was willing to accept the automobile
and release Carr, but was unwilling to ac-
cept the proposition of Bates, because he
did not regard the stock as of any value.
Bates insisted that the stock had a fine
prospective value, and would be worth par
in less than six months. Carr then saiid
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"I will turn the automobile over to you if
you will release me, and you can wait on
iSates until such time as the stock does be-
come valuable. Bates can hold his stock,
and just as soon as he can satisfy you thai
ii is worth iialf the debt, or $1209, vou can
take it," to which Horn replied, "That is
satisfactory." The automobile was turned
over to Horn and he gave to Carr tlie fol-
lowing receipt:
"Champaign, III., Nov. 30, 1913.
Received of William Carr. his automo-
bile, being a five-passenger Buick, valued
at $1200. In consideration of which I re-
lease him from further liability on the
partnesship debt of $2400 which 1 hold
against the late tirin of Bates & Carr.
Henry Horn."
Bates did not formally assent to this
arrangement, but heard the entire conver-
sation, saw Horn write the receipt, and de-
liver it, and saw Carr deliver the machine
to Horn.
In about six months after the delivery of
the machine, the cold storage stock belong-
ing to Bates became valuable and was sell-
ing at par. Horn made a demand upon
Bates for the stock, but Bates refused to
deliver any part of it to him, sold the
i
stock to third parties, and now refuses to
pay anything.
For the Plaintiff: Bye and Corbly.




On the 4th of April, 1914, James Pettis
who was the president of the Atlas Coal
Company, an Illinois corporation, engaged
in itiining coal in Sangamon County, Illi-
nois, executed and delivered to the Spring-
field State Bank a promisory note of which
the following is a copy:
Springfield, III., April, 4, 1914.
Four months after date v»e promise to
payjto the Springfie'd State Bank, or order,
two thousand dollars, ^vith interest from
date at the rate of seven per cent
And we hereby consiitute and appoint
any attorney of t'nis State, our attorney to
a!)|)Bar f(»r us in any court, in term time or
vacation, at atiy time hereafter, and v/aive
the issue of process, aad confess judgment
against us for tlte amount of the above
note includif»g interest then due and ten
per cent of the principal sum above men-
tioned for attorney's fee, and costs, tile a
cognovit for that amount and an agree-
ment releasing all errors, and waiving all
appeal in said cause, and that no bill in
equity shall be filed to interfere with the
operation or said judgment or any execu-
tion issued thereon.
A tlas Coal Company,
By James Pettis, President.
The note was given for borrowed money
which was used by the coal company.
When Pettis applied for the money for the
company, he represented to tlie cashier of
the bank that he was willing -.o endorse
the note personally and guarantee its pay-
ment. Accordingly, when he signed the
jiote as president of the company, he en-
dorsed his name on the back of it in blank,
"James Pettis". On the 23rd dav of Sep-
tember, R. C. Glover, attorney for the
bank, filed declaration in vacation of the
Circuit Court of Sangamon County, for
judgment on the note against the coal
company and against Pettis by reason of
his endorsement, and interest at that time
due and $200 attorney's fees. At the same
time, William Watts tiled cognovit for the
bank and for Pettis confessing judgment
for the amount of the note and interest
and $200 attorney's fees. A vacation judg-
ment was thereupon spread of record by




On ihe lOth of October, at the instance
of the bank's attorney an execuLion issued
from the jud^MTieni and was placed in the
liands of William Jones, Sheriff of Sanga-
mon County. On the I4th day of October,
1914, the Sheriff levied upon an automo.
bile, a piano, and a saddle iiorse belongi.ig
lo Pettis, and adverii^^ed the same for sale
as of the lOtli day of November.
Claiming that the judgement against
him is void, and that the execution is
void, the plaintiff employs II. E. Leop<jld
and T. G. Lewis, attorneys at law, to take
such steps as should be taken to protect
his legal rights.
Attorneys for the bank: Glover and
Gunnell.
Attorneys for Peitis: Leopold and Lewis.
The attorneys for the bank will prepare
all papers necessary for a vacation judg-
ment in accordance with the facts above
stated. They will also psepare a judgment
and an execution. The.se papers will be
tiled with the Clerk on ur before the 20; li
day of October. It will be presumed that
the presiding judge of the Moot Court is
the presiding judge of the Circnin Cnuri
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The defendant owns a large farm near
Nashville, Washinj^ton county, Illinois,
where he is engat^ed rather extensively in
raising cattle and sheep. Durinj,' tlie
spring and early siiinmer of 1914, lie was
greatly annoyed by dogs chasing his cattle
and sheep while grazing in pastures where
he kept them contine'1 About ttie middle
of June of that year a valuable Hereford
calf was chased, killed and devoured by
dogs. On the week following a local
newspaper published a notice as follows:
"A Warning
If the owners of dogs in Nashville do
not keep their animals off my premises I
sliall adopt means that will prevent their
coming more tlian once.
Eli Harvey."
A witness will testify that he heard
Harvey ?ay on two occasions that when a
dog next came to his pasture for fresh
meat, lie would not have to run it down,
that he would find it ready, but that it
would be the last that he would eat.
On the morning of July 2, 1914, two re-
cently poisoned dogs were found dead in
the outskirts of Nashville on a road pass-
ing by a woods pasture where Harvey kept
his cattle. One of the animals was an
English Coach dog which the plaintiff im-
ported from Liverpool at an expense of
•S200. An autopsj showed that he died
from poisoned meat. Two pieces of meat
containing the same character of poison
were found in the pasture near the road.
The plaintiff sues for i he value of his
dog, laving the da'na.jesa.i$500. Four wit-
nesses will teslify for Uie plaintiff and
two for the defendant.
For the Plaintiff, Hannah & Luney.







The plaintiff was the principal stock-
holder in an Illinois corporation engaged
in buying and selling coal at Peoria. To
secure a loan of $10,000 the corporation in
1913 placed a chattel mortgage on all its
teams, wagons and office equipment, wortli
$18,000 or $20,000, due September 1, 1914.
Some time during the month of June,
1914, the plaintiff began negotiations with
a Mrs. Nannie Towle looking to a purchase
from him of 300 shares of stock in the cor-
poration for $20,000 in cash. The purpose
of the plaintiff was to use the $20,000 in
lifting the mortgage mentioned and in
furnishing working capital at Peoria. Mrs.
Towle lived in Indianapolis and promised
the plaintiff to furnisli the money at that
place on the 10th of July. On the 1st of
July a check drawn by the plaintiff on the
defendant for $500 was presented by a
brother of Mrs. Towle's but was not
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honored. The plaintiff at that time had a
balance in checkini,r account with the de-
fendant of $1,250, but the bank held his
note for $2,000, payable on the 6th of July.
The check was not i)o?iured for the reason
that the bank had learned tliat the plain-
tiff" was in hard lines financially, and was
in danger of beinyf tiirovvn into bankruptcy.
The brother of Mrs. Towle at once notilied
lier that the plaintiff's check had been
dishonored and it would be unwise to pur-
chase the stock and she refused to pur-
chase. Had the. slock been purchased and
the $20,000 placed in the plaintiff's hands
he would have been able to lift tne chattel
mortgage mentioned and successfully con-
tinue the business of the corpcjration at
Peoria. The money market became quite
stringent, the plahititt' was unable to pro-
cure money elsewhere than from Mrs.
Towle and as a result the mortgage was
foreclosed and tiie property covered by it
it sacrificed at forced sale, it bringing
only $8,500.
Clain::ing that the action of the defendant
in refusing payinentof liis check influenced
Mrs. Towle to decline to fulfill her agree-
ment, and resulted in the sacrifice of the
property of tlie corporation, the plaintiff
now brings a tort action against tiie de-
fendant, nam.ing the damages at $40,000.
For Plaintiff: Patterson, Terrill.
For Defendant: Ratcliff, Ruth.
James Barton ")
vs. 1
The Peoria Life (Case No. 6.
Insurance Company J
The defendant is a life insurance com-
pany, incorporated under the 'aws of Illi-
nois. On tlie first of March the mother of
the plaintiff, Mary Barton, a resident of
Champaign county. State of Illinois, pro-
cured a certificate of insurance upon her
life for the sum of two thousand dollars,
payable to the plaintiff within ninety days
after her death and within thirty days af-
ter receiving satisfactory proofs of her
death. As premium she paid the sum of
fifty dollars, cash, and agreed to pay the
sum of five dollars on tne first day of eacii
month following for the period of twenty
years and t!ie additional sum of tliirty dol-
lars on the first day of Marcii of each year
for the period of eighteen years. It was
provided in the policy tliat any failure to
pay a mom lily payment within ten days,
after due, would work a forfeiture of the
policy and that atiy failure to pay an an-
nual payment within thirty days after due.
would work a forfeiture of the policy. The
defendant maintained a local office at
Cliampaign, in charge of one David Rodg-
ers. All casn, monthly and annual prem-
iums made by policy holders in Champaign
county were made to Rodgers, who receipt-
ed for them in pass books furnished by the
company and lield by the insured. The
policies issued to holders in Champaign
county required payments to be made to
Rodgers at his otHce or to the company's
general office at Peoria. PV)r the conven-
ience of patrons, however, collections from
residents of Champaign and Urbana were
made by Rodgers calling at tlieir places of
business and homes. It was the custom of
Rodgers to call upon a policy holder living
in one of tlie towns named on the day or
tlie day following the maturity of any pay-
ment, and if payment was not then made
the holder would be required to pay at
Rodgers' otfice. All payments on the cer-
tificate of Mary Barton were promptly met
up to the one due June 1st, 1913. When
Rodgers called at her house in Champaign
for the purpose of collecting it, on the sec-
ond of that month Mrs Barton tendered
him a twenty dollar bill, but he could not
make change. He told her he would mark
it paid in her pass book if she would have
the money ready for him when he made
his "rounds" for collection the following
week. She promised to have the money
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ready for him when he should corne the
follovvinor week: whereupon he entered in
lier pass boolc tiie payment of five dollars
for that month. Rodj,'ers called at Mrs.
Barton's the following' week, but she was
not at horue. He called tlie week follow-
ing? and tiien learne'l that she had ^"-one on
a short visit to Indiana.
Mrs. Barton met her death in a railroad
accident on the 3rd of July, 1913, while re-
turning from Indiana. The plaintiff, on
the 10th of July, 1913. called at Rodgers' of-
fice with the information that his mother
was dead and asked for blanks \vii"h which
to make proofs of death. Rodgers then
told him that because of default in the
June payment the company had the right
to insist upon a forfeiture of the policy.
He told the plaintiff, however, that he
could leave liis policy and pass book with
him and that he would report to the head
office and get blanks for proof of death.
The plaintiff thereupon delivered his pol-
icy and pass book to Rodgers. In a few-
days thereafter, he called in Rodgers' office
and was then informed tliat the company
had elected to declare a forfeiture and de-
clined to furnish blanks for proof of death.
On the first of August, the plaintiffs wrote
to James Batson, the secretary of the com-
pany at Peoria, and received in reply a
letter from the secretary to the effect that
the company did not consider itself liable
because the policy had been forfeited for
tiie non-payment, of the June dues.
The plaintiff brings this suit in The Cir-
cuit Court of Champaign county. To the
declaration tlie company pleads the general
issue and a special plea of forfeiture, to
which the plaintiff replies by way of tra-
verse and specialty that the condition witii
reference to forfeiture was waived.
For Plaintiff: Anderson and Britton.
For Defendant: Barlow and Brown.
Ica
Jane Day and Ward Day
^ ^^^ T^ LC se No.
Jos. Day. Nathan Day
and .John Day J
STATEMENT.
On March 1st. 1897, Tiiomas Day borrow-
ed from one John Black $400 and delivered
to him his promissory note for that sum
and interest at 7 per cent payable two
years after date with Robert Day as surety.
He and his wife. Mattie Day, on the same
day executed and delivered to Black a
mortgage on the northwest quarter of the
southeast quarter of section 2, town 15
north, range 2 west of the 3d P. M. in Mor-
gan county, Illinois. The west half of the
said track was then owned by Mattie Day
and the east half by Thomas Day. Ot>
February 21st, 1898, Mattie Day died intes-
tate leaving her husband, Thomas Day.
and, as her only heirs at law, the complain-
ants and defendants in this suit. On Feb-
ruary 6, 1900. Tliomas Day conveyed to the
complainants tlie east half of the above
described land. On February 7th, 1911,
Thomas Day paid $100 on the principal of
the above mentioned note and the interest
to that date. On February 14. 1911, Black
assigned the note to complainants and de-
livered to them a formal assignment of tiie
mortgage given to secure it. On February
28, 1911, Thomas Day died intestate, leav-
ing as his only heirs at law the five chil-
dren named as complainants and defend-
ants. On February 5th, 1913, complainants
tiled in the circuit court of Morgan county
their bill in equity against the defendants,
praying for an accounting of the amount
due on the note and mortgage and that
the defendants be required to pay their
equitable and pro rata share of the amount
so found to be due, and in default thereof,
that their interest in the west one-iialf of
llie said tract be sold. The defendants
ijled an answer setting up that the mort-
gage and note were barred by the statute
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of limitations, and upon that answer with
the replication tiled thereto, the cause is lo
be submitted lor a hearing.
I^'or Complainants: Bye and DuHadwa}'.






On February 15, 1913, the plaintiff recov-
ered a judgment of $1,260 against the de-
fendant. After having an execution is-
sued and returned "no property found,"
the plaintiff tiled a creditor's bill in aid of
execution against the defendant and his
son, John, E. Cole, to set aside as fraudu-
lant a deed of the defendant, conveying to
his said son the south half of the southeast
fourth of section 30, T. 10 S. R. I. E. in
Williamson county, Illinois, executed and
recorded January 4, 1913. Answers simply
denying the allegations of fraud and set-
ting up that theconveyance was for a valid
consideration, were .filed by both defend-
ants. A trial was had before the circuit
court of Williamson county, resulting in a
decree setting aside the deed as fraudulent
and ordering the land to be sold to satisfy
the execution. The sheriff sold the proper-
erty as directed by the decree on October
the 18th, 1913, to the plaintiff, for the sum
of $1,460, eight hundred dollars of which
was bid upon the southwest fourth of the
seutheast quarter of said section of land,
and $660 on the southeast of the southeast.
The deferidaiil has lived upon the south-
west of the souttieasi of said section as his
homestead for twelve or fifteen years. It
does not exceed in value $1,000. At the
time of the sale, however, he was tempo-
rarily absent, i);il left his household furni-
ture stored in one of the rooms of the
dwelling house situated on the land and in-
tended to return at the expiration of two
months, He now tiles a written motion to
set aside the sale of the southwest fourth
of the southeast quarter of said section,
upon the ground that ihe real estate con-
stituted his homestead and is exempt from
sale under execution.
The plaintiff tiles an answer to the mo-
tion, resisting upon the ground that as the
defendant failed to set up in his answer to
the creditor's bill any claim of homestead,
he is estopped from doing so after.vards
and is concluded by the decree rendered in
that case.
For Plaintiff: Glover and Leopold.
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PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE
MOOT COURT.
The Moot Court Bulletin will appear regu-
larly during the academic year, and will
contain the rules of the court, the cases and
various pleadings and briefs of counsel.
The publication will be in fact, as well as
in theory, the bulletin or journal of the Moot
Court. A copy of the bulletin will be kept
by the clerk of the court and filed among
the records; copies will be placed and pre-
served in the library so that they may be
open to students for examination at any time.
The cases are intentionally practical.
They are actual cases—cases that have
arisen and are pending in the Circuit, Ap-
pellate and Supreme Courts of the State,
and at the time of argument in the Moot
Court the cases in question are either unde-
cided or the judgments of the respective
courts have not been reported. The venue
and the names of parties are necessarily
changed, and not infrequently the facts of
the cases are modified in the interest of
simplicity.
In this way, fanciful or fictitious cases
are not considered, and the student has the
advantage of preparing and trying actual
cases in his undergraduate days. It is felt
that this practical training should be of
great service to the young practitioner.
Dean Oliver A. Marker takes entire charge
of the Court and will regularly preside.
MOOT COURT RULES.
1. The Moot Court will be held at 1:00
o'clock p. m. on Mondays and Tuesdays.
2. All members of the second and third-
year classes will be required to attend regu-
lar sessions of the Court.
3. The clerk will keep a docket of all
cases, and keep on file and open for inspec-
tion all papers in pending cases.
4. Two students will be appointed as
counsel on each side of every case.
5. Immediately after receiving the state-
ment of facts the attorneys for the plain-
tiff or complainant shall draw the declara-
tion or bill and file two copies of the same
with the clerk before 9:00 a. m. the Monday
following. Attorneys for the defendant
must file two copies of plea, answer or de-
murrer, by the Friday following.
6. The case must be called during motion
hour on the second Monday for the settle-
ment of issue.
7. Counsel holding the affirmative must,
on or before the third Monday following
the assignment of the case, furnish one
copy of their brief to the clerk of the
Court and one copy to opposite counsel.
' Counsel holding the negative will furnish
one copy of their brief to the clerk
and one copy to the opposite counsel by the
Friday following.
8. Oral arguments will be limited to
thirty minutes on a side.
9. Students not engaged as counsel will
be required to draft pleadings, motions and
affidavits on statement given out by the
judge of the Moot Court, and to comment
on cases after trial.
10. All freshmen in the College of law




Atlas Coal Co. and James Pettis
Case No. 3.
Opinion by Marker, P. J.
This is a motion to set aside a vacation
judgment entered by the Clerk of the Cir-
cuit Court rendered against the Atlas Coal
Co., and James Pettis, and to stay execution
which issued from the judgment. The mo-
tion is made by the defendant, James Pettis.
The judgment in question was entered up-
on a promissory note executed on the 4th
of April. 1914, by the Atlas Coal Co., where-
by it promised to pay to the plaintiff four
months after date, the sum of $2000, with
interest at the rate of 7%. The note con-
tained power of attorney authorizing any
attorney in the state to appear in any court,
in terra time or vacation and confess judg-
ment to the amount of the principal and in-
terest, with attorney's fees. The note was
delivered to the plaintiff to secure a loan
of $2000 borrowed by Pettis as the president
of the company. When he applied for the
loan, he stated to the cashier that he was
willing to endorse the note personally, and
guarantee its payment, and when he signed
the note as president, he endorsed in blank
on the back of it, his own name. "James
Pettis."
The note remaining unpaid, on the 23rd
of September. 1914, the attorney of the bank
filed a declaration in vacation of the Cir-
cuit Court, making Pettis a joint defendant
with the Atlas Coal Co. When he did so,
he procured William Watts, an attorney at
law to file a cognovit for the defendants,
which he did, confessing judgment in favor
of the plaintiff and against the coal com-
pany and Pettis for the amount due and $200
attorney's fees. Execution issued from the
judgment and was levied upon certain per-
sonal property belonging to Pettis.
Pettis alone files motion and he does so
upon the ground that the judgment against
him is void, he contending that no authority
was ever given to confess it. In other words,
he bases his motion entirely upon want of
proof of execution of a power of attorney to
confess judgment. In resisting the motion
attorneys for the bank assume that the
guarantor of the payment of a promissory
note must be regarded as an original prom-
issor, and bound by all the terms of the
original undertaking. They insist that as
the note was endorsed in blank, parol evi-
dence is proper to show that the undertaking
v/as that of a guarantor, and there was con-
siderable argument upon the hearing as to
the admissibility of parol evidence to show
that.
In the light with which the court views
the case, the question of whether Pettis
was a guarantor or an ordinary endorser
makes no difference. A decision of the case
must hinge upon the legal right to en-
ter judgment by confesV-on against one
who has endorsed a promissory note without
in the endorsement specifically authorizing
a confession of judgment.
We will assume, therefore, that the under-
taking of Pettis was that of a guarantor.
Our courts have repeadedly held that au.hor.-
ty to confess judgment without process
must be clear and explicit.
Chase v. Dana, 44 111. 262
Tucker v. Gill, 61, 111. 236
Keith V. Kellog, 97 111. 147
Little, et al. v. Dyer. 138 111. 272
Fry V. Jones. 178 111. 627
The contract of guarantor is merely a
collateral undertaking to pay a debt owing
by a third party in case the latter does not
pay.
Grindley v. Capon, 72 111. 11.
The court is unable to see why there
should be included in the guarantor's con-
tract a power of attorney to a third person
to confess judgment for him. In the light
of the authorities cited, it is clear to my
mind that Pettis did not authorize Watts
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to enter his appearance and confess judg-
ment. The execution will therefore be
quashed and the judgment vacated.
Edwin Barr.
vs.




Since October 1, 1914. the plaintiff has
been engaged in buying horses, to be resold
and delivered by him to an agent for the
French government, at Chicago, Illinois.
On the 20th of that month, he had ready
for shipment at Tolono, 20 horses. When
the plaintiff applied to the defendant's agent
at Tolono, for a car, the agent told him
that he had not any regular stock cars in
the yards, and that if they went on that day
they would have go in an ordinary box car.
Rather than wait a day or two till a regular
horse car could be furnished him, he shipped
on that day. When the horses arrived in
Chicago on the following morning, four
of them were badly injured. Two of them
had legs broken, and were necessarily
killed. They were worth $150 each. The
other two were considerable injured. He
brings suit against the company, alleging
as negligence that the car furnished him
was defective in that the floor and the sides
of the car were rotten, whereby the horses
got their legs through the sides of the car
and were injured. To the plaintiff's declar-
ation, the defendant will plead the general
issue, and upon the trial, it will be con-
tended that the car was in good condition
when it left Tolono, that the sides of the
car were broken because of the wildness
of the horses. It will also be contended
that the freight car used was one of the
plaintiff's own selection, preferring to use
an ordinary box car instead of waiting a







William Dale and John Barth.
Case No. 10.
STATEMENT.
On January 2, 1914, James Atwood, the
owner of the S. E. 14 of Section 19, Town
9, S. R. 1 E., executed and delivered to John
Barth, his promissory note for $3000. with
interest from date at 6%, payable in two
years, and his mortgage on the land to se-
cure it The mortgage provided that if
Atwood should not pay the taxes against
the land before becoming delinquent, that
Barth might pay them and charge the same
as part of the mortgage debt.
For delinquent taxes the land was sold
to Joseph Carr for $94, on June 30, 1911,
under order of the County Court, and a cer-
tificate was duly issued to him as provided
by statute. In July, 1914, Barth took an
assignment of the certificate from Carr,
paying its face and the amount of the pen-
alty. Barth held the certificate about 6
months, and then assigned the same to
William Dale. Dale paying him the face
of the certificate and the penalty attached
in case _of redemption.
There being no redemption from the sale and
Dale having complied with the statute with
reference to publication of notice, he, on
the 10th of July, 1913, obtained from the
County Clerk, a deed to the premises. The
land was vacant and unoccupied, and At-
wood was at the time residing near South
Bend, Indiana. On January 20. 1914, he ap-
plied to Barth to know how much he owed
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him on the note and mortgage. He had made
payments of interest from time to time, and
on one or two occasions had paid part of the
principal. Barth told him that there was
due him all told, $2466. Thereupon they
went to the county seat, where the mortgage
was recorded; Barth satisfied the mortgage
on the record, and Atwood paid him the a-
mount of $2466. Early in February Atwood
began the erection of a house and barn on
the place and did a considerable amount of
clearing of the land, getting it ready for cul-
tivation before the 20th of April. At that
time he moved with his family into the house
and began cultivating the land which had
been cleared. He had not knowledge of the
tax sale certificate that was issued to Carr
and afterward assigned to Barth and by Barth
to Dale. Dale had no actual knowledge of
the provision in the mortgage which per-
mitted Barth to pay taxes or redeem from
taxes and charge the same as a part of the
mortgage debt. Atwood, when apprised of
the situation, offered to pay to Dale the $94
and the 100% penalty thereon, the expense
of recording a deed, and interest at 6% on
the whole sum due on the 30th of October,
1913, but Dale refused, claiming that the land
belonged to him. He began action of eject-
ment in the Circuit Court. Atwood now
brings a bill to enjoin the prosecution of the
suit of ejectment and also for the purpose
of having the deed to Dale set aside as a
cloud upon his title. The bill will contain
an offer to pay what hss been paid out by
Dale, together with interest on the same.
The attorneys for the defendent. Dale, will
file a declaration in ejectment, bringing the
same in the Circuit Court of the County
where the land is located. Atwood will file
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Opinion by Patterson, A. J.
This is an action on a promisory note.
The material facts are as follows: James
Green had made a contract with the Board
of Managers of the Elkville Township Wheat
Growers Association, of which the plaintiff,
Walter Ross, was a member, to build an ele-
vator of a certain capacity at Elkville, Jack-
son County, Illinois, and to have the same
completed and ready for the reception of the
1914 wheat crop. The plaintiff was not a
member of the Board with which the con-
tract had been made. James Green, the
defendant, made a proposition to the plain-
tiff that if he did not have the elevator
finished and ready for the reception of the
wheat crop by July the 15th, 1914, he would
pay the plaintiff the sum of $500, and that
if he did complete the elevator and have it
ready for the reception of grain on that
date, Ross should pay him the sum of $500.
Ross accepted the proposition. Green de-
posited a note in the Elkville National Bank
of which the following is a copy:
Elkville, 111., May 1, 1914.
For value received, I promise to pay to
Walter Ross, or order, five hundred dollars,
on July 15, 1914, if the grain elevator now
being constructed by me under a contract
with the Board of Managers of the Wheat
Growers Association of Elk Township is
not finished by that date.
James Green.
The present action is on that note.
Ross deposited a note payable to Green
if the elevator should be finished.
The elevator was not finished by the date
agreed upon. The Bank turned the notes
over to Ross who brought this action upon
Green's refusing to pay the note according
to the contract.
The Association (not the Board of Mana-
gers) had raised a bonus by contribution
from its members, which was to be given to
Green upon the condition that he have the
elevator completed in time to receive the
first wheat threshed by any member of the
association. To this bonus the plaintiff con-
tributed.
Obviously the question is whether the
plaintiff and defendant have made a valid
contract.
The plaintiff contends that it is a valid con-
tract because it is a contract with a third
party to do some additional act, other than
those already required by an exsiting con-
tract and that such a contract is valid. He
contends that since the defendant was only
bound to complete the elevator in time to
receive the first wheat threshed by any mem-
ber of the association and since, by his con-
tract with the plaintiff, he undertook to fin-
ish it by July 15, a thing which he was not
bound to do, there is a good consideration
for his contract with the plaintiff and the
contract is valid. That general rule is cor-
rect where the third party will be materially
benefited by the performance of the original
contract. Abbot v. Doane, 163 Mass. 433,
and Smith v. Finch, 3 111. 321 are cited for
the proposition. In both of these cases the
third party with whom the second contract
was made would be materially benefited by
the performance of the original contract.
But the facts in the case at bar, as they
appear from the face of the record, do not
show that the plaintiff would be so bene-
fited. It is not shown that Ross had wheat
which had to be in the elevator on July 15,
or that he was, in any way, so interested
that he was willing to pay $500 to get the
elevator completed on that date. On the
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contrary, the inference to be drawn from the
evidence is that he was not so interested.
He had already contributed to a bonus to
be given to Green in case he completed the
elevator, not July 15, but in time to receive
the first wheat threshed by any member of
the association. Is it reasonable to suppose
that the plaintiff would have contributed to
the bonus which was to be given to Green
in case he completed the elevator at a time
which may be one or two months later than
July 15, if he had any special reason or
interest in wanting the elevator finished at
that date? If the plaintiff did have such an
interest would he not have hunted up Green
and made the proposition to him rather than
have waited until Green hunted him up and
made the proposal?
An Illinois statute, Sec.131 of the Crimi-
nal Code, provides; "All promissory notes,
executed where the whole or any
part of the consideration thereof, shall be
for any money won by wager on
any contingent event whatsoever, shall be
void and of no effect." The defendant con-
tends that this note is void by reason of
this provision.
At common law even though it was
shown that a given debt was the result of
a wager, nevertheless an action could be
maintained, and the money recovered. That
rule still obtains in States which have adopt-
ed the common law and which have not
changed the rule by statute. So, if the stat-
ute does not apply, the plaintiff has a good
cause of action even if we detennine that
this was in fact a wagering contract, because
Illinois has adopted the common law.
An Illinois case. The Merhants Saving,
Loan and Trust Co. v. Goodrich, 75 111. 554,
considering the above section of the statute,
says: A wager is a contract by which two
or more parties agree that a certain sum
of money or other valuable thing, shall be
paid or delivered to one of them upon the
happening or not happening of an uncertain
event." It seems to me that we have that
exact situation here, having come to the
conclusion that Ross had no interest in hav-
ing the elevator completed by July 15.
Green went to Ross and said, in effect; "If
you will give me $500 if I get this elevator
done on July 15, I'll give you $500 if I do
not .complete it by that date." It is un-
certain that he will be able to finish it, and
it is therefore a contract to pay money on
the happening or not happening of an uncer-
tain event. The Statute, therefore, governs
the case and by its effect the note is rend-
ered void. The action on it cannot be main-







Mrs. Mary Jones, a widow, on June 5th,
1910, made to her son, Leonard Jones, a
deed in fee simple with warranty, of her
farm, worth about $20,000, and described as
the N. E. 14, S. W. 14, Section 14, T. 4, N., R.
3 E., Marion Co., Illinois. The consideration
recited in the deed was $100, which was
paid. The chief consideration for tlie deed
was Leonard's oral promise to apply the in-
come of the farm to the support of Mary
in the degree of comfort to which she had
been accustomed, until her death, to provide
a home on the farm for her, and a suitable
burial after her death. Mary, at the time
of making the deed was 70 years old, and
had no other property than the farm. Leon-
ard continued to comply with his promise
until the summer of 1914, when, influenced
by his wife, who dislikes Mary, he ceased
to provide any support for his mother, and
threatens to turn her out of the house.
Mary now brings her bill in equity, seeking
a cancellation of the deed, offering to return
the consideration, $100, and further relief.
No evidence was offered to show that Leon-
ard's promise was not made in entire
good faith and with the intention of per-
forming it, unless his breach 01 the promise
constitutes such evidence. On this ground
the court dismissed the bill, without pre-
judice to an action at law by Mary on the
promise. Mary moves for rehearing.
Illinois cases may be cited, but the cause












On Jan. 2d, 1914, one Anna Thompson, a
music teacher, leased from the defendant,
Patrick Gannon, a small apartment in the
Francisco apartment building in Chicago for
one year. On the same day she leased
from the complainant, also for one year
at the monthly rent of $3.00, a piano
which is the subject matter of the
present suit. By the terms of the
lease, the piano was to be delivered and
taken away at the expiration of the lease at
the complainant's expense. It was found
that the narrow hall leading to the entrance
of the apartment did not permit the piano
to be brought into the apartment in the
usual way. Miss Thompson therefore ob-
tained the consent of the defendant to en-
large a window of the apartment temporari-
ly by removing a portion of the outer wall
for the purpose of bringing the piano in
through the opening so made; this was done,
the piano hoisted in, and the wall and win-
dow restored to its former condition. Miss
Thompson's lease of tire piano and of the
flat have now expired and she has left the
premises. The defendant refused to permit
the complainant to tear down the wall or
otherwise deface the building, even tempo-
rarily for the purpose of removing the piano.
There is no evidence that the defendant
ever promised to allow this to be done. The
piano cannot be taken to pieces without de-
stroying it. The defendant asserts no do-
minion over the piano, has done no act a-
mounting to a conversion of it, in fact is
anxious to get rid of it. The piano is worth
$500 and has no extraordinary or unique
value.
Bill in equity by complainant asking in
eftect that it be permitted to enlarge the win-
dov,' for the purpose of removing the piano,
on giving bond to restore the wall and win-











The defendant Sheffield owned a house in
a choice residence suburb of Chicago. There
was an understanding (not amounting to
contract) among the residents that an own-
er on moving away would sell out only to a
person of good reputation, acceptable to the
other residents. The complainant Anderson
contracted in writing with Sheffield to pur-
chase the latter's house for a residence,
representing that he (the complainant) was
a person of unblemished reputation. The
contract price was the full value of the land.
The defendant believing Anderson's assur-
ance, made no investigation into his past
history. As a matter of fact, Anderson had
served a term in prison in a distant state
for an iiifamous crime. This fact coming
to light, the defendant refused to convey,
and Anderson having tendered the balance
of the price, brings suit for specific perform-
ance. Defence, complainant's fraud. De-
fendant has not succeeded in proving that
he will suffer any pecuniary injury if he is
compelled to convey to complainant, nor that
the value of his neighbor's property will be
diminished on account of Anderson's resi-
dence in their midst. He has shown, how-
ever, that he has suffered much social os-
tracism at the hands of his friends and neigh-
bors on account of his carelessness in ac-
cepting Anderson as a purchaser, and will
suffer still more if he is compelled to con-
vey to Anderson.








Elizabeth Kent, et al
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
James Kent died June 5, 1914. His will
was admitted to probate in Champaign Coun-
ty, and letters testamentary issued to his
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widow, and sole divisee and legatee, Eliza-
beth Kent. Their only child, William, within
a month thereafter, brought this bill in chanc-
ery to contest and set aside the probate of
the will, on the ground that the will was
not attested as the statute requires.
It appeared, by uncontradicted evidence,
that the two witnesses, John Webb and Mary
Pickett, saw the testator sign the will, and
were in the room with him at the time; that
they signed it as witnesses after the testator
in the room adjoining that in which the
testator lay, and at a distance of ten feet
from him; that the testator was in bed, and
in such a position that if he had been able
to turn his head around he might, merely
by so turning it, have seen the backs of the
witnesses as they were signing the will,
though he could not have seen the will it-
self; but that in fact, owing to an injury to
the spine, he was unable to move or turn
his head; and that the witnesses immediate-
ly after signing, showed their signature to
the testator, who expressed himself satis-
fied.
Jury waived and trial by the court on
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James Barton
vs.
The Peoria Life Insurance Co.
BRIEF FOR THE PLAINTIFF.
1. An agent who solicits insurance, col-
lects premiums, receives and forwards ap-
plications, receives and delivers policies,
is a general agent and as such has power to
waive conditions.
Milwaukee Mechanics Insurance Co. v.
Schalman, 188 111. 213.
2. A general agent has power, also, to
extend credit to the insurred and to mark
the premium paid so as to satisfy the policy
in this regard, either on behalf of the Com-
pany, or on his own behalf.
Missouri Valley Life Ins. Co., v. Dunkle,
16 Kans. 158. Lebanon Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Hoover, Hughes & Co. 113 Pa. St. 591.
Bouton V. Amer. Mutual Ins. Co. 25 Conn.
542. 2 May on Insurance (3rd ed.) 360.
3. In this case the agent of the defendant,
by the arrangement on the second of July
whereby he marked the pass book of the
plaintiff paid in respect to the June payment,
and said that he would collect the money the
next week, in reality extended credit to the
insurred.
This may have been done either on behalf
of the Company which he represented, or on
his own behalf. In either case the policy
was satisfied even tho the insurred was liable
on a separate contract to pay the amount of
the premium, a failure to pay which would
not in any way work a forfeiture of the
policy.
4. Waiver of condition of policy of an
Insurance Co., outside of a special agree-
ment may be inferred from such a course
of conduct on the part of the Company as
is calculated to lead the assured to believe
that the company did not require its per-
formance. Dwelling House Ins. Co. v. Dow-
dall 159 111. 179 Durekorfpul Fire Ins. Co.
V. Orter 74 111. app. 139.
Respectfully submitted.




The Peoria Life Insurance Co.
BRIEF FOR THE DEFENDANTS.
1. The tender of a larger sum than the
amount due, when coupled with a demand
for the balance, will not be a good tender;
if the creditor refuses to give change and
objects to taking the money for that reason.
20 American and English Encyclopedia 18
Patterson vs. Cox 25 Ind. 261
2. A mere receipt for the premium is
like other receipts, only prima facia evi-
dence that the premium was paid.
Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., vs. Pendle-
ton 112 U. S. 696
Scurry vs. Cotton State Life Ins. Co.,
9 R. I. 346
3. A person accepting a receipt acknowl-
edging the payment of an advance premium,
can not claim that the company is estopped
to deny that receipt; if that person knew
as a matter of fact that he was not entitled
to the receipt because the premium was
not paid.
Brown vs. Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
59 N. H. 298
Baker vs. The Ins Co., 43 N. Y. 283
Sheldon vs. Atlantic Co., 26 N. Y. 460
Pitt vs. Birkshire Ins. Co., 100 Mass. 500
Bergson vs. Builders Ins. Co. 38 Cal. 541
4. An agent, although capable of waiving
stipulations in an insurance contract by
words, acts or other representations made
to the insured, does not effect a waiver of
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any stipulation unless he grants to the hold-
er of the policy some concession inconsist-
ent with the articles of the insurance con-
tract.
5. An insurance contract should be con-
strued in accordance with the rules gener-
ally applicable to other contracts.
145 111. 469 and 49 111. 106
Respectfully submitted,





The Peoria Life Insurance Co.
OPINION BY MARKER P. J.
This is a suit upon a certificate of in-
surance for $2000, issued upon the life of
Mary Barton, payable to the plaintiff within
90 days after her death. She paid for the
certificate $50 in cash and agreed to pay
the sum of $5 on the first day of each month
following, for the period of 20 years, and the
additional sum of $30 on the 1st day of
March of each year for the period of 18
years. It was provided in the policy that
a failure to pay any monthly payment within
10 days after it was due would work a for-
feiture of the policy. The defendant main-
tained a local office in Champaign in charge
of David Rogers. Monthly and annual prem-
iums were paid to Rogers, who receipted
them in pass books furnished by parties
insured. For the convenience of the com-
pany's patrons in Champaign and Urbana,
Rogers was in the habit of calling monthly
at their homes or places of business.
All payments on this policy were promptly
made by Mary Barton until one falling due
June 1, 1913. On that day, Rogers called
at her house and was presented with a $20
bill, which he could not change. He told
her he would mark it paid in her pass book
if she would have the money ready for him
when he came the following week and the
entry was made. When he called the fol-
lowing week, she was gone on a visit to
Indiana. She met her death in a railway
accident as she was returning on July 3,
1913.
Proofs of death were made, but the de-
fendant refused payment of the policy and
elected to declare a forfeiture because of
the non-payment of the June dues. The
plaintiff brings this suit in the Circuit Court
of Champaign county to recover the amount
of the certificate of insurance.
It has ever been the policy of the courts
in Illinois to look upon forfeitures with dis-
favor and they have declined to enforce
them unless a clear case is made to appear
from the evidence.
Voorhis v. Renshav/, 49 111. 425
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. vs. Walsh,
111. 154
Palmer vs. Ford, 70 111. 365
Coverdale vs. The Royal Arcanum, 193
111. 91
Forfeiture is a harsh mode of terminating
contracts, and he who insists upon it
being done must be held strictly within the
limits of authority which gives the right.
If an insurance company neglects to declare
a forfeiture when the right to do so ac-
crues, and any act is done by it indicating
to the party against whom a forfeiture would
work that the same will not be insisted
upon, then its right to declare one shall be
regarded as waived, and it cannot after-
wards avoid the policy upon that ground.
Totonia Life Insurance Co. vs. Anderson,
77 111. 384
Insurance Co. vs. Warner, 80 111., 410
In this case, it appears to me there was a
clear waiver upon the part of Rogers, the
agent, when he made the entry in the pass
book and agreed with Mrs. Barton to her
paying the week following. Under the ar-
rangement thereby made the claim become
one of Rogers against her. So far as the
insurance company was concerned, the
monthly due was paid. Such being the case
there was no right in the company to a for-
feiture. The question of tender was not
involved, because the duty of Mrs. Barton
to pay the exact amount when first called
upon by him had been waived under that
arrangement.
The judgment will therefore be for the






The plaintiff is the owner of a large farm
situated in Johnson County, Illinois. He
has a woods pasture or park of 20 acres
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in which he has for several years kept five
or six deer. One of the animals, a male,
had wandered upon the highway. The
plaintiff is a neighbor to the defendant,
his residence being about half a mile from
that of the defendant. On the 20th of Oc-
tober, 1914, the deer in question escaped
from the park and wandered along the high-
way until it reached the home of the plain-
tiff. The plaintiff at the time was in his
garden digging potatoes. The deer leaped
the garden fence, and while the plaintiff
unaware of the presence of the animal, was
stooping, picking up potatoes, the deer at-
tacked him from behind and threw him on
some fencing, whereby 'he sustained in-
juries. The plaintiff brings suit against










The plaintiff and the defendant are farm-
ers. In April, 1914, the defendant sold to
the plaintiff four hogs for $65. The hogs
had been kept in a pasture where three or
four other hogs had sickened and died with
cholera. When the four were delivered to
the defendant, they gave evidence of being
healthy hogs, but they became sick of chol-
era a few days after being purchased and
communicated the disease to the other hogs
of the plaintiff. The hogs purchased were
placed in a pasture with the plaintiff's hogs
immediately after being purchased The
plaintiff's other hogs did not come in con-
tact with any other hog§^but those pur-
chased by the defendant. As a result of
the disease, the plaintiff lost 50 head of hogs,
worth $700.
There was no guarantee that the hogs
were free from disease, but the defendant
knew that they had been in the pasture with
the hogs that had died of hog cholera. In
the defendant's pasture, where the three
or four that had died before the sale were
kept were 60 other hogs, none of which had
died although some ten or fifteen of them
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OPINION BY ANDERSON, A. J.
The defendant, Samuel Bates, was a part-
ner of one William Carr in the business of
buying and selling live stock. The firm later
became bankrupt and owed the plaintiff,
Henry Horn, $2,400. The only property
owned by Carr, not exempt from execution,
was an automobile worth about $1,000, and
the only property owned by Bates was forty
shares of stock in a cold storage corporation
of doubtful value. Bates offered to turn
over the shares of stock for his part of the
debt that they owed Horn, and Carr offered
to turn over the automobile for his share
of the debt. Horn refused this offer. Then
Carr said, "I will turn over the automobile
if you will release me. and you can wait
on Bates until such time as the stock does
become valuable. Bates can hold his stock,
and just as soon as he can satisfy you that
it is worth one-half of the debt, or $1,200,
you can take it," to which (Horn replied,
"that is satisfactory." The automobile was
turned over to Horn, who gave the follow-
ing receipt:
Champaign, 111., Nov. 30. 1913.
Received of William Carr, his automobile,
being a five
-passenger Buick, valued at
$1,200. In consideration of which I release
him from further liability on the partner-
ship debt of $2,400. which I hold against the
late firm of Bates & Carr.
HENRY HORN.
Bates did not formally assent to this ar-
rangement, but heard the conversation and
saw the receipt written and the machine
delivered. The stock becoming valuable,
Horn made a demand for the stock, but
Bates refused to deliver any part of it, and
sold it to third parties. Horn now hrings
suit against Bates, alleging a promise to
pay Horn the remainder of the debt owed
to him by the partnership.
The chief point of contention relied on
by the plaintiff in this case, was that in the
facts of this case we have an estoppel by
silence against Bates that will not allow him
to set up that he is not liable on the agree-
ment made between Horn and Carr. I do
not think this contention is justified by the
existing law on this subject. Bigelow on
estoppel, Eixth edition, at page 661, says:
It follows that it is not enough to raise
an estoppel, that there was an opportunity
to speak which was not embraced; there
must have been an imperative duty to speak.
Nor is any duty generated by the mere fact
that a man is aware that some one may
act to his prejudice, if the true state of
things is not disclosed. Again, it is said, in
Perry vs. Dow, in 59 Vt. 61, that the mere
fact of being present and hearing a con-
versation betweea others may not create
the duty to speak. Applying these prin-
ciples, which I regard as sound to this par-
ticular case, I do riot think here there was
any imperative duty to speak here. Bates
was an outsider to the agreement going on
between Carr and Horn, and if Horn
wanted to make an agreement with Bates
he should have gotten his express assent
to it. Carr and Bates at this time were
separate individuals, and contracting as
such, as the partnership hetween them was
dissolved. Also, we have nothing else to
bear our estoppel on here, but the mere
silence of Carr here was no previous de-
ceiving conduct or representations of any
kind made by him that would make Horn
rely on his conduct at this time. It is only
where there is the most imperative duty to
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speak, coupled with other conduct which is
misleading in its nature, that a party will
be charged on an agreement by estoppel
through silence. Any other rule would have
serious results; would have people sur-
prised into contracts, and liable on agree-
ments, where all the terms were made by
one side, and in this case no such conclu-
sion as this would be justified.
So the release of one Partner Carr, by
rules of Partnership, releases other.
As there is no estoppel, and therefor no
contract binding Bates, the other questions
raised in the case as to the consideration
of the agreement need not be discussed.
Judgment for the defendant.
Case No. 7.
Ward Day and Jane Day, Complainants,
vs.
Joseph Day. Nathan Day and John Day,
Defendants.
BRIEF FOR COMPLAINANTS.
1. Kurd's Revised Statutes of Illinois,
Chapter 83, Section 11, which bars fore-
closure of mortgage, unless within ten years
after right of foreclosure accrues, shall be
construed in connection with Section 16 of
the same chapter, which provides that if
any payment or new promise to pay shall
be made within or after the said period
of ten years, then an action may be com-
menced thereon at any time within ten
years after the time of such payment.
Houston vs. Workman, 28 111. App. 626
The Aetna Life Ins. Co. vs. McNeely,
166 111. 540
Kraft vs. iHolzman. 206 111. 548
Stem vs. Koun, 244 111. 32
iLathrop vs. Carroll, 155 App. 653
2. Where a wife pledges or mortgages
her separate property to secure the debt
of her husband, she occupies the position
of a surety, and the husband is the iirinci-
pal debtor.
24 A. & E. Cyc. of Law, Page 720




3. A payment by either the principal
debtor or the surety is an acknowledgment
of the debt by both, and is sufficient to take
it out of the Statute of Limitations, when
made while their joint responsibility con-
tinues.
8 Pennsylvania State 337
4 Pickering OMass.) 382
9 Minnesota 13
30 Indiana 289
A. If a wife mortgages her real estate
for the debt of her husband, the land re-
mains liable after her death.
24 Penn. St. 491
B. Where the contract of suretyship is
intended by the parties to cover a future
liability, the death of the surety will not
end the contract.
Green vs. Young, 8 Greenl. (Me.) 14
4. Where the debt is a continuing one,
and the default occurs after the death of
the surety, the estate of the surety is liable.
24 Penn St. 491
I Brandt, Suretyship & Guaranty 197
29 N. E. Reporter 503
113 Illinois 390
5. A surety is not discharged merely be-
cause the cause of action against the prin-
cipal debtor is barred.
82 S. W. Rep. 460
10 Texas Civil App. 439
69 Federal 798
16 C. C. A. 425
A. Although the action against the prin-






6. While the surety may be discharged
by lapse of the period of limitation spe-
cially applicable to sureties, a mortgage
given by a surety will not be barred until
the debt itself is barred.





Jane Day and Ward Day
vs.
Defendants James Dav. Nathan Day and
John Day.
BRIEF.
1. No person shall commence an action
or make a sale to foreclose a mortgage un-
less within ten years after right of action
accrues. Chap. 83, Sec. 11, 111. Revised
Statutes.
2. After statute has completely run
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against mortgage, no judgment, acknowl-
edgement, no promise, or new payment will
waive it against a purchaser of premises
or any other person whose rights accrued
prior to the revivor.
18 Kan. 104








36 111. App. 238
88 111. 4S6
41 111. 517
3. Partial payment by widow of the
mortgagor will not prevent running of the
statute against mortgage of the deceased.
65 111. App. 222
4. Debt once discharged can not be re-
vived as against the surety by any agree-
ment of the principal and the creditor.
121 Ala. 373; 37 Ind. 258
5. When the debt is barred as to the
principal, the surety is released, and if once
released the debt can not be revived as
against the surety.
70 Iowa 642; 63 Kan. 105
6. The fact that the surety has under-
taken to be liable until the debt is paid
dees net continue the obligation beyond
the time provided by the statute for barring
the action.
71 Conn. 733.
7. If the statute provides a period in
which the action must be brought, payment
by principal will not extend it.
56 S. W. 722 Ky.
8. Failure to register the mortgage re-
lieves the surety.





Jane Day and Ward Day
vs.
George Day, Nathan Day, and John Day.
OPINION BY MARKER, P. J.
This is a suit in equity by the complain-
ants to compel an accounting from their
brotTiers, the defendants.
The facts which the complainants aver, as
entitling them to an accounting, are as fol-
lows: In 1897 Thomas Day, the father of
the parties to the suit, borrowed $400 from
one Black and delivered his note, payable
two years alter date, with Robert Day as
surety. To further secure payment of the
note, Thomas Day and his wife, on the
same day, executed a mortgage to Black
upon forty acres of land. The east half of
the land was owned by Thomas Day, and
the west half by Mattie Day. Mattie Day
died in February, 1898, and Thomas Day
died in February, 1911. In February, 1900,
Thomas Day conveyed to the complainants
the east half of the land, and a year later
paid $100 on the principal of the note to
Black. Shortly afterwards the death of
Thomas Day the complainants paid Black
the amount of the note, and took an assign-
ment from him. The contention is that as
all of the parties were the heirs at law
of Thomas Day, that the complainants by
taking over the note from Black have a
right to compel a contribution, because
thereby the land was relieved from all en-
cumbrance. The defence set up is that the
note and mortgage is barred by the Statute
of Limitations.
The statute provides that actions on prom-
issory notes and other written contracts
shall be commenced within ten years after
the cause of action accrues, unless a new
payment, or promise to pay, shall be made
in writing within or after the said period
of ten years, in which event an action may
be commenced thereon at any time within
ten years thereafter. The only evidence of
a payment which it can be said took the
case out of the Statute of Limitations was
the payment made by Thomas Day on the
7th of February, 1911. The payment was
made by the principal debtor, and certainly
had the effect of taking the case out of the
Statute, so far as he was concerned. It
could not have that effect so far as con-
cerned Mattie Day or heirs claiming under
her. It is a firmly established rule of law
in this state that a partial payment upon
a joint and several promissory note by one
of the makers will not stop the running of
the Statute, as to other makers not assent-
ing to such payment. The doctrine an-
nounced in the celebrated English case of
Whitcomh vs. WTiiting (1 Smith's Leading
Cases, 703) that a payment by one should
be regarded as a payment by the agent of
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others, and that a new promise was there-
by raised as against the others was early
repudiated in the history of jurisprudence
in the United States. Bell vs. Morrison,
(1 Pet. 351)
Most of the states have followed Bell vs.
Morrison. In an exhaustive opinion deliv-
ered by Justice Scofield in Kallenbach vs.
Dickinson, 100 111. 427, our Supreme Court
expressly held that a partial payment of
one of two joint makers of a promissory
note without the knowledge, assent, or
ratification, of the other will not operate
to bind the later so as to authorize the
inference of a new promise on his part, and
thereby preclude his right to defend under
the Statute of Limitations. In that case,
Dickinson, the appellee, was but a surety
on the note which he had made jointly with
one iWenzel, the principal debtor. Wenzel
had made payments which were sufficient
to take the case out of the Statute as to
him, and it was contended that it did so
as to Dickinson. The court held that as
they were made without the knowledge or
assent of Dickinson, it did not have the
effect of reviving the obligation as to him.
In the case at bar, iMattie Day joined in
the note to Black as a mere surety for her
husband, and the payment by the husband
more than ten years after the note had
matured and after her death, could not
have the effect to revive the obligation as
against her heirs. When she by mortgage
pledged the twenty acres of land owned by
her as her separate property, she did so as
a surety. When a third person pledges
his property as security for the payment of
another's debt, such property will stand as
the surety of the debtor, and any change
in the contract of the principal which would
discharge a surety will operate to release
and discharge the property so pledged. The
rule applies to mortgages made to secure
the debt of another.
Ryan vs. Trustees of Shawneetown, 14
111. 20
Price, et al., vs. Dime Savings Bank,
124 111. 317
If Mattle Day were living, the payment
of February 7, 1911, could not have the
effect to extend the lien on the land owned
by her. She could Invoke the aid of the
Statute in a bill to foreclose the mortgage
by Black or his assignee. 'Her heirs,
claiming title through her, can do the same.
The complainants, by purchasing the note
and mortgage from Black and taking an
assignment thereof, obtained no equities
against the defendants which cannot be
defended against under the Statute of Limi-
tations. The bill is therefore dismissed for
want of equity, and judgment will be ren-




City of Sitka, et al.
STATEMENT BY PROF. POMEROY.
The state of South Alaska has a pro-
vision in its constitution similar to the Il-
linois 'Const., Art. 9, Sec. 12, limiting the
amount of indebtedness that may be in-
curred by cities. In 1908 the complainant
brought this bill in the Sitka Circuit Court,
averring that he is a resident taxpayer of
the 'City of Sitka; that the municipal of-
cers are about to let a contract to the
defendant—the Wrangell Water Co.—for
supplying the city with water at an annual
rental of $6000; that the indebtedness of
the city exceeds five per centum of the
assessed value of the taxable property
therein, and that there is no money in the
city treasury. The complainant prays for an
injunction restraining the corporate author-
ities from entering into the contract. The
defendants answer, admitting the averments
of the complaint, but avemng that the city
has a population of over -5,000, and is rapidly
increasing in wealth and population; that it
has no facilities for extinguishing fires ex-
cept three cisterns, which are wholly inad-
equate, and that the safety of the city de-
mands that a supply of water be secured;
that the assessed value of taxable property
in the city amounts to ^L.jOO.OOO; that from
other sources than taxation the revenue of
the city is $3000 per annum; that the or-
dinary current exiienses of the city are less
thin $6000 per annum, and that the current
revenues of the city during the next twentv
years will be amply sufficient to pav all
the ordinary expenses of the city, and the
water rentals under the proposed contract.
•Exception to the answer.
Argument on the exception.
Illinois cases may be cited, but will not
be considered more binding upon the court
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than authorities from other jurisdictions.
John Hart will be named in the bill as
Mayor.
Eli Carter, William Jones, George Perry
and Rudolf Steckman, Commissioners.







First National Bank of Urbana
vs.
John Gray, et al.
STATEMENT (BY PROF. POMEROY.)
John Gray, owning a house and lot in
Urbana, mortgaged it on June 1, 1913, to
the First National Bank, to secure $1000
then loaned by the bank to Gray, and such
further sums, not exceeding $1000 in th-e
aggregate, as the bank might, at its option,
advance to Gray. This mortgage was re-
corded on the same day. On June 10, 1913,
Gray mortgaged the same premises to
George Buck, to secure the sum of $900
loaned bj' Buck on that date; this mort-
gage was immediately recorded, but the
Bank received no actual notice of it until
the day before foreclosure prcceedines were
begun. On June 20, 1913. Gray mortgaged
the same premises to Adolph Beard, to se-
cure $800; this mortgage was never re-
corded, but the Bank and Buck were notified
of it the day after it was executed. On
June 30, the Bank advanced a further sum
of $700 to Gray. In January, 1915, the
Bank brought suit to foreclose its mort-
gage, making Gray, Beard, and Buck parties
to the suit. The proceeds of the fore-
closure sale, after deducting all costs and
expenses, are $3000; there are no other liens
than the mortgages of the parties men-
tioned. The question to be argued is that
of the privity of the several mortgages,
and the method in which the fund should be
distributed among the three mortgagees. It
is agreed that for the purpose of this com-
putation, seven per cent interest may be
added to the principal of each mortgage.
It is assumed that Gray paid nothing on
either mortgage; that the bill was pre-
sented at the September Term of the 'Cir-
cuit Court, 1914; that Gray was defaulted;
that Buck and Beard set up their respect-
ive mortgages in answer; that a money de-
cree in favor of each mortgage was ren-
dered against Gray, who is insolvent, and
that the Master in Chancery was directed
to make sale and report.
January 25, 1915, Master reports sale, and
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OPINION BY MARKER P.J.
To the creditor's bill of the Marion State
Bank to set aside a fraudulent conveyance
of eighty acres of land made by the defend-
ant to his son, the defendant answered sim-
ply denying the allegations of fraud and set-
ting up that the conveyance was made in
good faith and for a valid considreation.
A trial resulted in a decree setting aside the
conveyance and the sheriff, as authorized
by the decree, subsequently advertised and
sold the land under execution from the
plaintiff's judgment. The plaintiff was the
purchaser of the land, it being knocked off
to it as follows:—the east forty acres of
the tract for $660, and the west forty acres
for $800. The defendant had occupied the
west forty as a homestead for twelve or
fifteen years. It did not exceed in value
$1000. At the time of the sale, he was temp-
orarily absent, but his furniture was stored
in one of the rooms of the dwelling house
situated on the land, and it was his intention
to return in two months. He now files a
motion to set aside the sale as to his particu-
lar forty acres upon the ground that it is
his homestead, and is therefore exempt from
sale on execution.
The motion is resisted upon the ground
that the defendant, having failed to set up
any claim of homestead in his answer to the
creditor's bill is now estopped from doing
so In "support of the contention, counsel for
the bank insist that in a suit in equity where
the right of a defendant in land is involved,
and the defendant answers without dis-
closing all claim he has, he will not be allow-
ed to set up afterwards a claim that could
have been set up in the answer.
It must be admitted that there are expres-
sions in the opinions rendered in Lofquist
V Errickson, 152 111. 486, and First National
Bank V. Vest, 187 111. 389, which seem to
support the view of estoppel here contend-
ed for; but a careful examination of the
facts involved in those cases and of the par-
ticular questions involved will show that the
decisions announced are not decisive of the
question here involved. The real question
decided in those cases was that a claim of
homestead as against and in preclusion of a
creditor's bill must be set up in the answer!
The extent of the holding upon the subject
in each case is that a court of appeal will
not consider a claim of homestead where
no such claim was set up in the court from
which the appeal was taken.
Ever since we have had a homestead ex-
emption act in Illinois, our Supreme court
has held that the right of homestead can be
extinquished only in the mode provided by
statute. The law exempts it from debts, and
the homesteader is required to perform no act
nor manifest any intention to avail himself
of its benefits until an attempt is made to
MOOT COURT BULLETIN
deprive him of it. Green v. Marks, 25 111.
204; Pardee v. Lindley, 31 111. 174; Wing
V. Cropper, 35 111. 256; Hubbell v. Canady,
58 111. 425; Leopold v. Krause, 95 111. 440;
Gruhn v. Richardson, 128 111. 178.
Under these cases. Cole is entitled to the
benfits of exemption which the statute has
given him even tho he set up no claim of
homestead in the suit brought to divest his
grantee of title and to subject the land to the
payment of the judgment against him.
The sale of the forty acre tract in ques-
tion was illegal, and the motion to set it




William Dale and John Barth.
BRIEF FOR COMPLAINANT.
A title originating in tax sale may be af-
fected with equities the same as any other
title (Ragor v. Lomax, 22 111. App. 628);
and the tax deed, which is only prima facia
evidence, may be set aside in equity on
proper showing. 133 U. S. 471.
An assignment of a certificate of purchase
given on A sale of land for delinquent taxes
to one under a duty to pay the taxes oper-
ates as a redemption only. Busch v. Hous-
ton 75 111. 343; McChesney v. White 140 111.
330; Bassett v. Welch 22 Wis. 175; Bennett
V. White 140 111. 330; Bassett v. Welch 22
Wis. 175; Bennett v. Keehn 57 Wis. 582;
Bowman v. Eckstein 46 la. 583; Cooley on
Taxation 969, n. I, and numerous cases there
cited. ,
The mortgagee, whether in or out of
possession, cannot, by the acquisition of
a tax title, bar the right of the mortgagor
to redeem. Such title when so acquired at
once and by operation of law attaches to
the security and becomes liable to redemp-
tion on equitable terms. Moore v. Titman
44 111. 367 and cases cited; Stinson v. Conn,
Mutual Life Ins. Co. 174 111. 125, affirming
62 111. App. 319; Ragor v. Lomax 22 111. App.
628; Woodbury v. Swan 59 N. H. 22; Brown
V. Simons 44 N. H. 475; Maxfield v. Willey
46 Mich. 255; Martin v. Swofford 59 Miss.
328; McLaughlin v. Grier 48 Miss. 175; Fair
V. Brown 40 la. 210; Eck v. Swennenson 73
la. 523, 36 N. W. 503; Middletown Bank v.
Bacharach 46 Conn. 513; Fish v. Brunette
30 Wis. 102; Hall v. Westcott 15 R. I. 373.
When a tax deed is set aside, the holder
is not entitled to the full statutory penalty,
but only to the amount he has expended
with interest thereon. 124 111. 502;
128 id. 523;
137 id. 652: 135 id. 128;
190 id. 547; 194 id. 35;
113 111. App. 355.
And the holder of the tax deed must pay
costs of suit if he declines a tender of more
than he is entitled to.
213 111. 325;
257 id. 112;
209 id. 517; 235 id. 584.
Burden of proof rests on party claiming
under a tax deed to establish the affirmative




BRIEF FOR DEFENDANT DALE.
1. In the absence of an agreement, a
mortgagee not in possession is under no duty
to pay taxes.
Williams v. Townsend 31 N. Y. 411
Conn. Life Ins. Co. v. Stinson 174 111. 125.
Lomax v. Ragor 22 111. App 628.
2. One who stands in mere relation of
mortgagee is not precluded from acquiring
tax title based on a sale made before he
went into possession.
Waterson v. Devoe 18 Kans. 223.
McLaughlin v. Acom 58 Kans. 514.
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Reimer v. Newell 47 Minn 237.
Jones V. Black 18 Okla. 344.
Williams v. Townsend 31 N. Y. 411,
Cornell v. Woodruff 77 N. Y. 203.
Harrison v. Roberts 6 Fla. 711.
Walthall's Exr v. Rives 34 Ala. 91.
Jones on Mortgages (6th Ed) Vol I No. 713.
3. Mortgagee not in possession may pur-
chase a tax certificate for taxes accruing
before the mortgage was given.
Allen V. Dayton Hotel Co. 95 Tenn. 480.
4. Mere holding of tax certificate by mort-
gagee does not render it invalid.
Lomax v. Ragor 22 111. App. 628.
5. Assignee of a certificate of purchase
at tax sale acquires all rights thereunder
which original purchaser had.







William Dale and John Earth.
OPINION BY MARKER P. J.
The complainant borrowed of the defend-
ant Earth $3000 for a period of two years
and mortgaged 160 acres of land to secure
payment of a promisiory note given for that
amount to Earth. The mortgage contained
a provision that if the mortgagor should not
pay the taxes against the land before becom-
ing delinquent, Earth might pay them and
make the same part of the mortgage debt.
As a matter of fact, the land had been sold
for taxes and a certificate of sale was then
In the hands of the purchaser, one Joseph
Carr, all of which was unknown to the
complainant. He was a non-resident of the
state and the land was vacant and unimprov-
ed. Earth bought the certificate from Carr
and held it six months, when he sold it to
Dale. He did not tell Atwood what he had
done in that regard, and Atwood was in ig-
norance of the tax sale and certificate until
after he had paid to Earth the mortgage
debt, had cleared a large part of the land,
and had moved into a house constructed by
him on it. As soon as he learned of the situ-
ation, he at once went to Dale and offered
to pay him the amount paid by Carr at the
tax sale ($94), the 100% penalty thereon,
the expense of recording deed, and interest
on the whole sum at 6% after Oct. 30, 1913.
Dale refused, and brought action of ejec-
ment against Atwood.
Atwood now sues in equity to enjoin the
ejectment suit, and have Dale's tax deed
set aside, and deposits in court the sum of
$300, out of which he requests the court
to pay Dale all which the court may deem
he is in equity entitled to.
It was my direction that the issues be
presented and the case argued without ref-
erence to and independent of the provisions
of the Illinois Act, of June 14, 1909, provid-
ing for the reconveying of tax titles under
certain conditions therein named. I so di-
rected because I desired a development of
argument upon purely equitable grounds and
because the case was sent to me by a former
graduate of this school now practicing in a
state where there is no statute like that
named.
Had Earth instead of disposing of the cer-
tificate to Dale, retained it and procured a
tax deed to himself, there would be little
trouble in reaching a conclusion that the
deed be set aside. The doctrine is well set-
tled in Illinois that a mortgagee cannot af-
fect the rights of the mortgagor by purchas-
ing the property at a sale for delinquent
taxes accruing upon the premises. His re-
lation towards the property and the mort-
gagor so far as concerns the removal of
a tax encumberance is that of a trustee.
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The mortgagor and mortgagee have
a unity of interest in the protection of their
respective titles against a sale for non-
payment of taxes, and against oustanding tax
titles, and it is inequitable for either of them
to so act as to acquire such a title, Moore v.
Titman, 44 111. 367; Stinson v. Ins. Co., 174
111. 125; Ragor v. Lomax, 22 111. App. 628;
Ins. Co. v. Stinson, 62 111. App. 319.
The same is held in the states of Iowa,
Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, and
Wisconsin. It is the generally accepted rule
in this country.
A different question is presented here,
however. Here the holder of a tax title
was under no contractual relations whatever
with Atwood, and it would be unsafe to an-
nounce that there was a trust relation be-
tween them. If Dale is to be divested of
his title, it must be upon the theory that
when Barth acquired title to the certificate
it destroyed its efficiency as a foundation for
tax title, and must be considered as becoming
a part of and being merged in the mortgage
debt. I am inclined to take that view of it.
Under the view held by me, Dale is entitled
to all the rights of the holder of tax a cer-
tificate just before the expiration of the per-
iod of redemption. No great injustice Is
done him thereby. It cannot be said that
he was misled in any way by lack of infor-
mation concerning the relations between At-
wood and Barth. The mortgage executed
by Atwood to Barth was of record at the
time he received the certificate. He there-
fore had constructive notice that the rela-
tion of mortgager and mortgagee existed be-
tween Atwood and Bath. He knew, there-
fore, that when Barth acquired the tax cer-
tificate, he acquired it as a trustee, and that
no title could vest in him because of At-
wood's failure t o redeem. In other words,
he was in no better situation than Barth him-
self.
The finding, therefore, is in favor of the
complainant. The ejectment suit is perma-
nently enjoined. Dale is awarded out of the
$300 on deposit, the $94 purchase money,
100% on the same, in addition thereto, 6%
on the whole amount since the taking out
of the deed, aggregating the sum of $202.70.
Each party will be required to pay the costs
made by him.
<^
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James Ball
vs.
Peoples State Bank of Decatur.
BRIEF OF THE PLAINTIFF.
1. Malice in its legal sense means a
wrongful act, done intentionally, without
just cause or excuse;
Schaffner vs. Ehrman, 139 111. 109.
3rd National Bank of St. Louis vs. Otoer,
178 Federal 679.
2. A bank has no such lien upon its de-
positors' funds as to authorize its application
of such fund upon an indebtedness not yet
due;
Merchants National Bank vs. Ritzinger,
ao 111. App. .2i7.
Commercial National Bank vs. Proctor,
98 111. 558.
Elzy et al. vs. Morrison,
180 111. App. 711, at 716.
3. Where depositor's check has been dis-
honored, he has a two- fold remedy, suit for
deposits, or suit in case for damages.
Zane, Banks & Banking, Page 241 and
cases there cited.
First National Bank vs. Shoemaker,
117 Pa. 94.
4. In an action on case for dishonoring a
check, when a depositor had sufficient funds
in the bank with which to pay it, the plain-
tiff has a right to allege and prove special
damages.
Metropolitan Supply Co. vs. Bank & Trust
Co., 114 111. App. 318.
Patterson vs. The Marine National Bank,
130 Pa. 419.
5 La, NS. 871 note.
5. Jury may also take into consideration
the natural and necessary consequences of
the bank's refusal to pay check of the plain-
tiff and hold defendant for more than nominal
damages.
Schaffner vs. Ehrman, 139 111. 109.
Metropolitan Supply Co. vs. Banking &
Trust Co., 114 111. App. 318.
Patterson vs. Bank, supra. Atlanta Nat-






People's State Bank of Decatur.
BRIEF FOR DEFENDANT.
1. A stockholder of a corporation cannot
contract for a corporation; consequently
cannot recover damages resulting from the
breach of such contract.
Bonton vs. McDonough County, 84 111. 384.
Crown Coal Co. vs. Taylor, 184 111. 250.
Sellers vs. Greer, 172 111. 549.
Beardstown Pearl Button Co. vs. O jwald,
130 111. App. 290.
Coal Belt Railway Co. vs. Peabody Coal
Co., 2i30 111. 164.
2. Before a stockholder can sue for a
wrong and injury to a corporation, he must
first show that the officers of the corporation
have refused to bring suit.
Perry County vs. Stebbins, 66 111. App. 427.
Babcock vs. Farrell, 146 111. App. 307.
Babcock vs. Farrell, 245 111. 14.
3. When the plaintiff has been injured
by a breach of contract, he can recover only
damages for the natural and probable conse-
quences of such breach.
Snell vs. Cottingham, 7 111. 161.
Alvion Foundry Works vs. Columbia Iron
& Steel Co., 112 111. App. 183.
4. For a breah of contract by the de-
fendant, the plaintiff can recover only such
damages as may reasonably be supposed to
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have been in the contemplation of the
parties at the time of malting the contract.
Union Foundry Works vs. Columbia Iron
& Steel Co., 112 111. App. 183.
Rode & Son vs. Arney, 115 111. App. 629.
Hawley vs. Florsheim, 44 111. App. 320.
Weaver vs. Penny, 17 111. App. 628.
Western Union Telegraph Co. vs. Martin,
9 111. App. 587,
5, Before a plaintiff can recover damages
for loss of a collateral contract he must
ohow that defendant had actual notice of
such contract, and in no case can mere
:jrospective profits from such contract be
recovered.
Lapp vs. Illinois Watch Co.,
104 111. App. 255.
Cobb Chocolate 'Co. vs. Crocker-Wheeler
Co., 1'25 111. App. 241.
C. I. & W. Ry. Co. vs. Baker,







The People's State Bank of Decatur.
OPINION BY MARKER, P. J.
The plaintiff was a depositor in the de-
fendant's bank. He was also the principal
stockholder in a corporation engaged in sell-
ing coal at Peoria. There were 400' shares
of stock, par value $100, of which the plain-
tiff owned 350. To secure a loan of $ll0,000,
the corporation had placed a chattel mort-
gage on its entire equipment, worth about
?20,000. In the month of June, last, the
plaintiff began negotiations with Mrs. iNan-
nie Towle, of Indianapolis, for the sale ot
iOO shares of the stock to her for $20,000
in cash. It was the purpose of the plaintiff
to use the $20,000 in lifting the mortgage,
and in carrying on the business. The nego-
tiations reached the stage of Mrs. Towle
consenting to take the stock and furnish the
.?20,000 in cash on the 10th of July. On the
1st of July, a check drawn by the i)laintiff,
in favor of a brother of Mrs. Towle for ^500
was presented for payment. The plaintiff
had a checking account of $1250 in the bank
it the ,time. The bank held his note for
.52000, payable six days later. It therefore
refused to pay the check, fearing that the
plaintiff and his company would be thrown
into bankruptcy. Mrs. Towle's brother im-
mediately notified her of the dishonor of
the check and advised her not to let the
plaintiff have the $20,000 promised. When
the plaintiff applied to Mrs. Towle for pay-
ment of the $20,000 on the 10th, she declined,
and as the money market was so stringent
that the plaintiff could not get the money
elsewhere, the chattel mortgage was fore-
closed, and property worth $20,000 was sac-
rificed at a forced sale, it bringing only
$8500.
The plaintiff now brings suit against the
defendant because it refused payment of its
check, whereby Mrs. Towle was influenced
to decline fulfillment of her agreement, all
of which resulted in the property of the
corporation being sacrificed and the plain-
tiff's stock being rendered worthless.
I have encountered no difficulty in reach-
ing the conclusion that the bank had no
legal right to decline payment of the $500
check, nor have I had any difficulty in reach-
ing the conclusion that its wrongful act in
that regard resulted in injury to the plaintiff.
It has been rei)eatedly held in this state
that a bank cannot refuse payment of a
check drawn by a depositor upon a fund
deposited with it on the ground that it holds
the depositor's note which will mature at
some future date. Fourth Nat. Bank v. City
Nat. Bank, 69 111. 398; Commercial Bank v.
Proctor et al., 98 111. 558: Merchant's Nat.
Bank v. Ritzinger et al., 60 111. App. 27;
Elzy V. Morrison, 180 111. App. 711. The
danger of bankruptcy of the plaintiff or his
company could not constitute any exception.
I agree with counsel for plaintiff that
where a depositor's check has been wrong-
fully dishonored, he has a two fold remedy
—
an action ex contractu to recover his deposit,
and an action on the case for damages
growing out of the bank's tortious act. The
plaintiff has resorted to the last named.-and
that he is entitled to recover is clear in my
opinion. The difficulty arises over the
measure of damages.
It may be stated as a general rule that
where the evidence shows a commission of
the alleged wrcngfiil act by the defendant,
all the natural consequenres lowing there-
irom should be considered in fixing the dam-
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ages. Counsel for the defendant contend
tnat the plaintiff can recover only such dam-
ages as may reasonably be supposed to
have been in the contemplation of the
parties at the time of making the contract
and cite a long list of authorities in support
thereof. It is a sufficient answer to that
contention to say that this is not a suit in
debt or assumpsit to recover for a breach
of the contract. Altho the initial relation
between the parties was contractual, the
basis for recovery in this suit is a tort. The
rule relied upon by counsel and announced
in the cases cited does not apply.
Convinced, as I am, that the defendant's
wrongful act caused to the plaintiff the loss
of the fruits of his contract with Mrs. Towle,
it occurs to me that the damage should be
based on the value which his remaining
stock would have attained had that contract
been carried out and the amount to be re-
ceived less the mortgage debt. I cannot
adopt the view that because Mrs. Towle
had agreed to pay him $20,000 for his 300
shares he is entitled to recover $20,000.
$10,000 of the money was to be used in
liquidating the mortgage debt and $10,000
was to 'je used as working capital. It was
upon that agreement alone that she con-
sented to furnish the monev. Neither can
I adopt that other view, that because an ex-
tmguishment of the company's indebted-
ness and its possession of $10,000 in work-
ing capital would have put the company on
its feet, damages should be based upon the
par value of the stock. That the stock
would have reached par in actual value is
mere speculation.
As I view it the only safe method of fixing
the value of the stock is to base it upon the
trnglible assets. Had the arrangement con-
templated by plaintiff and Mrs. Towle
been carried out the company would have
had $20,000 in teams, wagons, etc., and
$10,000 cash. Deducting the $10,00'0 mort-
gage debt, the tangible property would have
been wcrth $20,000, and the stock worth $50
l.>ev share. I^^nder the arran£;ement with
Mrs. Towle his claim against the company
v.hen he should put in the $10,000 for work-
ing capital would be to that amount, and
the 50 shares s1ill held by him worth $2500.
I therefore fix the damages at $12,500, and
the '^ii'ert .iud.jrmen^ for thU amotint and






George W. Jenkins, a resident of Chicago,
v/as the owner of a piece of real estate
situated in Urbana, known as the Holbrook
Mill property. He desired to sell it, and in
May, 1914, agreed to pay Nobles, who is a
real estate agent in Urbana, $300 to sell it
for $8500, or find a purchaser who would
give that for the property. In pursuance of
the agreement. Nobles took Jenks to the
office of White & Todd, dealers in lumber
and real estate in Urbana, and introduced
him to Todd and made an effort to sell the
property at the price mentioned. The three
went together to examine the property.
Todd seemed pleased with it, but declined
to take it without the concurrence of his
partner, who was temporarily absent in
Michigan. He agreed to telegraph his part-
ner and upon his reply to notify Nobles.
Jenks was very anxious to dispose of the
property, and so on the same day placed
the matter of its sale in the hands of Wil-
liam George, a real estate agent in Cham-
paign. The same contract was made with
George that had been made with Nobles.
Quite a sharp contest ensued for the $300
prize between Nobles and George in the
race for a purchaser. On the 27th of May,
1914, Jenks told Nobles of his own efforts
to sell the property and that George was
trying to sell it, and that unless he. Nobles,
could sell by the 28th of May, the field
would be open to anyone to sell. On the
29th of May, Todd received a telegram from
his partner, consenting to his buying the
property. He visited Nobles' office. He
ascertained through a phone message that
Jenks was still in Champaign, and started
out to find him. He found him at George's
office. A sale was there made for the $8500.
Jenks paid George the commission of $300.
Nobles subsequently demanded $300 of
Jenks, which was refused, and Nobles there-








On the 23d of July, 1914, Adam Smith was
convicted before the police magistrate of
the city of Zeigler for violating an ordinance
of the city by an assault and battery upon
one Rose Smith. He was tried before a
jury which in addition to finding him guilty,
assessed a fine of $100, and upon that the
police magistrate, William W. Brown, ren-
dered judgment, which, including costs,
amounted to $109.45. Smith prayed an ap-
peal to the Circuit Court of Franklin County,
Illinois, and perfected his appeal by filing
appeal bond and having the transcript di-
rected to the Clerk of the Court. The case
not being placed upon the docket because
Smith had not payed the advance fees, the
city advanced the fee and placed the same
upon the docket. Subsequently the appeal
was dismissed for want of prosecution, with
a writ of procedendo to the police court at
Ziegler to proceed to collect the judgment.
On the 27th of February, 1915, a writ
against the body of Smith for the satisfac-
tion of judgment was issued and placed in
the hands of Walter Pete, a constable of
Franklin County. On failure of Smith to
discharge the judgment, Pete placed Smith
In charge of Henry Bates, keeper of the
jail in Franklin 'County. Smith applied to
the Hon. Henry Mott. Judge of the City
Court of Benton, for a writ of habeas corpus.
He alleges in his petition that the judgment
of conviction rendered against him is void
because the jury of six empanelled to try
him was composed entirely of women.
A writ will be issued and served upon
Bates and Pete, and in answer to the same,
they will plead the writ issued by the police
magistrate. Upon the trial the evidence
will show that Dora Newton, Ella Ward,
Jane Spring, Edith Crow, Oily Watson, and
Sarah Clark were empanelled as a Jury.
Upon the hearing, it will be admitted that
the jury were composed entirely of women.
For the Petitioner:
Ratcliff, Leonard & Robinson:
For Bates and Pete:
Leopold, Mourning, and Rang.
Counsel for Petitioner will prepare tran-
script of docket of Police Magistrate in addi-
tion to the petition and writ of habeas
corpus.
Counsel for respondents will prepare writ
issuing from Police Magistrate in addition
to the return.
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On September 1st, 1914, William R. and
James W. Keifer, doing business as part-
ners in East St. Louis, Illinois, under the
partnership name of Keifer Brothers, in pay-
ment for merchandise, executed and de-
livered to Charles Pemberton their ne-
gotiable promissory note for $500.00, to his
order, due and payable sixty days after date,
with interest from date at 6 per cent.
On the next day Pemberton duly indorsed
and sold the note to plaintiff, living in St.
Charles, Missouri. On October 15th, plain-
tiff indorsed the note for collection and sent
it to defendant (incorporated as a national
bank and having its place of business in
East St. Louis) with instructions to collect
it when due and place the proceeds to his
credit, he being a depositor in defendant's
bank. In the latter part of October, Keifer
Brothers got into difficulties, and at the in-
stance of creditors, on October 20th, a re-
ceiver was appointed by the United States
court to wind up its affairs.
The receiver took possession of Keifer
Brothers' place of business and stock of
goods, employing the two brothers as clerks.
On the day of maturity of the above de-
scribed promissory note, the president of
defendant bank handed it to the cashier of
the bank, telling him that the makers were
probably insolvent, and unable to pay, but
to make the proper demand and protest.
The cashier of the bank was a notary public
and as such usually made the protests neces-
sary in the bank's business. The cashier
went to Keifer Brothers' former place of
business, and meeting Jas. W. Keifer there,
asked if the receiver was in, and on being
told that he was in the back office, went to
him and presented the note and demanded
payment thereof. The receiver refused. The
cashier notified Pemberton at once that the
receiver had refused to pay the note, and
drew up a protest and notice of protest in
the usual form, affixing his notarial certi-
ficate and seal, and reciting therein that due
demand had been made on that day of the
receiver of Keifer Brothers, and that said










In 1S95 George C. Warren occupied and
owned in fee simple the northeast quarter
of section sixteen, in township sixty-six,
range five, in Lincoln County, Missouri. His
dwelling stood about four rods north of the
south boundary line of said tract. South of
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the dwelling lay a forty-acre tract, the north-
west quarter of the southeast quarter of said
section, which was of little value and sparse-
ly timbered. On inquiry among his neigh-
bors he learned that said forty acres was
school land, belonging to the state and would
be by it offered for sale at some future day.
Intending to buy said land when offered, he
took immediate possession thereof, by erect-
ing stables thereon, grazing his cattle there,
and cutting trees for fuel. In 1905, he fenced
the forty, broke up ten acres of it, and from
1906 to the present time has raised crops
thereon. Warren always claimed the land
as his, saying that he intended to buy it of
the state, and that he took possession so as
to have the first right to buy as an actual
settler.
In June, 1914, John F. Wallace demanded
possession of said forty acres under the fol-
lowing claim of title:
1. Patent, issued by United States to
Alexander White, dated December 1, 1880.
2. Warranty deed from Adah M. Allen,
sole surviving heir of Alexander White, who
died intestate March 16, 1903, in St. Louis,
to William B. Allen, dated and delivered July
20, 1906, in Cleveland, Ohio. On July 20,
1906, Adam M. Allen was a married woman,
and said William B. Allen was her husband.
She died intestate May, 1908, in Ohio, leav-
ing an adult unmarried daughter, Evalyn
Allen, only heir, now living and unmarried.
3. Warranty deed, by William B. Allen,
widower, to John F. Wallace, dated June 9,
1910.
All of said deeds were duly recorded, but
tlie patent, now in Wallace's hands, was
never put on record.
During all of the times mentioned the
following statutes are to be deemed to have
been in force in Missouri.
An action for the recovery of the title or
possession of lands, tenements, or heredita-
ments can only be brought within ten years
after the cause of action arose.
A married woman shall be deemed feme
sole so far as to enable her to carry on and
transact business on her own account, to
contract and be contracted with, to sue and
be sued.
The testimony will show that Warren first
learned, when Wallace demanded possession,
that said forty acres was not school land
and had never been the property of the state.
Attorneys for Plaintiff:
Siedenberg, Belnap, and Grossman.
Attorneys for Defendant:
Luney, Billman, and Hart.
Case No. 23.
STATEMENT.
Charles Smith for the last ten years has
conducted a hardware store in the town of
Clinton, Illinois, in which his nam.e only was
used. For the last three years. Smith also
has conducted an undertaking business in
the same town, under the name of Smith &
Still. Still has no interest in the business,
but worked in it on a salary for Smith. Ihe
firm name was over the door, and on the bill
heads and letter heads. The whole business
was conducted in the firm name, as was
known to Still.
On June 1, 1914, Smith's indebtedness was
concentrated in the hands of William Black
and Henry Cone. Black had a claim for
$5000, based wholly on goods sold to Smith
for his hardware business. Cone had a
claim for $4000, based wholly on goods sold
to Smith and Still for the undertaking busi-
ness. All the claims were overdue. On
June 2, 1914, Smith turned over the hard-
ware business to Black, who took immediate
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possession for a credit of $2000 on the debt
(a fair valuation) and gave his note to
Black at ten month for the balance of $3000,
and secured the same by a chattel mortgage
on the goods and chattels of the undertak-
ing business. The mortgage was executed
by Smith alone, without the knowledge of
^^lill and contained a recital that Smitn Avas
conducting the business under the name of
Smith and Still. The mortgage was regu-
larly acknowledged and recorded. Smith re-
mained in possession and Still continued on
a salary as before. Henry Cone learned
from some source of the recorded mortgage
and most of the goods covered by the mort-
gage had been sold by Cone to Smith. On
March 15, 1915, he made a demand on Smith,
who acknowledged that he was insolvent.
Cone turned to Still and said to him, "1 shall
hold you responsible, because this business
was conducted under the firm name of Smith
& Still, and I shall proceed to collect from
you."
Still is worth, above liabilities and exemp-
tions, about $2000. The goods and equip-
ment used in the undertaking business is
worth $4000. Cone and Still went in com-
pany to Black and stated to him that inas-
much as the entire indebtedness due Cone
was for goods sold by him to Smith and Still,
that he should release the mortgage so that
the property might be sold and the proceeds
applied in the extinguishment of Cone's
claim. Black refused, stating that his chat-
tel mortgage was good.
On the following day Black, learned that
some of the property was being disposed of
by Still, took immediate possession under
his mortgage, and has advertised the same
for sale, Henry Cone brings a bill in equity
to enjoin the sale and asks that the mort-
gage may be cancelled. On the 21st day of
February, 1915, he had taken judgment on a
note against Smith & Still which contained
power of attorney to confess judgment. The
judgment was entered in the Circuit Court of
DeWitt County for the sum of $4320.
In the bill, Cone will make Black, Smith,
and Still parties defendant. Smith, who is
insolvent, will be defaulted. Black will
answer, setting up his claim under the
chattel morgage. Still will answer separate-




For the Defendant Black:
Casner and Day.




On August 20, 1914, J. W. Schuyler was
acting as freight agent for the Chicago &
Alton Railroad Company, at its station at
Brighton, Illinois. The company was in-
corporated under the general laws of Illi-
nois. Schuyler had general authority to re-
ceive goods for shipment over the company's
lines and to issue bills of lading therefor.
On the above date he issued to Charles F.
Griswold a bill of lading for 1000 sacks of
wheat to be shipped to Arlington, Missouri.
Griswold was named as consignee in the
bill. He transferred the bill of lading by
endorsement and delivered thereof on the
same day to Caldwell & Company, millers.
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of St. Louis, they paying him $2000 therefor.
The firm of Caldwell & Co. was composed of
James C. and Robert A. Caldwell, in busi-
ness as partners. The bill of lading was
upon one of the regular blanks of the rail-
road company and was signed for them by
Schuyler as agent. It described the wheat
as No. 2, and stated the value to be $2100.
In due course, such shipment should liave
reached Arlington on August 22nd. Caldwell
& Co., on August 23rd, presented the bill of
lading to the company's agent at Arlington
and demanded the wheat for which it called.
No wheat was in fact delivered by Griswold
to the railroad company, and the bill was
falsely and fraudulently issued by Schuyler
acting in collusion with Griswold. Caldwell
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Case. No. 25
Emily New, By Chas. New, her Next Friend,
vs.
Delia Brabant
Orland New was a widower with one
child only, Emily New, five years old, when
he married his second wife, Portia Brabant,
on January 2, 1910. On January 4, 1911,
from jealousy which had no foundation in
fact, he murdered his wife and shot himself.
He died at Burmham Hospital six days later.
The only blood relative surviving Mrs.
New was an unmarried sister, the defendant,
Delia Brabant. Mrs. New and her sister,
Delia, prior to the marriage with Orland
Drew, had owned as tenants in common, in
fee simple, the N. W. % of the S. E. % of
Sec. 22, Tp. 19 N, R. 8 E., in Champaign
County, Illinois They had inherited the
land from their father. Delia has been in
continuous possession of the property from
January 1904 up to the present time, under
an arrangement whereby she was to pay
the taxes on the property, keep the improve-
ments in repair, and pay to her sister $125
per year. She made the successive an-
nual payments of $125 under the agreement
up to the time of the death of Mrs. New.
Since the death of Mrs. New, Delia Brabant
claims the property as hers in fee simple,
and refuses to pay anyone rent or permit
anyone to interfere with her exclusive pos-
session. The attorneys for the complainant








After filing of the answer and replication,
the cause will be referred to the Master in
Chancery to take proofs and make findings





Prank E. Wilde and Sidney A. Colter
In consideration of a loan of $2000, the
defendant Colter executed and delivered to
the plaintiff, May 1, 1909, a promissory note
for that sum, due two years after date,
with interest from date at 6% per annum,
and secured the same by pledging 100 shares
of stock in the Luminous Gas Co., a corpo-
ration doing business at Janesville, Wiscon-
MOOT COURT BULLETIN
>\
sin. On October 10, 1910, Colter, having
learned of the utter failure of the gas com-
pany, with the intent to hinder and defraud
the plaintiff in the collection of his note,
conveyed to the defendant Wilde, lots 7 and
8, in Block 66, in the City of Bloomington,
Illinois. The lots at the time were and are
now vacant and are worth about $3000.
Defendant Wilde claims that he did not
know of Colter's fraudulent intent, but he
did know that he bought the lots for Vz of
their fair value. Wilde still owns the lots.
His deed was filed for record October 15,
1910. At the time he paid the $1500 and
accepted the deed, it was agreed between
the grantor and the grantee that the con-
sideration in the deed should be placed at
$3500. On June 15, 1913, the plaintiff first
actually learned of the conveyance of the
two lots, and that the stock of the Luminous
Gas Co., was utterly worthless. He thereup-
on began an action against Colter in the Cir-
cuit Court of McLean County, on the note
and on the 4th of October, recovered judg-
ment against Colter for $2000, and interest
since May 1, 1913. He had execution issued
and returned unsatisfied because of the ina-
bility of the officer to find property belong-
ing to Colter. As a matter of fact, Colter
was at that time and is now insolvent.
Attorneys for the complainant will file a
creditor's bill and seek to set aside the con-
veyance to Wilde, so that the property may
be levied upon and sold upon execution is-








Colter will make default and Wilde will
answer. After filing replication to the an-
swer, the cause will be referred to the Mas-






The defendant has for many years been a
mine prospector and mine operator. In
June, 1911, he visited his friend, James Ham-
ilton, the plaintiff's husband, then residing
at Evanston Illinois, and told him that he
had made a great discovery of copper in
northern Michigan, and was undertaking to
develop it, but that he had exhausted all of
his means in doing so, and was likely to lose
the whole advantage of his discovery be-
cause of lack of means to make the neces-
sary development. Hamilton had known
Bolton for a great many years, and had con-
fidence in his Integrity. He told Bolton he
would help him get the money, provided
Bolton would make a substantial settlement
upon Hamilton's wife out of the proceeds
of the mining enterprise. Bolton readily as-
sented to that and stated that he was willing
to make a settlement upon her of $15000 if
Hamilton would endorse his note to the
First National Bank of Chicago for $7000.
Hamilton was a man of means and had ex-
cellent credit with the First National Bank
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of Chicago. Accordingly, the following a-
greement in writing was made and delivered
to Hamilton by Bolton:
"Evanston, Illinois, June 10, 1911.
In consideration of the promise of James
Hamilton to endorse my promissory note
for 17000 to the First National Bank of
Chicago, it is agreed that the proceeds of
said note shall be used in the development
of my copper mines in Michigan. I further
promise the said James Hamilton to pay
unto his wife, Mary S. Hamilton, the sum
of ?15000, out of the proceeds of said mine,
it being my intention to sell the mine as soon
as it may be developed and a purchaser can
be found.
Arthur Bolton"
Hamilton placed his name on Bolton's
note to the bank, and through it Bolton pro-
cured the $7000 with which he proceeded
to work on his mining property. The note
was made payable in 90 days. It was re-
newed at the end of the 90 days and again
at the end of the second 90 days, Bolton
paying the quarterly interest earned by
the money. Hamilton signed each one of
the renewal notes. Hamilton died in De-
cember, 1912, and in the same month, Bolton
was able to make such a showing with his
mine that certain parties bought it of him
for $200,000 cash. Bolton paid his note at
the bank, but has done nothing in the way
of earring out his agreement with Hamilton
to pay the latter's wife the $15000 according
to the terms of the above agreement. The
plaintiff has repeatedly called upon Bolton
to pay.
For the Plaintiff
Lawyer, Mills, and Rogers
For the Defendant
Lowe, Robinson, and Whitnel
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BRIEF FOR THE COMPLAINANT.
1. When a parent has deeded land to her
son in consideration of a promise of the son
to apply the income of thefarm to the sup-
port of the parent in the degree of com-
fort to which she had been accustomed, and
the son later refuses or fails to carry out
such promise, equity will decree a cancel-
lation of the conveyance because of the
peculiar nature of the contract which rend-
ers the legal remedy if damages inadequate.
Houston V. Greiner, 144 Pac. 133.
Patterson v. Patterson, 81 la. 626.
Diggins V. Doherty, 4 Mackey 172.
Scott V. Scott and McClure, 3 B. Mon. 2.
Reeder v. Reeder, 89 Ky. 529.
Sheparson v. Stevens, 77 Milh. 226.
Frazier v. Miller, 16 111. 48.
Cash V. Cash, 41 S. W. 579.
Grant v. Bell. 26 R. I. 288.
Wampler v. Wampler, 30 Gratt. 454.
Lowman v. Crawford, 79 Va. 688.
Peck V. Hoyt, 39 Conn. 9.
Bruer v. Bruer, 109 Minn. 260.
Whittaker v. Tramell, 86 Ark. 251.
Tomisk v. Tomisk, 78 Neb. 103.
6 Pomroy Eq. Jur., sec. 686.
2 When the grantee refuses to perform
the contract to support the grantor, which
contract was the consideration of the con-
veyance, a presumption arises that there
was a fraud in the inception of the contract
and equity will decree a cancellation of the
conveyance.
Frazier v. Miller, 16 111. 48.
Oard V. Oard, 59 111. 46.
Jones V. Neeley, 72 111. 449.
Knush V. Knush, 143 111. 353.
Cooper V. Gum, 152 111. 471.
McClelland v. McClelland, 176 111. 83.
Frabrice v. Von der Brelie, 190 111. 460.
Stebbins v. Petty, 209 111. 29.
Sherrin v. Flinn, 155 Ind. 422.
Spangler v. Yarborough, 23 Okla. 806.
Wampler v. Wampler. 30 Gratt. 454.
3. The retention of the property and the
refusal of the grantee to perform the prom-
ise to support, is in itself such fraudlent
conduct that equity will take jurisdiction
and decree a cancellation of the conveyance.
Diggins V. Doherty, 4 Mackey 172.
Barnes v. Barnes, 9 Mackey 479.
Reid V. Burns, 13 Ohio St. 49.
Bogie V. Bogie, 41 Wis. 209.
Bresnahan v. Bresnahan, 46 Wis. 385.
Bishop V. Aldrich, 48 Wis. 619.
Blake v. Blake, 56 Wis. 392.
4. Conveyances made by aged people in
consideration of support and care are deem-
ed to be conveyances upon condition sub-
sequent, and will be set aside by a court of
equity upon proof of a substantial failure to
perform.
Blake v. Blake, 56 Wis. 392.
Gilchrist v. Foxen, 95 Wis. 428.
Delong V. Delong, 56, Wis. 514.
Knutson v. Bostrak, 99 Wis. 469.
Glock V. Glock, 113 Wis. 303.
Wanner v. Wanner, 115 Wis. 196.
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2 Washburn Real Prop. p. 7.
Blum V. Bash, 49 N. W. 142.
Mansfield v. Mansfield 52. N. W. 290.
Cree v. Sherfy, 37 N. E. 787.
Young V. Young. 147 N. W. 361.
Richter v. Richter, 12 N. E. 698.
Hefuer v. Yount, 8 Blackf 455.
Wilson V. Wilson, 38 Me. 18.
Drew V. Baldwin, 48 Wis. 529.
Cros V. Carson, 8 Blackf 138.
5. While a conveyance of property upon
an agreement for support of grantor is not
often in the form of a trust, it is usually
such in fact, and upon breach, it is more
consonant with the principles of equity to
treat it as an implied trust renounced by
grantee than as a mere contract.
A bill in equity seeking a reconveyance of
land conveyed upon an agreement to support
of grantor will, after breach by grantee, be
sustained, the latter being placed in statue
quo.
Grant v. Bell, 26 R. I. 288.
Wampler v. Wampler, 30 Graft. 454.
Lawman v. Crawford, 99 Va. 688.
Penfield v. Penfield, 41 Conn. 474.
Cooper v. Gum, 152 111. 471.
Chadwick v. Chadwick, 59 Mich. 87.
Reid V. Burns, 13 Ohio St. 49.
Lane v. Lane, 505 W. 857.
Patterson v. Patterson, 81. la. 626.
Barnes v. Barnes, 9 Macky 479.
Towle V. Ambs, 123 111. 410.




Solicitors for the Complainant.
Mary Jones vs. Leonard Jones Case No. 13.
BRIEF FOR THE DEFENDANT.
1. Fraud must relate to fact existing or




(b) Mere breach of a promise does not
in itself raise a legal presumption of fraud.
42 N. C. 19.
34 Texas 218.
31 Amer. St. Rep. 39 (notes),
(c) Purchase of property by a child from
its parents is no badge of fraud; rather the





20 Mo. App. 176.
II. Mere failure by a grantee to perform
a promise which forms a whole or part of
the consideration, inducing an executed con-
veyance gives rise to no right of recission in
grantor either in law or equity unless such




Pom. Equity Jurisd. sec. 686.
III. Where a parent deeded land to a son
in consideration of a promise to give parent
a home and support for life and the latter
refuses or fails to carry out such promise







IV. In cases where the language is doubt-
ful or the intention of the parties is doubt-
ful the promise or obligation of the grantee
will be construed as a covenant limiting the
grantor to an action thereon, and not a
condition subsequent with a right to defeat
the conveyance.
73 Iowa 328.
115 N. Y. 361.
96 Mo. 174.
43 Kansas 148.
120 N. Y. 447.
124 Ala. 273
Pom. Equity Jurisd. sect. 686.
MOOT COURT BULLETIN
V. A condition subsequent is not created
where the consideration of a deed is an a-











In 1910, the complainant deeded a farm in
Marion County, worth $20,000, to her son,
the defendant, in consideration of $100, and
his oral promise to apply the income of the
farm to her support during life and provide
for suitable burial at her death. She was
70 years old at the time and had no other
property. For three years, the defendant
complied with his promise, but afterwards,
through the influence of his wife, declined
to provide for any further support of his
mother. She brought her bill in the circuit
court for the purpose of cancelling the deed.
There was no evidence offered to show that
that the son's promise was not made in en-
tire good faith. The court dismissed the bill
without prejudice to an action at law by the
complaintant. She now moves for a re-
hearing.
Opinion by Pomeroy, J.
The question whether equity may take
jurisdiction to rescind and cancel a "sup-
port deed," that is to say, a deed whereby
an aged person conveys all his property to
a son or other relative on the faith of the lat-
ter's promise to furnish care and support to
the grantor—because of a mere failure of
the consideration, is a question that has usu-
ally received an affirmative answer in the
numerous jurisdictions where it has arisen.
2 Pom. Eq. Rem. 6S6. There is, however, a
curious divergence of opinion among the
courts as to the reason on which this con-
clusion shall be based. In Illinois the rule
and its reason are settled by a long series
of dicisions. The bad faith of the grantee,
manifested by the unexpected breach of his
promise to the grantor, is carried back to
the inception of the agreement, and the pre-
sumption is indulged that he obtained the
conveyance with the fraudulent intention
fro mthe outset to fail in the performance
of his promise at some time in the future.
Frazier v. Miller, 16 111. 48; McClelland v.
McClelland, 176 111. 83; Domeracki v. Jani-
kowski, 255 111. 575, and many other cases.
This view has some following outside of
Illinois: Spangler v. Yarborough,23 Okla.
806; 101 Pac. 1107; Gustin v. Crockett,
(Wash.) 97 Pac. 1091.
A few courts hold that the grantee's prom-
ise, though oral, is a condition subsequent,
giving the grantor a right of re-entry for its
breach, and the consequenctial remedial
right in equity to the remowal of the cloud
caused by the conveyance: Glocke v.
Glocke, 113 Wis. 303; 57 L. R. A. 458; Mash
V. Bloom, 130 Wis. 366; 118 Am. St. Rep.
1028; Cree v. Sherfy, 138 Ind. 354.
The artificial character of the reasons as-
signed by the Illinois and Wisconsin courts
is apparent, however desirable may be the
result attained. The majority of the courts,
on the other hand, state no definite reason
fo rtheir conclusion, being content, it would
seem, to rest their decisions upon the hard-
ship of the situation and the inadequacy
of the legal remedy by periodic suits for
damages. To the present writer, the silence
of these courts is more persuasive than the
labored reasoning of the Illinois or Wiscon-
sin courts. To attribute a fraudulent in-
tention to one who admittedly made his
promise in good faith simply contradicts the
basic fact of the case for the sake of reach-
ing a foregone conclusion; and to call a
mere oral promise accompanying a deed
a condition subsequent, and treat it as if
written with the deed is to violate element-
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ary rules of construction. It is better to
face the situation squarely, and admit that
we have here an equity that is sui generis,
one that it is difficult to find a place under
existing catagories and classifications, but
neverless a sound illustration of the in-
herent power of equity to extend its beni-
ficent jurisdiction to a novel state of fact.
Compelled by the multitude of decisions,
we must accept it (and without serious re-
grets) as an established rule of American
equity, that it has an independent jurisdic-
tion over aged persons as a class to protect
them from the results of rash and improvi-
dent contracts of this particular sort; and
may, if we like, find some analogy in the
time-honored jurisdiction to avoid the con-
tracts of expectant heirs (Pom. Eq. Jur.
Sec. 953) of sailors (Pom. Eq. Jur. Sec. 952),
and of other classes of persons who are
deemed to be exposed to peculiar tempta-
tion to improvidence. The appeal of the
over-trustful parent to a court of conscience
may well be considered as potent as that of
the extravagant heir.
The suggestion (Patton v. Nixon, 33 Oreg.
159) that the courtof equity; instead of rescind-
ing the transaction should enforce the gran-
tee's promise by giving the grantor a lien or
charge upon the land, has as yet, but little
following. The rule which it disregards,
viz., that no grantor's lien exists where the
demand is uncertain or unliquidated (3 Pom.
Eq. Jur. Sec. 1251, n. 1; Peters v. Turnell,
43 Minn. 473, 19 Am. St. Rep. 252) is itself
an arbitrary and unimportant exception. It
is true, therefore, that the Oregon holding
does violence to no cardinal principle, as
do the reasons assigned by the Illinois and
Wisconsin courts. If the contract calls for
the grantor's support only, it may secure ef-
fectively enough the performance of the con-
tract. But in the majority of the cases,
the oral contract provides that the grantor
shall retain a "home" on the premises con-
veyed, and this, of course, is to him the most
vital and essential feature of the contract.
Full justice, therefore, requires that he be
restored in specie to the possession and en-
joyment of that of which the grantor's breach
has deprived him. For this reason, it may
be doubted if the compromise view of the
Oregon court will ever obtain wide accept-
ance.
Re-hearing granted and decree for com-






I. Reputation is a mater of opinion.
II. Reputation being a matter of opinion,
a representation by a person that he has a
good reputation is not fraud, a misrepresen-
tation of fact being an essential element of
fraud.
III. If such could be construed as fraud
it is no defense in this case, for fraud with-
out damage is no defense.
ARGUMENT.
I. Reputation is a matter of opinion.
Webster's definition of reputation is, "The
character imputed to a person in a communi-
ty, society or public. The reputation of a
person is the estimate in which he is held
by the public in the place where he known."
Anderson's law dictionary says, "Reputa-
tion is the general opinion in the community,
not the declaration of a person as to a par-
ticular fact not of public nature."
II. Reputation being a matter of opinion
a representation by a person that he has a
a good reputation is not fraud, a mis repre-
sentation of fact being an essential element
of fraud.
"A misrepresentation to constitute fraud
must contain the following essentials ele-
ments: (1) Its form is a statement of fact
(2) Its purpose of inducing the other party
to act (3) Its untruth (4) The knowledge or
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belief of the party making it (5) The belief
trust and reliance of the one to whom it is
made, and (6 Its materiality."
II Pom. Eq. Jur. par 876.
Thus one of the essential elements of
fraud. There are two reasons for this rule
fraud is lacking. So the general rule is
opposite party has no right to rely on it.
that a mere expression of opinion is not
advanced by the courts. The first is, the
and having no right to rely on it, he cannot
be mislead by it, and not having been mis-
lead, one of the necessary elements of fraud
is lacking. This is a very logical and reas-
onable rule.
Puffing and trade talks, statements of
value, quality, title,credit, and the like are
regarded as expression of opinion, rather
than statement of fact. The reason given
by the courts why a party should not put too
much reliance on opinion is that, a party is
likely to puff liis wares, and the listener
knowing this should not be mislead. The
courts recognise this frailty of human na-
ture. The reason is much stronger where
a person makes a statement as to his own
reputation. A person is more likely to over-
estimate his reputation than he is his wares.
To hold a man strictly to the literal mean-
ing of his expression of opinion would open
a great field for fraud in law, instead of be-
ing a remedy. It would open litigation at
public expense and is against sound reason-
ing and the policy of the courts. It would
allow one to overthrow or get around his
contracts at will.
A recommendation is giving an opinion of
another. Lord v. Colley, 6 N. H. 99 25 Am.
Dec. 447, holds, recommendations are gener-
ally understood to be nothing mire than the
opinion of those who give them, resting up-
on common reputation an dthe apparent
circumstances of the individual recommend-
ed, and not upon a minute examination of his
affairs. A person giving his own reputa-
tion is likewise givng a matter of opinion.
Also in 27 Vt. 415, Jude v. Woodburn, it
was held that a statement by a person ask-
ing for credit, that he is safely to be trusted
is a mere opinion. Whether he is safely
to be trusted, and whether or not he has a
good reputation are analagous. Yet a repre-
sentation of reputation is clearly mere a
matter of opinion than a reputation that a
person can safely be trusted.
The second reason given by the courts for
the rule that a mere expression of opinion
is not fraud is, there is no adequate means
of proving opinion as expressed, was not
truly entertained, and it could scarcely be
said to be fraudulent if it is an honest opin-
ion.
To say whether or not it was an honest
opinion would be a matter of guess work
for the court, which courts intend to avoid.
In Bell V. Byerson, 11 Iowa 77 Am. Dec,
142, a case very analagous to our own, the
statements to defendant as to price of flour
fraud charged was, that plaintiff made false
at Iowa City, by representing that he had
come from certain mills in that place, and
the pirce named in the contract was the
market price in that city. Held that defend-
ant could have found out the facts and the
law will not interfer to protect the negligent.
This case goes further than is necessary to
sustain the compliments cause in the case
at bar.
Merely showing the statement false does
not prove fraud. As held in Hubbel v.
Meigh, 50 N. Y. 480, "Fraud is not estab-
lished by proving the falsity of the state-
ments, which were simply expressions of o-
pinion and belief founded upon information
derived from others." A person's own repu-
tation must necessarily be derived from oth-
ers. "The party alleging fraud must show
that he who made the statement knew them
to be fause at the time of making them.
Pulton v. Hood, 34 Pa. St. 365, 75 Am.
Dec. 664, holds a false affirmation of a mat-
ter resting on opinion or even on a fact
equally open to the knowledge or inquiry
MOOT COURT BULLETIN
of both parties, is available for any such
purpose (fraud).
The very idea is that reputation is a mat-
ter of common knowledge. Common knowl-
edge is a matter equally open to both par-
ties. Defendant, was negligent i snot find-
ing out and cannot invoke the aid of a court
of equity to aid him in his own negligence
or carelessness.
Fish v. May, 2 Bibb 44, 85 Am. Dec. 626.
is a case of disputed title to land. The de-
fendant represented that he had a better
title and that plaintiff had better compro-
mise, and plaintifl did so. This is a bill in
equity and plaintiff alleges fraud. Logan,
J. says "Fraud can never be mputed where
mere opinion calculations, and detuction,
shall constitute the essential grounds for
imputing it.
III. If such could be constructed as fraud
it is no defense in this case, for fraud with-
out damages is no defense.
II Pom. Eq. Jur., par. 898, "The last ele-
ment of misrepresentation in order that it
may be the ground for any relief affirmative
or defensive, in equity or law, is its materi-
ality. The statement of facts of which it
consists must not only be relied upon, as an
inducement to some action, but it munst also
be so material to the interests of the party,
thus relying and acting upon it that he is
pecuniarily prejudiced by its falsity, is plac-
ed in a worse position than he otherwise
would have been. The party must suffer
some pecuniary loss or injury as the nat-
ural consequences of the conduct induced
by the misrepresentation. Inshort the mis-
representation must be so material that its
falsity renders it unconsciencious in the per-
son making it to enforce the agreement or
the transaction which has caused. Fraud
without resulting pecuniary damage is not
a ground for the exercise of remedial jur-
isdiction, equitable or legal. Courts of jus-
tice do not act as mere tribunals of consci-
ence to enforce duties which are purely
moral."
The facts of the case at bar admit there
is no pecuniary loss resulting to the defend-
ant or to his neighbors if the contract is enn-
forced specifically. Thus an essential ele-
ment of fraud is lacking.
To the same affect as to the materiality
of a misrepresentation, in order that it may
constitute grounds for any relief whatever,
are the following authorities.
Bigelow,—Fraud, page 54.
Story,—Eq. Jur.—13th ed. par 203.
Pomeroy,—Spec. Perf, of Contracts, Sec.
227.
Bispham, Equity, par. 217.
We cite the following cases, to sustain
our general proposition, that courts of law
or equity, do not sit to judge the moral right
or wrong of a misrepresentation, where
there is no damage from such misrepresen-
tation.
Smith V. Richards—13 Peters 26 (US).
Hill V. Bush, 19 Ark 522.
Buckner v. Street, 15 Fed. 365.
Rogers v. Higgins, 57 111. 244.
Braham et al. v. Record, 42 Ind. 181.
Fellows V. Lord Gwyder, 1 Simmons 63,
1 Russ & M. 83.
Marsh v. Cook. 32 N. J. Eq. 262 at page
266.
Wuesthoff V. Seymour, 22 N. J. Eq. 66.
Marr's Appeal, 78 Pa St. 66.
Marrimer v. Dennison, 78 Cal. 202, at
216.
Hall V. Johnson, 2 N. W. 55, 41 Mich 286.
Morrison v.Lods, 39 Cal. 381.
Reay v. Butler, 69 Cal 572.
Britton v. Supreme Council. 46 N. J.








1. Equity may refuse specific perform-
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ance of a contract when it would not decree
recission or grant affirmative relief.
Pom. Eq. Jur. 1405 and note.
Malby vs. Thews 171 111. 264
Taylor vs. Merrill 55 111. 52 at 61.
Jackson vs. Ashton 11 Pet. 229 at 248.
Cadman vs. Horner 18 Ves. 11.
Fry Spec. Per. par. 650 page 304.
Pom. Spec. Per. par. 228.
2. Fraudulent misrepresentations is a de-
fense to a suit for specific performance.
Kelly vs. Kendall 118 111. 650.
Cowan vs. Curran 216 111. 605 at 622.
Smith vs. Richards 13 Pet. 26 at 37.
Kerr, Fraud and Mistake 358-9.
3. Misrepresentation such as will be a de-
fense to specific performance consists of:
a. A positive statement or representa-
tion.
b. Must he made for the purpose of
procuring a contract.
c. Must be untrue,
d. Party making it need not know of
its falsity nor intend to deceive.
e. The one to whom it is made must
believe and rely upon it.
f. It must have been material to the
contract.
Pom. Spec. Per. sec. 210-229.
Fry Spec. Per. sec. 697.
a. Pom. Spec. Per. 212 (Opinion vs
fact),
d. Pom. Spec. Per. 217 (Knowledge &
belief.)
Kelly vs. Cent. Pac. R. R. 74 Cal. 557.
Cadman vs. Horner 18 Ves. 10.
See Rogers vs. Mitchell 41 N. H. 154 at
158.
f. Fry Spec. Per. par 697 page 304.
Pom. Spec. Per. par 227.
Knatchbull vs. Grueber 1 :\Iadd. 153.
4. The Complainant must come into
Equity with clean hands: Any unjust, un-
fair, inequitable or unconscionable act of
the Complainant is sufficient for Equity to
refuse him aid.
11. Pom. Eq. Rem. par. 1308-1309.
Kelley vs. Cent. Pac. R. R. 74 Cal. 557.
5. A statement of reputation is a state-
ment of fact.
11. Pom. Eq. Jur. par. 878.
22 111. App. 180.
6. In 111. the duty is on the Complainant
to show that he is entitled to specific per-
formance; that damages at law are inade-
quate; that a decree of specific will not be
unjust toward the defendant.
82 111. 242 at 244.
140 111. 597 at 602.










The complainant contracted in writing
with the defendant to purchase the latter's
house for a residence, representing that he
was a person of good reputation. The de-
fendant, believing the plaintiff's representa-
tion, made no investigation into his past
history. Complainant had served a prison
sentence in another state, which fact com-
ing to the knowledge of the defendant, he
refused to convey, basing his refusal on the
complainant's fraud. It does not appear
that the defendant will suffer any pecuniary
injury if compelled to convey to the com-
plainant, but in view of an understanding
among the residents of the neighborhood,
that any person desiring to sell should sell
only to a person of good reputation, and the
fact that he has already suffered social
ostraction on account of accepting Anderson
as a purchaser, he refuses to comply with
his agreement, whereupon complainant
brings bill for specific performance.
Opinion by Pomeroy, J.
We have here presented the question
whether a misrepresentation inducing the
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contract but productive of no pecuniary in-
jury may be a defense to specific perform-
ance. The cases directly involving the
question are not numerous. In support of
the negative we have the statements of the
leading text writers: see Story Eq. Jur., Sec.
203; Fry Spec. Perf. (4th Eng. Ed.) Sec.
697; Pomeroy, Spec. Perf. Sec. 227; 2 Eq.
Jur, Sec. 898. In support of the affirmative
we have the views of Commissioner Hagne
in Kelly v. Central Pac. R. R. Co., 74 Cal.
557, and the decision by Baldwin, J. in Britt
V. Cooney. 75 Conn. 338. The facts of these
two cases are similar to those of the case
at bar. In each of them the vendor, relying
on the misrepresentation, sold to a person
with whom he would have refused to have
dealings if certain facts concerning that
person had been known to the vendor. B-*t
the authority of the Kelly case is weakened
by the fact that the decision is in part rest-
ed by the court upon another ground which
is indisputably sound. The learned commis-
sioner appears to assume that his view is
the prevailing rule, but the cases on which
he relies are found, on examination, to have
no bearing upon the question. The decision
in the Connecticut case is a strong one in
favor of the defendant in the present case,
since there the misrepresentation was not
set up by way of defense, but as the sole
ground for cancellation of an executed deed.
The scheming individual who sought to in-
trude upon the privacy of the fashionable
suburb in that case was not an ex-convict,
but a boarding house keeper in a college
town. Can we wonder at the white heat of
moral indignation that glows in the opinion
of the distinguished jurist? Unfortunately,
the court furnshes us with no authorities in
support of its decision, and takes no notice
of the statements countra of standard writ-
ers and of the cases on which they rely.
In this state of the authorities, we believe
that to adopt the defendant's contention
would be to yield to an innovation plausible,
perhaps, but unconvincing. If the rule in
its new form permits a purely social, emo-
tional, or sentimental detriment resulting
from the contract into which a party is en-
trapped to operate as a bar to its enford-
ement, how far shall that rule carry us?
Shall equity take cognizance of every whim
or fancy of the defendant, no matter how
unreasonable? If we apply the supposed
rule consistently, it is easy to see that it
may (without advancing much further that
the Cooney case) lead to absurd results;
if we do not apply it consistently when shall
we stop?
Decree for specific performance in accord-
ance with the paryer of the bill.
'S'ry,Kill™ ^^^^^ '•»'.. „,
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Opinion by Marker, J.
The defendant sold to the plaintiff four
hogs form a pasture where three or four
other hogs had recently sickened and died
from cholera. When sold the hogs appeared
to be healthy. Plaintiff had no knowledge
that they had been exposed to the disease
and placed them in a pasture with other
hogs. In a few days they sickened with
cholera and communicated the disease to
other of his hogs, fifty of them dying as a
result.
The defendant sold without a guarantee,
but he knew that the hogs had been in a
pasture with hogs that had died of cholera.
Clearly the proper action for the plaintiff
in this case is ex delicto. The substantial
loss to him was the fifty hogs lost by chol-
era contracted from the hogs purchased by
the plaintiff from the defendant. The real
question is whether the defendant is liable,
not because of a guarantee but because, at
the time he sold the four hogs to the plain-
tiff, he did not make known to him the fact
that they had been exposed to cholera.
Cholera is universally recognized as a con-
tagion disease. It is more often fatal than
any disease to which the hog is subject.
The facts in this case show a clear case
of fraud. True, there was no fraudulent rep-
resentation concerning the healthfulness of
the hogs sold, nor affirminative act by the
defendant for the purpose of throwing the
plaintiff off his guard; but fraud may consist
in the suppression of the truth as well as in
a false statement. The suppression of a fact
material to be known is equivalent to the
assertion of a falsehood.. Lockridffe vs.
Foster 4 Scam. 569; Aorston v. Ridgeway and
Anderson, 18 111. 38; Stewart V. Wyoming
Cattle Ranch Co., 128 U. S. 383.
These men were neighboring farmers. The
danger that would attend the placing of the
hogs sold with others of the plaintiff, the
defendant must have known. It is true that
the hogs sold did not have the appearance
of being afflicted at the time but they had
been running with hogs that had
died. Notwithstanding the fact that a num-
ber of his hogs that had been afflicted had
recovered it was the plain duty of the de-
fendant to disclose the fact that the hogs
sold had been exposed. That duty rested
upon him so as to enable the plaintiff to
exclude from his other hogs the ones pur-
chased until such time as would preclude all
danger of communication.
On principle the case is much like French
V. Vining, 102 Mass. 132. In that case the
defendant sold to the plaintiff hay to be fed
to the plaintiff's cow. The hay was un-
wholesome and poisonous because of paint
which had been dropped or sprinkled upon
it. The defendant knew that paint had been
upon a part of the hay and had made an
effort to separate that which had become
MOOT COURT BULLETIN
saturated and at the time of the sale, sup-
posed he had succeeded in separating from
the good all the contaminated hay.
He was in error however, and the hay sold
to the plaintiff contained such quanities of
the poisonous matter that after the plain-
tiff's cow had eaten it she sickened and died.
The court sustained a recovery because the
defendant did not disclose the fact that
paint had been upon the hay. In the Su-
preme Court it was urged as error that the
trial court held that if the cow died in con-
sequence of eating the paint adhering to the
hay sold the plaintiff might recover although
the defendant did not know or believe there
was paint upon the hay. In apporving the
holding of the trial court, thet Supreme court
used the following language: "Deceit may
sometimes take a negative form and there
may be circumstances in which silence
would have all the legal characteristics of
actual misrepresentation." * * * * *
"If he the defendant, knew that the hay
had a defect about it or had met with an
accident that rendered it unsuitable for that
use, and dangerous or poisonous, it would
plainly be a violation of good faith and an
illegal act to sell it to plaintiff without dis-
closing its condition.'
To prevent the spread of contagious and in-
fections diseases among hogs the Illinois
legislature in 1895 passed an act which makes
it the duty of the owner of hogs having know-
ledge of, or reasonable grounds to suspect
the existence of hog cholera, or any con-
tagious or infection disease, among his
hogs, to use all reasonable means to pre-
vent the spread of the disease. The act
further provides that a person convicted
for a violation of the act shall be fined and
shall also be held liable in damages to
any person suffering loss on account of such
violation.
The defendant was guilty of a flagrant vio-
lation of the statute. Instead of using "all
reasonable means to prevent the spread of
the disease," he did a firmative act conduct-
ive to its spread. The plaintiff has suffer-
ed damages because of such violat on and
the defendant is liable for all loss occassion-
ed by his wrongful act, liable under the
statute as well as at common law. The
judgment will be for $700.00 the value of the




Petition for Habeas Corpus
1. The jury which tried the prisoner was
illegal and unconstitutional.
Art. 2, Sec. 5, 111. Const. 18
George v. People. 167 111. 447.
Gage V. Ewing, '07 111. '1.
B. At common law the jury must be com-
posed of males. Men is not used in the gen-
eric sense.
3. Bl. Com. 362.
Harland v. Territory, 13. Pac. 453
C. In Illinois a woman cannot serve as
juror under Ch. 78, Sec.
Hurds Revised Statutes, because he is
not a legal voter.
N. Chicago R. R. Co. v. Mossman.
82 111 A. 172.
2. No statute can give women right to
serve on jury, either expressly or by impli-
cation, because it would be unconstitutional.
II. Since the jury was illegal and uncon-
stitutional, if this was the only fatal error
in the proceedings, habeas corpus should be
allowed because the petitioner has no other
adequate remedy to gain his freedom.
A. Appeal does not lie since case has
been dismissed in the upper court for want
of prosecution.
B. Certiorari is inadequate for it will only
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lie where there has not been negligence in
prosecution of appeal.
Gibson v. Ackerman, 70 111. A. '99.
Chapman v. Kane, 97 111 A. 567.
C. Paymeint of fine may be impossible,
and in any case would acknowledge that
the proceedings under which he was tried
are legal.
D. City did have an adequate remedy
by satisfaction of the judgment on the appeal
bond.
III. This is more than a reversable error.
This trial by jury unknown to the law and
unsanctioned by it made the court an illegal-
ly constituted court.
A. The term court in its general and en-
larged sense, comprehends within its pur-
port both the judge and the jury.
70 N. Y. Supplemene 744.
2 111.
12 A. M. Dec. 665.
People V. Molineaux 2 Yeag 96 at 104.
Gold V. CVermount.
B. Wlien a court having jurisdiction of
the prisoner denies to him a constitutional
right or immunity, its purisdiction ceases,
and a judgment rendered in the case may
be attacked on habeas corpus.
8 Wyo. '92.
131 U. S. 176.
C. Under no circumstances could this
jury of women render a verdict which the
law can respect. In Illinois, in a criminal
case, the jury is judge of the law as well
as the facts. Since this tribunal is abso-
lutelj'^ incompetent, its judgment is void.
IV. Judgment rendered by an illegally
constituted court is void and habeas corpus
lies.
People V. Whitson, 74 111. 20.
People V. Murphy, 222 111. 493 Dictum.
A. This is not a waiver of trial by jury.
B. No real reason on principle why dis-
tinction should be made, as regards right
to trial by jury, in case of a felony and in
case of a misdemeanor,
C. A grand jury empanneled by a court
having no authority to do so is illegally con-
stituted and judgment rendered in trial by
indictment returned by them is void and
habeas corpus lies.
Ex Parte Farley, 40 Fed. 66.
D. Where defendant was convicted of
jury of eleven men, it was held to be void





BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS.
1. It will be presumed that the persons
selected as jurors are qualified and the bur-
den of proving a disqualification is upon the
party alleging it.
State V. Weaver 58 S. C. 106.
San Antonio R. R. v. Lester 84 S. W. 404.
2. A jury composed of women is legal and
constitutional.
Hurds Revised Stat. Chapt. 78 Sec. 1
and 2.
Hurds Revised Stat. Chapt. 79 sec. 48.
Illinois Court 1870 Art. II. Sec. 5.
3. Assuming for the sake of argument
that the jury was wrongfully arrayed, this
fact alone did not constitute an illegal court;
nor render the judgment void.
Kavanaugh v. Hamilton 30 Colo. 157.
People V. McRelvey 74 Pac 533-534.
4. Petitioner had other adequate remedy
which precludes him from resorting to the
remedy of Habeas Corpus.
(a) Any objections to a writ of certi-
orari are addressed to the sound discretion
of the court, and will be awarded or refused
according to whether it will promote the
ends of justice or not.
(b) There are two classes of cases in
which common law certiorari will lie.
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1. Where it is shown that the inferi-
or court or jurisdiction has exceeded its
jurisdiction.
3. Where it is shown that the inferi-
or court has proceeded illegally, and no ap-
peal or writ of error will lie.
Hyslop V. Finch. 99 111. 171.
5. A judgment erroneous but not void
is no ground for a writ of Habeas Corpus.
People V. Allen 160 111. 400.
6. Habeas Corpus does not lie to reach
errors of law in proceedings, resulting in
conviction, which are properly reviewable
by a writ of error.
People V. Allen 160 111. 400.
People V. Murphy 202 111. 493.
7. A writ of Habeas Corpus will not op-
erate as a writ of error, and cannot be used
to review a judgment entered by a court
which had jurisdiction of the person and the
subject matter of a suit, where the judg-
ment was rendered.
People V. Zimmer 252 111. 9.
Ex Parte John, S. Smith 117 111. 63.
8. No person shall be discharged by vir-
tue of the writ of Habeas Corpus if he is in
custody by virtue of a final judgment or
decree of any competent court of civil or
criminal jurisdiction, or of any execution
issued upon such judgement or decree, un-
less the time during which such party may
be legally detained has expired.
2 Starr and Curt. Stat. 1896 page 2104.
203 111. 99.
9. To allow petitioner after having pros-
ecuted a valid and adequate remedy, and
having thrown aside his prerogative to con-
tinue that remedy and later to assert the
same right by a writ of Habeas Corpus, is
contrar-y to all ideas of procedural justice
and sound policy.





The People, ex rel Adam Smith
vs.
Walter Pete and Henry Bates
Opinion by Harker, P. J.
The petitioner seeks by habeas corpus his
discharge from custody by virtue of an exe-
cution against the body which issued from a
judgment of conviction for violating an or-
dinance of the city of Zeigler.
Smith was charged with assault and bat-
tery upon a woman, and was tried before a
police magistrate by a jury composed of
women. He was found guilty and a fine of
$100 assessed against him. From the judg-
ment of conviction he prosecuted an appeal
to the circuit court, but the appeal was sub-
sequently dismissed by the circuit court for
want of prosecution with an order for
procedendo to the police court at Zeigler.
Soon after a writ of capias ad satisfaciendum
issued and under it Walter Pete, city con-
stable, took Smith into custody and deliver-
ed him to Henry Bates, the keeper of the
county jail, to hold until the judgment
should be satisfied.
A discharge is sought by habeas corpus up-
the ground that the judgment of conviction
is void, it being based upon a verdict render-
ed by persons not competent to sit as jur-
ors. Two questions are presented—1. Are
women legally competent to serve as jurors
in Illinois? 2. Is the petitioner entitled to
a discharge by the habeas corpus route, if it
be hold that women are not competent to
serve as jurors?
I have not experienced much difficulty in
reaching a conclusion on the first question.
Section 5, Article 2, of our State Constitn-
tion reads, "The right of trial by jury as
heretofore enjoyed, shall remain inviolate;
but the trial of civil cases before justices of
the peace by a jury of less than twelve men
may be authorized by law." In construing
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this provision, our Supreme Court has re-
peatedly held that the right guaranteed was
trial by jury as that existed at common law.
Jones V. Fortune, 128 111. 518.
Parmelee v. Price, 208 111. 544.
Turner v. Brenckle, 249 111. 394.
People V. Rodenberg, 254 111. 386.
Women were not eligible to jury service
at common law. Furthermore, it is evident
that the framers of the constitution had no
intention of vesting in the legislature the
power to make women competent to serve
as jurors; because in the last clause, where
the power is given to provide in a certain
class of cases for a less number of jurors
than that known at common law, the word
"men" is specifically used. In this case six
jurors were used, the authority vested in the
legislature having been exercised; but in
the selection of the individuals the court,
as to kind, went beyond authority of consti-
tution and of legislation, given or attempted.
If the legislature should pass a bill express-
ly making women competent to serve as
jurors the act would in my opinion be un-
constitutional. The jury that tried Smith
was not a legal jury and the judgment en-
tered upon its verdict was erroneous.
Whether the validity of a judgment of con-
viction may be tested by habeas corpus de-
pends upon whether the court had juris-
diction of the defendant's person and juris-
diction of the subject matter. As I under-
stand the Habeas Corpus Act and the con-
struction which our Supreme Court has
placed upon its various provisions, a con-
victed defendant may not secure his dis-
charge thru it, however irregular and
illegal the proceedings which resulted in his
conviction, unless it appear that the court
was without jurisdiction of his person or of
the offense charged against him.
Section 21 of the Habeas Corpus Act pro-
vides that no person shall be discharged
under it, if in custody "By virtue of a final
judgment or decree of any competent court
of civil or criminal jurisdiction, or of any
execution issued upon such judgment or
decree, unless the time during which such
party may be legally detained has expired."
Section 22 reads, "If it appear that the pris-
oner is in custody by virtue of process from
any court legally constituted, he can be dis-
charged only for some of the following
causes:
1. Where the court has exceeded the
limit of its jurisdiction, either as to matter,
place, sum or person.
2. Where, though the original imprison-
ment was unlawful, yet, by some act, omis-
sion, or event which has subsequently tak-
en place, the party has become entitled to
his discharge.
3. Where the process is defective in
some substantial form required by law.
4. Where the process, though in proper
form, has been issued in a case or under
circumstances where the law does not allow
process or orders for imprisonment or ar-
rest to issue.
5. Where, although in proper form, the
process has been issued or executed by a
person, either unauthorized to issue or exe-
cute the same, or where the person having
the custody of the prisoner under such pro-
cess is not the person empowered by law
to detain him.
6. Where the process appears to have
been obtained by false pretense or bribery.
7. Where there is no general law, nor
any judgment, order or decree of a court to
authorize the process if in a civil suit, nor
any conviction if in a criminal proceeding.
No court or judge, on the return of a habeas
corpus, shall, in any other matter, inquire
into the legality or justice of a judgment or
decree of a court legally constituted."
If a petitioner, in custody under order of
a court does not bring himself within some
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of the provisions above named, no other
court has the power to discharge him.
People V. Foster, 104 111. 156.
In the case cited the petitioner who had
been committed to the county jail in default
of payment of certain fines assessed against
her sought discharge by habeas corpus in
the Supreme Court on the ground that the
circuit court had erroneously refused to dis-
charge her under a certain section of the
Crin^inal Code. In passing upon the power
to review the action of the circuit court on
habeas corpus, Justice Mulkey, speaking for
the Supreme Court, said, "To allow this ap-
plication would be simply to review, upon
habeas corpus, the decision of that court, for
the purpose of correcting merely an alleged
error, which we are not permitted to do. It
is, therefore, unimportant to,inquire whether
the ruling of the circuit court in rejecting
petitioner's evidence was proper or improp-
er; for, conceding it was erroneous, this is
not a proceeding in which we are authorized
to correct it. It is clear that the court had
jurisdiction both of the subject matter of
the suit and of the parties before it, and
hence the order in the case, however erron-
eous, can not be set aside or reversed on an
application of this kind. In this proceeding
we can only act when the court has acted
without or exceeded its jurisdiction."
The doctrine there announced has been
reaffirmed in: Ex parte Smith, 117 111. 13;
People V. Allen, 160 111. 400; People v. Jonas,
173 111. 316; People v. Murphy, 212 111. 584;
People V. Superior Court, 234 111. 186; Peo-
ple V. Zimmer.
In People v. Jonas, the petitioner had been
convicted before a justice of the peace and
committed to the county jail because of his
refusal to pay the fine imposed,—in that re-
spect like the case at bar. He claimed the
act under which he had been convicted was
unconstitutional. His writ was to the Su-
preme Court direct. In holding that it would
not lie it was pointed out that the justice of
the peace had jurisdiction to hear the case
and render judgment against the petition-
er, that in doing so he had full authority
and jurisdiction to decide all questions in-
volved in the case, including the constitu-
tionality of the statute. The learned judge
who delivered the opinion used the follow-
ing language: "The fact that the court was
an inferior one, and that its decision of a
constitutional question might not be of
great authority as a precedent, does not
change the case in any degree. The pe-
titoner could have appealed from the judg-
ment of the justice and have had a trial
de novo in a proper court of record, in
which trial he could, if he chose, by pre-
senting propositions of law, have preserved
for review in a still higher court the con-
stitutionality of the law under which the
judgment was rendered. The statute above
quoted was evidently framed to meet just
such a case as is here presentes. The ef-
fect of granting writs in cases of this kind
would be to allow defendants In all convic-
tions under ordiaces or statutes the validity
of which might be questioned, to come di-
rectly to this court by a proceeding in
habeas corpus instead of appealing or pros-
ecuting writs of error, as the law contem-
plates. Such a practice contravenes the
statute, and is not to be permitted. In this
case the remedy by appeal was complete,
and the writ of habeas corpus is denied."
In the most recent of the cited cases.
People vs. Zimmer, supra, Justice Hand
stated the doctrine concisely as follows:
"It has never been the office of the writ of
habeas corpus to operate as a writ of re-
view, and we take it that no well consider-
ed case can be found where it has been
held that the writ may properly be used
to review the judgment of a court where
the judgment sought to be reviev,'ed had
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been rendered by a court which had juris- nances; he had jurisdiction of the petition-
diction of the person and subject matter of er's person, and, although he erroneously
the suit in which the judgment had been asumed that a jury of women might try the
rendered." case and rendered judgment upon a verdict,
The police magistrate of the city of habeas corpus will not lie to test the val-
Zeigler had jurisdiction to try a case for idity of the proceedings,
personal assault in violation of city ordi- Petitioner remanded.
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